

บรรณานุกรม



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## ภาคผนวก

p. 13 Dear Intra the body is not the self, though they have the meaning only for the self. The self is not an abstract formal principal of deep sleep too, the eye, the body, the mental states, the presentation continuum, the stream of consciousness-are all mere struments and object of the self. The self is the ground of waking, dream and sleep states and yet it transcends them all. The self is universal, immanent as well as transcendent. The whole universe lives and moves and breathes in it. It is immortal, self-luminous, self-proved and beyond doubts and denials, as the very principal which makes all doubts, denials and thoughts possibal. It is the ultimate subject which can never become an object and which is to be nesslerily presupposed by all knowledge.

p. 20 I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement...all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment.

p. 21 All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas...Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, passions, and emotions, as they make their

first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images in thinking and reasoning.

p. 23 But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such.

p. 24 For my part, when I enter most intionately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can obserue anything but the perception.

p. 29 That though the change of any considerable part in a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole, yet we must measure the greatness of the part, not absolutly, but by its proportion to the whole...The addition or diminution of a mountain would not be sufficient to produce a diversity in a planet. Though the change of a very few inches would be able to destroy the identity of some bodies.

p. 30 The idea of a substance...is nothing but a collection of simple idea, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection.

p. 32 The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.

p. 46 When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which according to modern philosophy are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.

p. 47 When men have found by experience that it is impossible to exist without society, and that it is to maintain society, while they give free course to their appetites, so urgent an interest quickly restrains their actions, and imposes an obligation to observe these rules which we call the law of justice.

p. 47 Justice is certainly approved of, for no other reason than because it has a tendency to the public good. We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues, which have a like tendency to the public good.

p. 48 In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either to them,

viz. That all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a skeptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions.

p. 57 Hume's own analysis seems to be self-contradictory. He writes, "I never catch myself..."but what or whome does the word "I" refer to ?

p. 59 How can there be thoughts and feelings without owners, without any person or self to have them ? No thought occurs without a thinker, and no experience without an experiencer.

## ประวัติผู้เขียน

นางสาวศิริวรรณ โอสถานนท์ สำเร็จการศึกษาได้รับปริญญาศิลปศาสตรบัณฑิต มหาวิทยาลัยเกษตรศาสตร์ วิชาเอกสังคมศาสตร์ ในปีการศึกษา ๒๕๑๖ และได้เข้าศึกษาต่อในบัณฑิตวิทยาลัย จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย ภาควิชาปรัชญา ในปีการศึกษา ๒๕๑๘.

