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ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



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Conjecture with probability that body does exist; but this is only with probabilities, and although I examine all things with care, I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature, which I have in my imagination, I can derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body. (HRI: 187)

And because the ideas which I receive through the senses were much more lively, more clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct than any of those which I could of myself frame in meditation. (HRI: 188)

I term that clear which is present and appresent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within it self nothing but what is clear (HRI: 237) and de re modalities and possibilities which belong to a thing independently of how the thing happens to be picked out or characterized." (Williams 1978: 115)

And more than that, I do not even know that I have a body, since you have shown me that I might doubt as it. (HRI: 319)

And indeed the very term feign in imagination proves to me my error . . .

(HR I: 152)

Observing that there is nothing at all in the statement I am thinking, therefore I exist, I judged that I could take it as a general rule that whatever we conceive very clearly and very distinctly is true.

(Kenny 1968: 63)

I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be some. What, and remarking that this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.

(HRI: 101)

While we thus reject all that of which we can possibly doubt, and feign that it is false, it is easy to suppose that there is no God, nor heaven, nor bodies, and that we possess neither hands, nor feet, nor in deed any body; but we cannot in the same way conceive that we who doubt these things are not; for there is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not at the same time as it thinks, exist. And hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain of all that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.

(HRI: 221)

He who says, "I think, hence I am, or exist, does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but by a simple act of mental vision, recognises it as if it were a thing that is known per se. This is evident from the fact that if it were syllogistically deduced, the major premise, that everything that thinks is, or exists, would have

to be known previously; but yet that has rather been learned from the experience of the individual-that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars.

(HRII: 38)

But what then am I? A thinking thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.

(HRI: 153)

By the word thought I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thought.

(HRI: 222)

. . . you will surely admit that you are less assured of the present of the objects you see than of the truth of the proposition "I think therefore I am"? Now this knowledge is no product of your reasoning, no lesson that your masters have thought you; it is something that your mind sees, feels, handles.

(Kenny 1968: 53)

By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the sense, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of

reason alone; it is more certain than deduction it self, in that it is simpler, though deduction, as we have noted above, can not by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks, that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single superficies, and soon.

(HRI: 7)

I myself, am I not at least something? But I have already denied that I had senses and body. Yet I hesitate, or what follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and senses that I cannot exist without these? But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven no earth, that there was no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something (or merely because I thought of something). But there is some deceiver of other, very powerful and very cunning who ever employs his ingenuity is deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceives me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition. I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.

(HRI: 150)

When you say that I could have inferred the same conclusion from any of my other actions, you wander far from the truth, because there is none of my activities of which I am wholly certain (in the sense of having metaphysical certitude, which alone is here involved),

save thinking alone. For example you have no right to make the inference: I walk hence exist except in so far as our awareness of walking is a thought; it is of this alone that the inference holds good, not of the motion of the body, which sometime does not exist, as in dreams, when nevertheless I appear to walk. Hence from the fact that I think that I walk I can very well infer the existence of the mind which so thinks, but not that of the body which walks. So it is also in all other cases.

(HRII: 207)

. . . And in fact if I did not think, I could not know whether I doubt or exist. Yet I am, and I know that I am, and I know it because I doubt, that is to say because I think. And better, it might be that if I ceased for an instant to think I should cease at the same time to be like wise the sole thing that I cannot separate from me, that I know certainty to be me and that I can now affirm without fear of deception that one thing, I repeat, is that I am a thinking thing.

(HRI: 322)

But what then am I? A thinking thing. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, (conceives), affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.

Certainly it is not small matter if all these things pertain to my nature. But why should they not so pertain? Am I not that being who now doubts nearly everything, who nevertheless understands certain things, who affirm that one only is true, who denies all the others, who desires to know more, is averse from being deceived who imagines many things, sometime indeed despite his will, and who perceives many like wise, as by the intervention of the bodily organs? Is there nothing in all this which is as true as it is

certain that I exist even though I should always sleep and though he who has given me being employed all his ingenuity in deceiving me? Is there like wise any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thought, or which might be said to be separated from myself? For it is so evident of itself that it is I who doubts, who understands, and who, desires, that there is no reason here to add any thing to explain it. And I have certainly the power of imagining likewise; for although it may happen (as I formerly supposed) that none of the things which I imagines are true, nevertheless this power of imagining does not cease to be really in use, and it forms part of my thought.

(HRI: 153)

I do not now admit anything which is not necessarily true: to speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks that is to say a mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a reason which are terms whose significance was for merely unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing which thinks. . . . I am not a collection of members which we call the human body.

(HRI: 152)

Everything in which there besides immediately, as in a subject, or by mean of which there exists anything that we perceive, ie. any property, quality, or attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a substance; neither do we have any other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of our ideas, exists formally or eminently. For by means of our natural light we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing.

(HRII: 53)

But now I must explain how it is that, from the mere fact that I apprehend one substance clearly and distinctly apart from another, I am sure that the one excludes the other.

Really the notion of substance is just this-that which can exist itself, without the aid of any other substance. No one who perceives two substances by means of two diverse concepts ever doubts that they are really distinct.

(HRII: 101)

And first of all, because I know that all things which I apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God. I apprehend them, it suffices that I am able to apprehend one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, since they may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotent of God, and it does not signify by what power this separation is made in order to compel me to judge them to be different: and, therefore, just because I know certainly that I exist, and that mean while I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing (or substance whose whole essence of nature is to think).

(HRI: 190)

For all the modes of thinking that we observed in ourselves may be related to two general modes, the one of which consists in perception, or in the operation of the understanding, and the other in volition, or the operation of the will. Thus sense-perception, imagining and conceiving things that are purely intelligible, are just different methods of perceiving; but desiring, holding in

aversion, affirming, denying, doubting, all these are the different modes of willing

(HRI: 233)

I do not here explain various other terms of which I have availed myself or will after wards avail myself, because they seem to me perfectly clear of themselves. And I have often noticed that Philosophy err in trying to explain by definitions logically constructed, things which were perfectly simple in themselves; they thereby render them beet more obscure. And when I stated that this proposition I think, there fore I am is the first and most certain which present itself to those who philosophise in orderly fasion, I did not for all that deny that we must first of all know what is knowledge, what is existance, and what is certainty, and that in order to think we must be, and such like: best because these are notions of the simplest possible kind, which of themselves give us no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think them worthy of being put on record.

(HRI: 222)

Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc. . . .; and when my body has need of drink or food, I should clearly understand the fact without being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst. For all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind and body

(HRI: 192)

Finally . . . , we must think that power by which we are properly said to know things, is purely spiritual, and not less distinct from every part of the body than blood from bone, or hand from eye. It is a single agency, whether it receives impressions from the common sense. Simultaneously with the fancy, or applies it self to those that are perceived in the memory, or forms new ones. Often the imagination is so beset by these impressions that it is unable at the same time to receive the idea from the common sense, or to transfer to the motor mechanism in the way befitting its purely corporeal character.

(HRI: 38-39)

And it is only in the repugnance which exist between the movements which the body by its animal spirits, and the soul by it will, tend to excite in the gland at the same time, that all the strife which we are in the habit of conceiving to exist between the inferior part of the soul, which we call the senseuous, and the superior which is rational, or as we may say, between the natural appetites and the will consists. For there is within us but one soul, and this soul has not in itself any diversity of parts; the same part that is subject to sense impressions is rational, and all the soul's appetites are acts of will.

(HRI: 353)

Finally, the fact that the power of thinking is asleep in infants and in maniacs-though not indeed extinct, yet trouble-should not make us believe that it is conjoined with the corporeal organs in such a way as to incapable of existing apart from them. The fact that our thought is often in our experience impeded by them, does not allow us to infer that it is produced by them; for this there is not even



the slightest proof.

(HRII: 103)

I have often also shown distinctly that mind can act independently of the brain; for certainly the brain can be of no use in pure thought: its only use is for imagining and perceiving. And although, when imagination or sensation is intense (as occurs when the brain is troubled or disturbed), the mind does not readily find room for thinking of other matters, yet we experience the fact that, when imagination is not so strong we often understand something diversly from it: for example, when we sleep we perceive that we are dreaming, while we having the dream we must employ the imagination; yet our awareness of the fact that we are dreaming is an act of the intellect alone

(HRII: 213)

I shall nevertheless make an effort and follow anew the same path as that on which I yesterday enter . . . and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain. Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it else where, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable.

(HRI: 149)

As regards these matters which we consider as being things or modes of things, it is necessary that we should examine them here one by one. By substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing

which so, exists that it need no other thing in order to exist.

(HRI: 239)

So if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, then something will follow, to wit that I am; and if I judge that my imagination, or some other cause, whatever it is, persuades me that the wax exists, I shall still conclude the same. And what I have hear remarked of wax may be applied to all other things which are external to me And futher, if the notion or perception of wax has seemed to me cleas and more distinct, not only after the sight or the touch, but also after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me, with how much more (evidence) and distinctness must it be said that now know myself since all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax, or any other body, are yet better proofs of the nature of mind.

(HRI: 156-7)

But in order to understand how the knowledge which we posses of our mind not only precedes that which we have our body, but is also more evident, it must be observed that it is very manifest by the natural light which is in our souls, that no qualities or proporties pertain to nothing; and that where some are perceived there must necessarily be something or substance on which they depend. And the same light shows us that we know a thing or substance so much the better the more properties we observe in it. And we certainly observe many more qualities in our mind than in any other thing, in as much as there is nothing that excites us to knowledge of whatever kind, which does not even much more certainly compel us to conciousness of our thought, to take an example, if I persuade myself that there is an earth because I touch or see it, by that very same fact, and by a yet

stronger reason, I should be persuaded that my thought exists, because it may be that I think I touch the earth even though there is possibly no earth existing at all, but it is not impossible that I who form this judgement and my mind which judges thus, should be none-existent; and so in other cases.

(HRI: 223)

Let us begin by considering the commonest matters, those which we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the bodies which we touch and see; not indeed bodies in general, for these general ideas are ususally a little more confused, but let us consider one body in particular. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax: it has been taken quite freshly from the hive, and it has not yet lost sweetness of the honey which it contains, it still retains some what of the oder of the flowers from which it has been called, its color; its figure; its size are apparent; it is hard, cold easily handled, and if you strike it with the finger, it will emit a sound. Finally all the thing which are requisite to cause us distinctly to recognise a body, are met with in it. But notice that while I speak and approach the fire what remained of the taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates, the colors alters the figure is destroyed, the size increases, it becomes liquid, it heats, scarcely can one handle it, and when one strikes it, no sound is emitted. Does the same wax remain after this change? We must confess that it remains; none would judge otherwise, what then did I know so distinctly in this piece of wax? It could certainly be nothing of all that the senses brought to my notice, since all these things which fall undertaste, smell sight, touch, and nearing, are found to be changed, and yet the same wax remains.

(HRI: 154)

Further, the faculty of imagination which I possess, and of which, experience tell me, I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of material things, is capable of persuading me of their existence; for when I attentively consider what imagination is I find that it is nothing but a certain application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is immediately present to it, and which therefore exists.

(HRI: 185)

And yet I have learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they sometime seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated, which made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me, even though I felt pain in it.

(HRI: 189)

I have nevertheless made use of no principle which has not been approved by Aristotle and by all the other philosophers of every-time for I have only considered the figure, motion and magnitude of each body and examined what must follow from their mutual concourse according to the laws of mechanics, confirmed as they are by certain and daily experience. But no one ever doubted that bodies were mixed and have diverse magnitudes and figures, according to the diversity of which their motions also vary, and that from mutual collision those that are larger are divided into many smaller, and thus change their figure. We have experience of this not alone by one single sense, but by several, eg. by touch, sight and hearing; we also distinctly imagine and understand this. This cannot be said of other things that come under our senses, such as colours, sounds, and the like, which are perceived not by means of several senses, but by single

one; for their images are always confused in our minds, nor do we know what they are.

(HRI: 296-7)

By the objective reality of an idea I mean that in respect of which the thing represented in the idea is an entity, in so far as that exists in the, idea; . . . For whatever we perceive as being as it were in the objects of our ideas, exists in the ideas themselves objectively.

(HRII: 52)

Idea is a word by which I understand the form of any thought, that form by the immediate awareness of which I am conscious of that said thought.

(HRII: 52)

Now I have written somewhere an idea is the thing thought of itself, in so far as it is objectively in the understanding. But these words he evidently prefers to understand in a sense quite different from that in which I use them, meaning to furnish me with an opportunity of explaining them more clearly. "Objective existence in the mind is; he say, the determination of the act of mind by a modification due to an object, which is merely an extrinsic appellation and nothing belonging to the object, etc. Now, here it must be noticed first by that he refers to the thing itself, which is as it were placed outside the understanding and respecting which it is certainly an extrinsic attribute to be objectively in the understanding, and secondly, that of what I speak of is the idea, which have no time exists outside the mind, and in the case of which "objective existence" is indistinguishable from being in the understanding in that way in which objects are wanted to be there. Thus, for example, if someone asks what feature in the sun's existence it is to exist in my mind, it will be quite right to reply that this is a

merely extrinsic attribute which affects it, and to wit, one which determines an operation of the mind in the mode due to the object. But if the question be, what the idea of the sun is, and the reply is given, that it is the object thought of in so far as that exists objectively in the understanding, He will not understand that it is the sun itself, in so far as that extrinsic attribute is in it; neither will objective existence in the understanding here signify that the minds. Operation is here determined in the mode due to the object, but that it is in the mind in the way in which object are want to exist there. Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively is, in the way objects are want to exist in the mind.

(HRII: 9-10)

I find, for example, two completely diverse ideas of the sun in my mind; the one derieves its origin from the senses, and should be placed in the category of adventitious ideas; according to this idea the sun seems to be extremely smalls but the other is derived from astronomical reasonings, i.e. is elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else it is formed by me in other manner; in accordance with it the sun appears to be several times greater than the earth. These two ideas cannot, indeed, both resemble the same sun, and reason makes me believe that the one which seem to have originated directly from the sun itself, is the one which is most dissimilar to it.

(HRI: 161)

And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects, I do not recognise in them any thing so great or so excellent that they might not have possibly proceeded from myself; for if I consider them more closely, and examine them individually, as I yesterday examined the idea of wax, I find that there is very little in them which I perceive clearly and distinctly. Magnitude or extension in height, breadth, or depth, I do so perceive, also figure which results from a termination of this extension the situation which bodies of different figure preserve in relation to one another, and movement or change of situation; to which we may also add substance duration and number

(HRI: 164)

In this way we shall ascertain that the nature of matter or of body in its universal aspect, does not consist in its being hard, or heavy, or coloured, or one that affects our senses in some other way, but solely in the fact that it is a substance extended in length, breadth and depth

(HRI: 255-256)

As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of corporeal things, some of them seem as though I might have derived them from the idea which I possess of myself, as those which I have of substance, duration, number, and such like.

(HRI: 165)

There is therefore but one matter in the whole universe, and we know this by the simple fact of its being extended. All the properties which we clearly perceive in it may be reduced to the one, viz. that it can be divided, or moved according to its parts, and consequently is capable of all these affections which we perceive can

arise from the motion of its parts. For its partition by thought alone makes no difference to it; but all the variation in matter, or diversity in its forms, depends on motion. This the philosophers have doubtless observed, in as much as they have said that nature was the principle of motion and rest, and by nature they understood that by which all corporeal things become such as they are experienced to be.

(HRI: 265)

. . . hence we must conclude that there is an object extended in length, breadth, and depth, and possessing all those properties which we clearly perceive to pertain to extended objects. And this extended object is called us either body or matter

(HRI: 255)

And in the same way, when I feel pain in my foot, my knowledge of physics teaches me that this sensation is communicated by means of nerves dispersed through the foot, which, being extended like cords from there to the brain, when they are contracted in the foot, at the same time contract the in most portions of the brain which is their extremity and place of origin, and then excite a certain movement which nature has established in order to cause the mind to be affected by a sensation of pain represented as existing in the foot.

(HRI: 196-197)

For when I think that a stone is a substance, or at least a thing capable of existing of itself, and that I am a substance also, although I conceive that I am a thing that thinks and not one that is extended, and that the stone on the other hand is an extended thing which does not think, But as to all the other qualities of

which the ideas of corporeal things are composed, to wit, extension, figure, situation and motion, it is true that they are not formally in me, since I am only a thing that thinks; but because they are merely certain modes of substance . . .

(HRI: 165)

For it becomes greater when the wax is melted, greater when it is boiled, and greater still when the heat increases; and I should not conceive (clearly) according to truth what wax is, if I did not think that even this piece that we are considering is capable of receiving more variations in extension than I have ever imagined. We must then grant that I could not even understand through the imagination what this piece of wax, is, and that it is my mind alone which perceives it. I say this piece of wax in particular, for as to wax in general it is yet clearer. But what is this peice of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the (understanding or) mind? It is certainly the same that I see, touch imagine, and finally it is the same which I have always believed it to be from the beginning. But what must particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an intuition of the mind, which may be imperfect and confused as it was formerly, or clear and distinct as it is at present, according as my attension is more or less directed to the elements which are found in it, and of which it is composed.

(HRI: 155)

Here it must be noted that though the rule, what ever we can conceive clearly exist; is mine, and true, so long as the question concerns a clear and distinct concept, in which is contained the possi-

bility of the thing to be realised, (because God can bring into being everything which we clearly perceive to be possible), nevertheless we must not make rash use of it. A man might quite easily imagine that he rightly understood something which in reality he did not understand, being utterly blinded by some sort of prejudice.

(HRI: 437-438)

The union of soul and body is a basic unanalysable notion: three basic ideas in this connection that of the soul that of the body, and that of the union between them.

(Williams 1978: 282)

I showed, too, that it is not sufficient that it should be lodged in the human body like a pilot in his ship . . . but that it is necessary that it should also be joined and unite more closely to the body in order to have sensations and appetites.

(HRI: 118)

We must know, therefore, that although the mind of man informs the whole body, it yet has its principal seat in the brain, and it is there that it not only understands and imagines, but also perceives; and this by means of the nerves which are extended like filaments from the brain to all the other members, with which they are so connected that we can hardly touch any part of the human body without causing the extremities of some of the nerves spread over it to be moved, and this motion passes to the other extremities of those nerves which are collected in the brain round the seat of the soul,

(HRI: 289)

1. Some of my thoughts, namely, my ideas, are like images or like-nesses of things in that they represent things external to me as having certain characteristics. (AT VII, 37; HR I, 159)

2. Some of the objects of my ideas are represented as having more formal reality, that is, more being of perfection, than others are represented as having. (AT VII, 40; HR I, 162)

3. Whatever exists must have an efficient and total cause which possesses at least as much formal reality as the effect does. (AT VII, 40; HR I, 162)

4. Every idea must have a first and principal cause which possesses at least as much formal reality as the idea represents its object as having. (AT VII, 41-42; HR I, 162-163)

5. I have an idea of God as an actually infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful substance by whom I (and anything else which may exist) have been created. (AT VII, 40, 45; AT IX, 32, 35-36; HR I, 162, 165)

6. I myself do not actually have all the perfections which my idea of God represents God as actually having (AT VII, 45; HR I, 166)

7. I am not the first and principal cause of my idea of God.

8. The first and principal cause of my idea of God is some being other than myself who possesses at least as much formal reality as my idea of God represents God as having.

9. God exists. (Williams 1978: 125-126)

1. I exist as a thinking thing, or substance, and possess an idea of God as a supremely perfect being. (AT VII, 48; HR I, 167)
2. Whatever exists has a cause possessing at least as much formal reality as the effect does. (AT VII, 49; HR I, 169)
3. The cause of my existence is either myself, of God, or some other being or beings less perfect than God. (AT VII, 48; HR I, 167)
4. Whatever causes its own existence can acquire any perfection it conceives. (AT VII, 48, 166; HR I, 168, II, 56-57)
5. Whatever conceives a perfection it can acquire, does acquire that perfection. (AT VII, 48, 166; HR I, 168, II, 56)
6. I conceive of perfections, such as knowledge, which, insofar as I doubt, I do not have. (AT VII, 48; HR I, 168)
7. I am not the cause of my existence.
8. If the cause of my existence is some being (or beings) other than God, it (or they) must also be a thinking thing, possessing the idea of all the perfections I attribute to God. (AT VII, 49; HR I, 169)
9. If a thinking thing possessing the idea of all the perfections I attribute to God is the cause of its own existence, it is God. (AT VII, 49-50; HR I, 169)
10. If it is not the cause of its own existence, then it must be caused by some other thinking thing which also has an idea of all the perfections I attribute to God. (AT VII, 50; HR I, 169)
11. The series of causes of thinking things having an idea of God cannot be infinite, that is, it must have a first member. (AT VII, 50; HR I, 169)

12. The first member of the series of causes of thinking things having an idea of God must be the cause of itself. (AT VII, 50; HR I, 169)

13. The first member of the series of causes is God.⁶
(Williams 1978: 135-136)

1. I have ideas of things which, whether or not they exist, and whether or not I think of them, have true and immutable natures or essences. (AT VII, 84; HR I, 179-180)

2. Whatever property I perceive clearly and distinctly as belonging to the true and immutable nature of something I have an idea of really does belong to that thing. (AT VII, 84; HR I, 180)

3. I have an idea of God as a supremely perfect being.
(AT VII, 65; HR I, 180)

4. I perceive clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the true and immutable nature of a supremely perfect being.
(AT VII, 65; HR I, 180-181)

5. A supremely perfect being really does exist.

6. God exists. (Williams 1978: 141-142)

The distinction is between what are called in the traditional terminology *de dicto* modalities, which are properties of propositions or sentences, and *de re* modalities, necessities and possibilities which belong to a thing independently of how the thing happens to be picked out or characterized. (Williams 1978: 115)

1. If A can exist apart from B, and Vice versa, A is really distinct from B, and B from A.

2. Whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand can be brought about by God (as I understand it)

3. If I can clearly and distinctly understand A apart from B, and B apart from A then God can bring it about that A and B are apart (separate)

4. If God can bring it about that A and B are apart, then A and B can exist apart (and hence, by (1), are distinct)

5. I am able clearly and distinctly to understand A apart from B and B apart from A, if there are attributes \emptyset and $\not\emptyset$, such that I clearly and distinctly understand that \emptyset belongs to the nature of A, and $\not\emptyset$ belongs to the nature of B, and I have a clear and distinct conception of A which doesn't include $\not\emptyset$, and a clear and distinctly conception of B which doesn't include \emptyset .

6. When A is myself, and B is body, thought and extention satisfy the above condition on \emptyset and $\not\emptyset$, respectively.

7. Hence, by (5), (6), (3), and (4), I am really distinct from body (and can exist apart from it) (Wilson 1978: 198)

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ประวัติผู้เขียน

นายประสิทธิ์ ฤกษ์พิศุทธิ์ เกิดเมื่อวันที่ 13 เมษายน พ.ศ. 2500 ที่กรุงเทพมหานคร สำเร็จการศึกษาปริญญาบัณฑิตจากคณะสังคมศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเกษตรศาสตร์ ในสาขาวิชาจิตวิทยา เมื่อปีการศึกษา 2522 เข้าศึกษาในหลักสูตรมหาบัณฑิต ภาควิชาปรัชญา จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย เมื่อปี พ.ศ. 2523



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