

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS AND TRANSITION TO
CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE STUDY OF SOUTH KOREA AND THAILAND

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บทบาททหารทางการเมืองและการเปลี่ยนผ่านสู่ประชาธิปไตยมั่นคง กรณีศึกษาเกาหลีใต้และไทย



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งานวิจัยนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อศึกษาบทบาททางการเมืองของทหาร ที่ส่งผลต่อกระบวนการ
ความเป็นประชาธิปไตย และศึกษาปัจจัยสำคัญที่ส่งเสริมให้ประชาธิปไตยในเกาหลีใต้มีความมั่นคง
มากกว่าประชาธิปไตยของไทย โดยศึกษากรณีของเกาหลีใต้ตั้งแต่ ปี ค.ศ.1980 ที่นายพลชุนดูฮวาน
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ตั้งแต่หลังเหตุการณ์พฤษภาทมิฬปี ค.ศ.1992 จนถึงปี ค.ศ. 2014 ซึ่งเป็นช่วงที่เกิดรัฐประหารครั้ง
ล่าสุด งานวิจัยนี้เป็นงานวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพ โดยศึกษาข้อมูลทางเอกสาร ได้แก่ผลงานวิจัย งานเขียนทาง
วิชาการ บทความ ข้อเขียน ข้อวิจารณ์ และงานแปลที่เกี่ยวข้องกับเรื่องราวในการวิจัย แล้วทำการ
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ผลการวิจัยแสดงให้เห็นว่า ความอ่อนแอของสถาบันการเมือง ความวุ่นวายในสังคม และ
ความขัดแย้งทางอำนาจระหว่างทหาร คือปัจจัยที่ทำให้ทหารเข้ามาแทรกแซงการเมืองในเกาหลีใต้
ส่วนปัจจัยที่ทำให้ทหารเข้ามาแทรกแซงการเมืองของไทยคือ วิกฤติทางการเมืองอันเนื่องมาจากความ
แตกแยกของสังคม รวมถึงปัจจัยภายในกองทัพ เช่น ผลประโยชน์ของกลุ่มทหารถูกกระทบกระเทือน
และเมื่อทั้งสองประเทศได้เปลี่ยนผ่านไปเป็นประชาธิปไตยแล้ว ประชาสังคมในเกาหลีใต้ซึ่งมีความ
เข้มแข็งมากกว่าประชาสังคมของไทย คือปัจจัยสำคัญที่ทำให้ประชาธิปไตยของเกาหลีใต้สามารถ
พัฒนาไปอย่างมั่นคง ขณะที่การเมืองภาคประชาชนและประชาสังคมของไทยเกิดความแตกแยก และ
ทัศนคติของชนชั้นกลางที่หวนกลับไปสนับสนุนระบอบอำนาจนิยม คือปัจจัยที่ทำให้ทหารสามารถ
กลับเข้ามาแทรกแซงทางการเมืองด้วยการยึดอำนาจอีก ประชาธิปไตยไทยจึงยังไม่สามารถพัฒนาให้
มีความมั่นคงเหมือนเช่นเกาหลีใต้

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NATCHAYA SUWANNARAJ: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS AND TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE STUDY OF SOUTH KOREA AND THAILAND. ADVISOR: PROF. CHAIWAT KHAMCHOO, Ph.D., 82 pp.

This research examines the roles of military that influence the process of democratization in South Korea and Thailand. This research also studies the factors that contribute to the establishment of a consolidated democracy in South Korea by focusing on the periods when the democratization process started in South Korea in 1980 until the end of Kim Dae-Jung's presidency in 2003. For Thailand, the focus begins after Black May 1992 until 2014, when the last coup d'état occurred. This research is a qualitative study, employing a descriptive and analytic approach drawing on mostly secondary sources both in Thai and English.

The research results showed that in South Korea, military intervention emerged as a result of political weakness, social chaos and military advantage. In Thailand, military intervention has occurred due to social disharmony, e.g. political crisis, social disunity and the military's conflict of interest. When the two countries transformed from authoritarian to democratic states, Korea's robust civil society was the crucial factor leading to democratic consolidation. The dividing of Thailand's civil society and the middle class returning to support authoritarianism are the factors paving the way for military re-intervention. Thus, they could not develop the consolidated democracy like South Korea.

Field of Study: Korean Studies

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Background

There is a saying that the duration of the period after World War II was a golden age for militaries all over the world. Given the prevalence of military-orchestrated coups in various countries, it might be considered as the "rule" of the politics, rather than as the exception. This sort of non-democratic seizure of power became a political pattern of developing countries throughout Asia, Africa and South America.

The heightened tensions between the superpowers of the world after World War II, namely the USA and the Soviet Union, created a stronger environment for allowing this kind of practice to flourish. Military-led governments became an important alternative to the Western world in the fight against communism. Thus, in the period after World War 2, the military had an important role in politics. Moreover, civil power was weak at that time (Bamrungsuk. 1998).

However, during the 1980s, developing countries began to move toward to democracy. Some would call this a "democratic transition". This phenomenon was the transition from military administration to a civilian-controlled government.

It was inevitable that Korea and Thailand would also be a part of this phenomenon. At that time, these two countries were governed by authoritarian military governments. As people grew more and more restless under the oppressive

governments, they forged strong civilian democratic movements in Korea (1987) and Thailand (1992). These civilian movements succeeded in decreasing the role of the military governments. Moreover, they had government which came from an election. This thesis is to reveal what factors contributed to the move away from military rule to a stable civilian political environment in South Korea. This will be contrasted with Thailand's partial democracy, which still experiences interference from the military. Some factors that will be considered in regards to their contribution to either the success or failure of democratic consolidation include the military body, political environment, and the civilian populations.

Following the split of the Korean peninsula and the foundation of the Republic of Korea (also known as South Korea) in 1948, an authoritarian regime took hold. It was followed by a democratic period for a short duration, but a coup soon brought South Korea under almost three decades of military rule. Many Korean people resisted this government, and demanded democratic reform which later succeeded. Since that time, the democratic culture of South Korea has only strengthened. The Economist ranked Korea second in Asia in regards to the strengths of its civil society and democracy. This, of course, stands in contrast with the recent 50 years of authoritarian rule that the country had experienced, making its newfound position all the more surprising.

Thailand shifted from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional democracy in 1932, but this revolution was unstable, and a tumultuous period that still hasn't ended

followed, cycling between military and civilian governments frequently. Just as in Korea, there has been a strong demand from the public for a true democratic revolution, most notably shown in Black May in 1992, which managed to overturn military rule for 15 years. So it was that in 2006, no one expected the return of military rule. However, a political crisis broke out, and the military stepped in again.

Many scholars have sought the factors that contribute to a permanent shift away from military control of a nation's government. The factors that have been studied by researchers were the military initiation of withdrawal, the middle class, the degree of social civility and cultural factors.

To obtain a truly consolidated democracy, dealing with anything less than all of these factors is insufficient. This thesis will attempt to further the research on all specified factors. What is the most essential factor that supports the development of democracy in South Korea and Thailand? In what ways are Korea and Thailand different? Why is Thailand still unsuccessful in consolidating democracy? These issues will be identified in later sections.

1.2 Literature Review

Many factors were taken into account when a country's democratic consolidation was to be measured. It is important to understand that having an elected government alone is not sufficient to shift the power away from potential authoritarian regimes (include military government) to the civilian government. In many countries,

the breakdowns of democracy occur because the military intervenes in some domestic political crisis by overthrowing elected governments through a coup d'état. Therefore, the aim is to understand how to sustain democratic consolidation.

In South Korea and Thailand, several studies have claimed that the role of the military was related with a stable democratic transition.

Barany argued that democracy could not be consolidated without military elites committed to democratic rule and obedient to democratically elected political elites. In the cases of South Korea and Thailand, Barany said that the South Korean military accepted democracy as a necessity and did not interrupt the process of building democracy. In Thailand, on the other hand, after the military was forced to withdraw in 1992, the military elites still maintained a level of political power. This could mean that the military did not truly accept the rules of democracy (Barany 2013).

Gunawan studied the factors that led to military withdrawal in South Korea and Thailand by summarizing changes in military ideology. The South Korean military eventually changed their ideology in civil – military relations by accepting the concept of civilian control of politics. However, in Thailand, the military ideology has not changed. Instead, the military has continually been reluctant to relinquish their political role, only doing so when they are forced to withdraw. However, this study might not be totally applicable to Thailand's current situation, which has been more complicated in its social structure. Sometimes, to remedy a political crisis, some segment of Thai people have requested military intervention (Gunawan 2000).

Ringgi asserts that one of the biggest challenges to build a stable and democratic civil-military relationship was not only to exercise civilian supremacy, but also, most importantly, to control the military's ruling ambition. South Korea presented a low intensity of the military's ruling ambition. The significant turning point for gradually reducing the military's ruling ambition of the Korean Armed Forces was the election of Kim Young-Sam as a new president, replacing Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993). Kim dismissed the Hanahoe (One Mind), a secret association created by Chun and Roh. This agency was a political body of the South Korean armed forces since Presidents Roh and Chun. President Kim began to reform the military in order to reduce their political power and to establish institutionalized civilian control of South Korea's army. Moreover, former presidents Chun and Roh, who were found guilty of rebellion and corruption, were punished. With this trial and a series of other institutional reforms, firm civilian control and a gradual reduction of military ambition were achieved under Kim's presidency. The ruling ambition in South Korea was categorized as low because the civilian leadership was able largely to control and reduce the ambition of South Korean armed forces (Ringgi 2013).

As we could see from the above studies, the main focus on factors that lead to military withdrawal was the willingness of the military's leadership to withdraw. The military believed that their political involvement could lead to conflict among militaries. Thus they discontinued to intervene and accepted the democratic.

However, many scholars argued that in many cases, military withdrawals occur involuntarily. In such cases, the military did not want to lose political power, but the middle class that emerged from economic development, who tend to be very politically conscious, active and aware of their rights, forced the military to back down. The growing discontent among members of the middle class in regards to authoritarian rule, and their demand for a democratic system that guarantees more rights and freedom lead them to play important roles in anti-military dictatorship demonstrations. The middle class became a crucial factor to force the military to return to barracks. Koo stated that the middle class has a highly progressive and reform-oriented political ideology and has acted as a democratic force in several important periods of political change (Koo 1991). According to Kim some scholars assert that although the middle class had enjoyed the benefits of successful economic growth, this did not guarantee that they would continue to support authoritarian military rule (Kim 2008). On the contrary, the middle class tried to challenge authoritarian military rule and pushed military leaders to accept the demand for a democratic government (Kim 2008).

However, Im (1997) argued that the Korean middle class generally seeks political order and social stability because they were afraid of losing the benefits which they received from economic development under the authoritarian regime. That was the reason why the middle class ignored the democratic struggle (Im, 1997: 14-15 cited in Kim, 2008: 11). Zinn (1987) agreed that one of the major obstacles to Korea's democratization was the conservative tendency of the middle class (Zinn, 1987: 114-119 cite in Kim,

2008: 11). Choe (1987) added that the Korean middle class was interested more in the promotion of private interest than in the advance of social justice. Thus, these scholars believed that the Korean middle class was not the deciding factor that led South Korea to democracy (Choe, 1987: 345-363 cited in Kim, 2008: 12). Kim pointed out that there were many groups of the middle class, such as the old middle class and the new middle class. The new middle class that emerged during Industrialization tended to be more progressive than the older middle class. Although the middle class showed progressive consciousness and activism during the summer of 1987, it had again shifted toward a more conservative orientation in response to the ensuing social disorder. (Hong and Koo cited in Kim, 2008: 12).

There are studies that supposed civil society was the most important factor in building democratic consolidation. Kim said that civil society has consistently been a crucial factor in determining Korean democratization. After the transition to democracy, civil society played an important role. In particular, the shifting alliances of various civil groups put pressure on the government for preventing future military intervention (Kim 2000)

Seo studied the differences and the similarities of civil society in both South Korea and Thailand. It focused on how civil society had a significant influence on keeping the military from interfering with politics. This study stated that socioeconomic development in Thailand and South Korea facilitated and supported democratization. Successful economic growth changed the attitudes of the public toward authoritarian

military rule. Both Thailand and South Korea began to demand a more liberal and open political environment. The growth and strength of civil society was the important factor behind democratization. This study said that the result of economic growth was the widened political awareness of the middle class, which was the key factor in producing a democratic system. However, this research did not discuss the role of civil society after the transition (Seo 1993).

Wichian Intasi argued that, apart from social and economic factors, civil society in South Korea had important roles in the perpetual support of the democratic transition. This resulted in the acceptance of the public's demands by the military. After they obtained civilian government, people still supported President Kim Young Sam reforms of the military to end the coup, political intervention, and the use of institutions as political tool. Since South Korea's shift to a democratic system in 1987, there has been no danger of sliding back into an authoritarian military regime. Therefore, it is possible that the permanence of South Korea's democracy might be a result of the important role of civil society (Intasi 2013).

On the other hand, there is another group of scholars that believed cultural factors were the essential element for producing a durable democracy. In South Korea, Confucianism plays an important role in society, at the family, personal, social and governmental levels. These scholars also believed that Confucianism lies in opposition to democracy. Confucianism, as many scholars argued that concentrates on morality political regularity, social unity, the status quo and the structure of hierarchical

relationships, instead of change and reform (Deuchler and Kihl cited in Wichian Inthasi, 2013: 100). Confucianism also places importance on the family unit, and group structures important ideal to family or group. Political development was obstructed by Confucian ideals, as traditionally educated people believed in the importance of being in harmony with the family or group. This belief was also common in other groups, such as alumni and people from the same homeland (You 2001). This system was actually the opposite of democracy, in which each member must make their own decisions, regardless of family and self-favor (Intasi 2013).

However, as suggested by Fetzer and Soper, although the ideals of Confucianism were loyalty to the family, social hierarchy and social unity, that these factors might not have had an important impact on the development of democracy (Fetzer 2007). Additionally, they also believed that Confucianism lost its dominance in Korean society as Western values, which concentrated on individualism, civilian rights and equality, proliferated during the second half of the 20th century (Kim 1997).

Many scholars said that democracy in Thailand was often a scheme to force people to obey regulations, respect others and uphold responsibility, which seemed to scare Thai people. As a result, democratic revolutions in Thailand were met with failure many times. Some had questioned whether democracy was suitable for Thailand. Parinya Thaewanarumitkul, however, said that this was the wrong question. From his point of view, many European countries also experienced circumstance variety of sociopolitical crises, such as riots, overthrown governments, and civil wars.

There is no nation that was born democratic. In fact, only 30% of countries have succeeded in democratic revolution. These countries succeeded at least in part by focusing on civic education. Thus, Thai people must be educated properly in order for a democratic revolution to be successful (PrinyaThaewanarumitkul. 2014).

From the literature review, the conclusions of the above literature show that some scholars believed the key factor, in determining the success of South Korea's democratic consolidation was the acceptance and support of the wishes of the public by the military. Other scholars believed that strong economic development was the key. Additionally, some believe that civil society was the key factor in the shift against authoritarian rule. Finally, a fourth group believed that culture was a key factor in supporting a long-lasting democratic system.

In any case, if the military's withdrawal was the key event that allowed for the establishment of democracy in South Korea in 1987, and in Thailand from 1992 to 2006, this would beg the question of why the military agreed to step back in the first place, as they had been in power for a long time. The answer would be the strong demands from civilians regarding the development of democracy. The military would never consider such a transition on their own.

To unite people on the issue of democratization, the middle class played an important role. From the inception of the military regime in South Korea, the authoritarian government played the leading role in economic development and investment, resulting in more economic opportunities for the people of South Korea,

and the growth of a wide middle class. Ironically, the expansion of the middle class brought about a desire for liberalism in politics and the economy. In Korea, although the middle class was once satisfied with the military regime's economic improvements of the country, they eventually changed their attitude towards authoritarian rule due to their higher education (Koo 1993) which developed the liberal ideals of the younger generations, leading to a turning of the tide against the military. This theory has some similarities with the 1992 Black May situation in Thailand. Although Thailand's economy was not as developed as Korea's, the middle class had nevertheless expanded significantly. At one time, due to the fear of communism, they were satisfied with a military government. However, after the fear of communism abated, fear of the military regime grew. It was at this time that the military was faced with great resistance (Bamrungsuk. 2011) . In this point of view, we could say that the middle class was an essential aspect in the democratic revolution. However, after a review of the literature, there is some evidence that illustrates that the middle class's attitudes are not necessarily consistently progressive, and that they could swing back to conservatism. If they feel threatened by political crises or social instability, they might opt for a return to authoritarian control. We could say that the middle class's role has the potential to influence the military to step back from politics, but that their attitudes may still vary in relation to prevalent fears.

In regards to cultural characteristics, according to the literature, it was not a key factor for political change, but that it still could play either a positive or negative

influence on the establishment of democracy. We could agree that civil society played an important role in the acquisition of the withdrawal of the military regime and in the development of a durable democracy. Civil Society, as expressed in both official and unofficial organizations such as student movements, religious circles, professional associations, trade unions, Civil Liberties Organization, manufacturers and journalists, were crucial members of the resistance against the authoritarian system, and were essential in the dissolution of that system and the further establishment of a functional democracy in South Korea. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the consequence of Black May was the reduction of the military's role in politics. Following this event, there was a 15-year period of relatively stable democracy; nevertheless, Thailand's institutions of civil society were not as strong as Korea's, and authoritarian rule returned in 2006 and 2014.

1.3 Research Questions

How did Korea succeed in the consolidation of democracy and make a permanent shift away from being an authoritarian state? In contrast, why does Thailand's military retain a significant political role? What are the similarities and differences between the established factors in these two countries, and how might it help to understand the difference in levels of success in democratization?

1.4 Hypothesis

Civil society was the most important factor that removed the military from politics, and which brought democracy to both Korea and Thailand. While Korea's democracy has proven to be permanent, however, Thailand's democracy was only stable for 15 years, after which Thailand experienced two coups d'état. We could say that Korea's civil society is much stronger than Thailand's civil society.

1.5 Research Objectives

1. To analyze the roles of military that influence the process of democratization in South Korea and Thailand.
2. To study the essential factors that enabled the shift to democratic systems in South Korea and Thailand.
3. To examine the role of civil society in contributing to the establishment of a consolidated democracy in South Korea and the role of civil society and other factors in preventing Thailand from consolidating democracy

1.6 Expected Outcome

1. Understanding about the factors that influence military withdrawal in politics
2. Increasing knowledge about the political roles of the military in South Korea and Thailand
3. Appreciating how the role of civil society affects democratic consolidation.

1.7 Methodology

This research was a qualitative study, employing descriptive and analytic approach drawing on mostly secondary sources both in Thai and English.

1.8 Scope of Research

This study focuses on the periods when the democratization process started in South Korea in 1980 until the end of Kim Dae-Jung's presidency in 2003. For Thailand, the focus begins after Black May 1992 until 2014, when the last coup d' état occurred. This study also emphasizes the role of the military, middle class and civil society, which are crucial factors for democratization and the breakdown of democracy.

1.9 Organization of the study

This thesis consisted of five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapter two is concerned with conceptual framework regarding the theories and factors that lead towards military intervention and withdrawal, as well as that lead to the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation. Chapter three analyzed the South Korean military's role in politics, crucial factors influenced the military withdrawal and the role of civil society in establishing consolidated democracy. Chapter four explains the Thai military's role in politics, crucial factors influenced the military withdrawal and which lead to democratic transition between the years of 1992-

2006, and the failure to establish a democratic consolidation due as attested by the military interventions in 2006 and 2014. And the last chapter concludes the findings of this thesis.



CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to provide conceptual framework for the ensuing parts of this work. It discusses concepts and factors leading to military intervention in politics and democratic transition as well as democratic consolidation.

2.1 Military Intervention in Politics

The researcher studied the military politics to find out the reasons why the military took part in politics in South Korea and Thailand. Some scholars believe that the failure of the Parliament and systemic disruption causes military intervention.

Huntington stated that the important reasons of military intervention are related to social structure, complexity and unity. The Military was likely to intervene when there was a social crisis, such as when old power structures collapse without an immediate replacement. In this situation, every group was aware of the absence of a political state. However, there was no suitable professional group that could be neutral to exercise power. There was no agreement or coordination between groups about the handling of power, causing intense conflict. However, the military was a group in society that wanted to enjoy political power, like others. Importantly, militaries may

often be successful in intervention due to their possession of and skill with sophisticated armaments (Huntington 2006).

Many scholars believe that the reason for military intervention was social chaos, aggressive tension, an unbalanced system, economic crises, corruption, and conflict between political parties and ineffective government administration (Aristide R. Zolberg and Samuel Decalo cited in Suchit Bunbongkarn, 1994: 229-230).

Suchit Bunbongkarn asserts that factors that cause military intervention include

1. Failure of a civilian government's administration, such as ineffective solutions for economy issues or other crises.
2. The civil government was corrupt. The military would consider whether the people still trust the government. If they still do so, the military would not intervene because they are concerned about the damage it may cause. Moreover, people's political ignorance also leads to military intervention (Bunbongkarn. 1994).

However, some scholars believe the main factor contributing to military intervention is their strength and power, systematic organization, professionalism, and cohesion lead to superior organizational capability which contributes to military intervention.

Finer stated that social disorder under an ineffective civilian government might lead to a "power vacuum" in the country. There were factors that lead the military, which had superior organization, skill, discipline, social cohesion and education, to fill this vacuum. In cases where the military is highly political active, it tends to want to

develop its country's nation integration, leading to the glorification of nationalism, founded on a prosperous economy and social stability and harmony (Finer 1962).

To withdraw military from politics and to prevent further intervention from them, Huntington proposed that they had to be professionalized. This could mean that political situations won't be at risk of military intervention, as the military would only focus on military activities. Being a member of the military would then be a profession that requires an extreme level of training to improve capability of the successful completion of important missions. With a complete focus on military missions, they would not have time to focus on social matters (Huntington 1981).

Other authors challenged Huntington's argument. Finer (1962) argues that professionalism alone does not prevent military intervention in politics. Generally, military officers must also show independent adherence to the principle of civilian control. Finer argued that "professionalism by itself may spur the military to political intervention because they may see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government. They might become obsessed with the needs of military interests. Some militaries are very strict in their military ideals and social role, and it's possible that they could object to being used by the civilian government to restrain the opposition party" (Finer 1962).

2.2 Democratic Transition

The concept, about changing from authoritarianism to democracy, involved a dynamic process with changes in both the internal and external systems.

Huntington explained his concepts of the waves of democracy as follows:

The first wave was developed in the West as political systems there changed from absolutist monarchy to democracy. This process developed over a long period between the 18th and 20th centuries in Europe and North America.

The second wave, which started after World War II, emerged from the victory of the Allied Forces. This encouraged democratization in former Axis-controlled territory. Meanwhile, the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule produced a number of new states with democratic tendencies.

The third wave, which began in the middle of 1970, started from the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Spain, Greece and Portugal, and continued with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The effects of this wave spread to over 30 countries in Latin America and Asia. However, Huntington concluded that a reverse of the third wave of democratization was always possible (1993) (Huntington 1991).

Huntington explained the factors that had contributed significantly to the occurrence and the timing of the third-wave transitions to democracy as follows:

1. The legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted the consequent dependence of these

regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain “performance legitimacy” due to economic failure.

2. The unprecedented global economic growth of 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries.

3. The changing of religious institutions that made people tend against military dictatorship. The changing of National Catholic churches from the guardian to be enemy of authoritarian regime.

4. Changes in the policies of external factors, most notably the European Community, The United State and The Soviet Union.

5. An effect of demonstration that occurs in one country encourages democratization in other countries.

Schneider and Schmitter suggested steps for transitions from authoritarian to democracy as follows:

1. Liberalization means the idea that populations must have basic needs and enforcement of legal rights. If this process is successful, society has the opportunity to move into the second stage.

2. Transition to democracy, this step will have conflict between many groups in society because the old power group does not want to lose their power. On the other hand, other groups that never had power are not sure to smoothly manage and take control of the transition to democracy (Schneider 2004).

While Przeworski sets the conditions of transitions are as follow:

1. Authoritarians thought that its authority and leadership are no longer necessary.
2. The right to remain authoritarian is no longer valid.
3. Internal conflict between elite groups, especially conflict within the military leadership to separate and seek groups for support.
4. Foreign influence or pressure to foster democracy to lead to compromises in country (Przeworski 1991).

Gaddes asserts that the end of authoritarianism in many countries could be different because there were differences in decision making, processes to obtain leaders, and social responses. Geddes differentiated authoritarians into four types of regimes. There were military regimes, single-party regimes, personalize regimes, and regimes that mixed these traits. For military regimes, there was typically some conflict in the democratic transition that caused the military's leaders to decide to enact a coup d'état. In these cases military's withdrawal would appear in of the course of negotiations. For personalize regimes, the leaders, who might came from military, could establish a political party to support themselves. However, the military and political parties are not able to make decisions independently. Therefore, the leaders might utilize close connections, such as friends, families and personal alliances. At the same time, the leaders could ensure the loyalty from those connections by providing benefits in several ways to maintain their power as long as possible. Generally, these

leaders' rule ended via coup, assassination, civil resistance or intervention from outside of the country (Geddes 1999).

Lipset (2003) noted that if a country has prosperity, democracy would often naturally follow. They measured the level of economic development regarding prosperity, industrial development, and education. Pye also believed that the emergence of the middle class and an educated class establishes a new core center which influenced the attitudes of authority (Pye 1990).

2.3 Democratic Consolidation

A society that had stayed under authoritarianism, after they had successfully developed to democracy.

Juan J. Linz and Stephan stated that a democratic consolidation is complete if and only if “democracy has become the only game in town”. There must be no one trying to interfere or change it to other types of regimes (Juan J. Linz. 1996).

To sustain democracy and prevent the return of authoritarianism, Rustow argued national unity is to be taken into account before other factors. To solve the conflict and properly exercise democracy, politicians and people must also follow the principles of democracy. Moreover, political education is also a key to developing political systems, as political education is based on the ideals that notions of in the principles of democracy (Rustow 1970). Political education could occur in any part of

society. Nevertheless, the political experience of leaders is an essential aspect to creating democracy. Authoritarian rulers and dictators must recognize that the resistance of civilians is always a consequence of political crises, and often herald the end of the regime (Bermeo 1992).

Moreover, civil society is an essential aspect for sustaining democracy, as they organically and independently gathered from society of their own will.

Civil society has been widely studied since it plays an important role in strengthening democracy. O'Donnell and Schmitter point out that civil society plays an important role in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The revival of civil society has paved the way for the brainstorming of independent groups and grass root groups in the Philippines, South Korea, Chile, Poland and South Africa. Civil society includes students, religious groups, professional associations, female groups, labor unions, civil rights organizations, manufacturers, intellectuals, mass media and unauthorized working groups. Such groups can force authoritarian governments to allow competitive elections.

Ishiyama states that civil society involves in the emergence of democracy (Ishiyama 2012). The London School of Economic Centre for Civil Society defines civil society as

Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil

society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups (CCS).

Larry Diamond defines civil society as:

The realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by the legal order or set of shared rules...it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interest, passions, and ideas, exchange ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. It is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state (Diamond 1994).

Anek Laothamatas points out that civil society refers to group networks, associations, clubs, foundations, institutions and communities whose activities involve the state and individuals. Their focus is trying to lead, direct and counteract the state at some points and they are not for the extreme individualism that promotes selfishness, competing with each other at the expense of common benefits. In contrast, they support individual groups to be responsible for the whole group while

taking the specific individual's or group's benefit protection into consideration (Laothamathas. 2000).

Academics differentiate civil society and society in that civil society fosters civic engagement to serve public goals rather than personal goals. It tries to get assistance from the state, ask the state to change certain policies or ask the state to take something more seriously.

Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963) view civil society as playing an important role in strengthening democracy. It is an institution participated in by individuals through their own volition and links them with the state. The individuals exchange information about politics, enhancing their political performance and civic skills (Almond 1963).

With civic consciousness, civil society investigates the state in the use of its power, encourages political participation through opinion expression, requests and collects social benefits; as a result, democracy can better meet the public's needs as well as offering fair play.

Parinya Theawanarumitkul thought that civil society is a social group that contains people who are democratic. This could refer to six components, which were:

1. independent and self-reliance,
2. equality of members,
3. acceptance of differences,
4. respect for others,
5. social responsibility, and
6. the understanding of and participation in the democratic process (Theawanarumitkul 2009).

After the emergence of civil society, society would be strong enough to balance political power and economic administration. Civilian political movements would work together with local administrations, communities and consumers. People would be involved in solving problems of social, economic, environment, and moral nature. These problems would be resolved rapidly, as people would not wait for the government to bring every remedy, like before. People would help each other. On the other hand, if a country with a democratic system does not have a civil society, breakdowns of democracy will occur (Thaewananarumitkul 2009).

Larry Diamond (1992) asserts that civil society can strengthen democracy because firstly it examines the state. It is the foundation for limiting the power of the state that may corrupt its power or violate the laws, putting the state under public investigation.

Second, the strong bonding enhances the roles of political parties in political participation, promotes political performance and civic skills and promotes understanding about civic duties and rights in the democracy system.

Third, it is a stepping stone for the development of political culture in other dimensions such as patience, modesty, readiness to compromise and respect towards other's opinions.

Fourth, it creates more channels than political parties do in terms of requesting and collecting benefits so democracy can meet people's needs and offers greater justice more.

Fifth, it helps select and train new political leaders. Leaders and activists in civil society are trained to present their standpoints and they become leaders through working from the bottom to the top in society. As representatives of their groups, they learn how to convince and manage the crowd in addition to debating, campaigning, negotiating and befriending. Working for the public benefit attracts more political supporters. As a result, political parties do not create new political leaders in political parties because they parties do not offer enough space for them to grow. Civil society adds spice to politics, includes every social group and instills righteousness in democracy.

Sixth, active civil society can disseminate information to a larger crowd and this empowers people to promote and protect their interests and values. Civil society may not successfully fight against the government's policies if it does not have sufficient and correct information, especially policies concerning military and national security in a developing country where its citizens lack the relevant knowledge and the mass media are under the government's control. Citizens should obtain such information from various sources such as independent institutions and not from the government alone.

After civil society has performed all six duties, the state will be more responsible in meeting the citizen's needs. Eventually, righteousness will be the essence of the political system, leading to the citizen's respect to the state and active

participation in political activities. The state, consequently, can exercise its power effectively and gain trust from citizens (Diamond 1994).

In society and culture, Huntington state that social structure was an ideal to develop democracy. It consists of different, independent elements, such as social class, religious groups, and employment groups. These groups restrain the authority's scope. They also examine the government's administration. If any society is composed solely of dependent groups, that society would be governed by leaders who have unlimited power, such as in the systems of absolute monarchy and authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1984).

According to the conceptual framework above, there are two major sets of factors leading to military intervention. First, social factors. Second, military factors. Military withdraws from politics is a key step for a transition to democracy process. However, scholars frequently observe that the military still re-intervenes in politics. Consolidated democracy would be successful depends on a crucial factor that is civil society. These conceptual frameworks will be examined in the case of South Korea and Thailand.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

This chapter deals with the politics and democracy in South Korea covering the period when the military took charge of government, the rally for democracy in 1980 and the end of Kim Dae-jung's administration in 2003. The factors that led to the transition from the authoritarian to democratic system and those that stabilized democracy were analyzed.

3.1 Military in Politics

Since Korea became independent from Japan in 1945, the military had taken charge of government for almost three decades. The political role of South Korean military rose when General Park Chung-hee ousted the civilian government run by Chang Myon. Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea, resigned following the public rallies and marches in protest against him in 1960. The main factors leading to the seizing of Chang Myon's power was the failure of administration, maintenance of peace and order in the society, economic problems and the threat from communism.

After the 1961 revolution, South Korea came under the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee for 18 years until he was assassinated in 1979 by Kim Jae-gyu, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and his underling. After the death of

Park Chung-hee, Choi Kyu-hah became the acting president, calling an emergency cabinet meeting and declaring martial law (Kim 1988). General Chung Sung-Hwa, army chief of staff, was appointed head of the junta.

Although martial law was imposed, the people expected that the country would be geared toward democracy since other countries were moving in that direction. As a result, the number of intellectual activists advocating democracy increased. Choi Kyu-hah declared that he would revise the constitution to support democracy and hold a general election under the new constitution.

Due to the unrest, high-ranking military officers viewed civil government as not being able to deal with the problems effectively, especially the political crisis, in addition to the conflicts in the Unified Society; therefore, these officers staged coup d'état on December 12, 1979 (Tim).

The Unique Society, a secret society established by General Park Chung-hee, consisted of graduates from a military school that were politically ambitious. They came under two lines of command – the army and the society. After the assassination, the society was so powerful that it orchestrated the coup d'état led by General Chun Doo-hwan, commander in the society. General Chung Sung-Hwa was arrested and the society tricked the soldiers under the army's line of command not to obstruct this coup (Oh. 1999).

General Chun Doo-hwan declared martial law on May 17, 1980 to suppress the movement for democracy. The opposition leaders were confined to house arrest

while colleges and universities were closed. Protesting students in Gwangju organized powerful protests for democracy, leading to confrontations between armed forces and students. On May 19, 1980, more people joined the rallies and marches to show that they were also against the junta.

The incident turned into a citywide protest and resulted in the Gwangju massacre led by General Chong Ho-yong on May 27, 1980 (Oh. 1999).

Chun Doo-hwan's took the reins of power and ended the hope for democracy. Military interference in 1979 confirmed the fact that South Korean was still under the army's influence. Social factors and military factors – especially military officers' thirst for power and ambitions and conflicts in the military – were factors that resulted in the interference of the military in 1980, affecting the inception of democracy.

During his regime from 1980 to 1988, Chun Doo-hwan faced many problems including the question about his rise to power and whether it was legitimate, the Gwangju massacre and the anti-American activists. Civil society was strongly against dictatorship and the grouping of citizens saw limitations in the military power (Barany 2013).

3.2 Transition to Democracy

Some academics agreed the role of the military in politics was to be reduced following the eight-point proposal by the government's presidential nominee, Roh Tae-woo, which called for the holding of direct presidential elections and restoration of civil rights on June 29, 1987. This declaration supported democracy in South Korea.

Some thought that military power was reduced because of the strong civil society and the movement for democracy in South Korea during the late 1980s in the moves against authoritarianism (Armstrong 2007).

The June Democratic Uprising was a nationwide democracy movement in South Korea that generated protest from June 10 to June 29, 1987. The demonstration forced the ruling government to reform itself, leading to the transition to democracy (Kim 2007).

From 1980 to 1983, after the Gwangju massacre, Chun Doo-hwan ruled the country with strict measures – arresting opposition, charging them with corruption, creating conflicts, conspiring to overthrow the government and staging treason. The legislative body was on Chun's side, issuing laws against democracy such as limiting basic civil rights, controlling mass media and suppressing the labor movement.

During late 1983, Chun seemed to relax in enforcing some measures by releasing dissenting students and lecturers, granting amnesty to political prisoners, and raising the political rights of the opposition politicians. His purpose was to make his

party, the Democratic Justice Party, popular so that they could win the upcoming election (Kim 2007).

The result was that his party did not gain more popularity; in contrast, the opposition parties attracted more supporters. The students went back to study in their universities and organized groups to protest against the dictatorial government. At last, 42 universities jointly organized a group called the National Student Coalition for Democratic Struggle.

In addition to that, the Korean Council for Labor Welfare (KCLW) took shape in April 1984, consisting of labor unions and the Cheonggye Garment Labor Union. The KCLW took an active role during the 1970s but was dissolved by the military in 1981. The KCLW and the Cheonggye Garment Labor Union were revived and fought against unfair labor laws. They were supported by students and religious institutions such as the National Catholic Priest's Corps for the Realization of Justice. The KCLW also played an important role in political reform.

Student groups, labor unions, religious institutions and other actors in civil society were united under the Council of Movement for People and Democracy (CMPD) aiming to work together to put pressure on the government. Later, other movements united under the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR), which acted as a coordinator in fighting for democracy (Intasi 2013).

The pro-democracy movements were actively participating in political activities and the opposition politicians set up a party called the New Korea Democratic Party

(NKDP), which was supported by various groups in civil society, particularly the young and students. In the general election on February 12, 1985, the NKDP gained 29.29% votes and became the leading opposition party. After the election, the NKDP and civil society raised the fight for democracy to another level.

From 1986 to 1987, the activities organized by the civil society movement for democracy were first carried out by religious activists, denouncing the authoritarian rule, requesting constitution reform so the president could be directly elected, improving basic civil rights and reducing social inequality, followed by the campaign launched by the NKDP, enlisting ten million people nationwide to pressure the government to revise the constitution. Even though the headquarters of the party was raided by the police and some activists were arrested, the campaign continued. Later in March and early April 1985 the NKDP joined hands with the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR) and the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR) and staged rallies for constitution reform in such main cities as Gwangju, Cheongju, Daegu and Daejeon. A mass of people joined these rallies (Intasi 2013).

Another factor that led to the unification of the civil society groups in South Korea was the death of Park Chong-chol, a student at the National University of Seoul, during interrogation by police. This incident angered the people against the government who called for an investigation into this matter.

Another was the announcement by Chun Doo-hwan on April 13 that the constitution would not be revised so that there could be the direct election of a president but there would be a general election under the existing constitution stating that a committee and not the people would elect the president. This announcement was criticized by the public and protests were organized. Chun Doo-hwan called the meeting of the Democratic Justice Party on June 2, 1987 and declared that Roh Tae-woo would be the government's presidential nominee.

In May 1987, the National Movement Headquarter for Democratic Constitution (NMHDC) was established. It consisted of pro-democracy groups, with 25 civil society groups, and staged protests throughout the country. In June 1987, during the rally in Yi Han-yol, a university student from Yon-sae University was killed by tear gas. As a result, on June 26, 1987, the NMHDC asked more people to join the protest called the Peace Parade. It was reported that millions of people joined this (Kim 2007).

Although there were many protests in South Korea, the protests against Chun Doo-hwan after the death of Park Chong-chol and the Yi Han-yol incident were considered the biggest of all since millions of people from all walks of life joined these protests in 37 cities. In the past, the middle-class did not join the protests but these incidents made them angry and the economy was not good, threatening their security if the protests did not end soon (Oh. 1999).

Confrontation between the protesters and the police became more frequent. The military was called in to suppress the protesters when students seized the police

shields, batons, tear gas grenades and sometimes burned the police stations, leading to civil uprising (Oh. 1999)

Some military officers and the United States of America were against Chun's plan. With the cry for democracy, on June 29, 1987, Roh Tae-woo announced the Declaration of Political Reforms, which called for the holding of direct presidential election revision of the constitution for democracy, amnesties granted for Kim Dae-jung and other politicians and the restoration of civil rights. The announcement surprised both government members and the opposition parties. Chun Doo-hwan also accepted this.

With Roh's eight-point proposal, Chun Doo-hwan granted political rights to Kim Dae-jung, freed political prisoners and initiated talks with the opposition parties concerning the revision of the constitution. Kim Dae-jung joined the Reunification Democracy Party (RDP), which separated from the NKDP. As for the response to the people's demand for constitutional reform, the National Council appointed a special committee comprising the government and opposition representatives totaling 100 members to revise the constitution. This was a new page in South Korean history. The role of the military in political activities was reduced. For example, Article 5 Clause 2 stated, "The military had to protect the national security and the country and had to be neutral." In addition, those who were in the military could not be prime minister or cabinet members (John Kie-Chiang Oh, 1999).

The people's demand for the holding of direct presidential elections was stated in the 1987 Constitution, saying that the president had to be elected directly by the people and the president could be in office for one term of five years. Following the revision, the National Council announced the election under the new constitution after the referendum.

Before the election, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who were members of the RDP, did not agree with each other since both had ambitions to be candidate for the president. Kim Dae-jung set up a new party called the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) and announced that he would run for the president.

Roh Tae-woo was also a candidate, along with Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, both of whom were symbols of activists for democracy. The election was held in December 1987. It was expected that this would lead the country to democracy after the three decades of military regime and that the president would be a civilian.

However, after 13 years of military regime, Roh Tae-woo, who was once a military officer, won the first direct presidential election because the votes were split between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. The table below shows the number of votes.

Table 1 : The 13th Presidential Election on December 16, 1987

Roh Tae-woo (Democratic Justice Party)	36.6%
Kim Young-sam (Reunification Democratic Party)	28.0%
Kim Dae-jung (Party of Peace and Democracy)	27.0%
Kim Jong-pil (New Democratic Republican Party)	8.1%
Jae Y-sin (Independent)	0.2%

Roh Tae-woo was inaugurated on February 25, 1988. This was considered the peaceful transfer of power even though he won only 36.6% of votes. The positive consequences were that firstly, even though Roh Tae-woo was a military officer, he won the direct presidential election. This was a democratic victory over the dictatorial presidential election. Secondly, it was the first direct presidential election since 1971. Questions were raised against both Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan as to whether they came into power legitimately so Roh Tae-woo wanted to distance himself from such accusations by winning the election. However, he was criticized for being so close to Chun Doo-hwan and having conspired with Chun to attack the people in the 1980 Gwangju incident. Thirdly, the transfer of power was carried out through the democratic process and not through a coup d'état like in the past.

In conclusion, the most important factor behind South Korea changing from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime was the strength of the people against authoritarianism. The active civil movements for democracy lead to the surrender of the military government to democracy.

3.3 Democratic Consolidation 1988 – 2003

Although people had accomplished a requirement of constitution amendment for democratic and liberally election the president, Korea was not accounted as a completely democratic country. There was an opportunity of military intervention into the politic, if they did not properly balance each aspect of political power. Nevertheless, since 1987, there was no military intervention. Also, this was stated in The Economist Magazine as a completely democracy country after Japan. Many scholars believed that civil society has great impact on a stability of democracy.

Civil society in Korea is very strong and active. After they made a big rally in June, 1987, several groups were established such as Traditional people's movement groups (minjung) which gathered from labors, farmers, paupers, anti-authoritarian politician and student. This group had a significant role in fighting with authoritarian regime. Later, South Korea stepped in to a democratic revolution. However, this group still moved for a civil amend legislation which aimed for a democracy stabilization (Kim 2003).

Another significant political movement group (Citizen's Movement Group – Simin Undong Tanche) which consisted of several groups. Most of them came from middle class, company employees, scholars and religion leaders. They mainly focused on the subject that interested the social which generally aimed to reconstruct several institutions. They represented the idea in peace, legal and non-aggressive. Also there were other NGOs such as Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice – CCEJ, Korean Federation of Environmental Movements – KFEM and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy – PSPD. These groups had essential roles regarding to environment, woman's right, human's right and economic justification (Kim 2003).

However, Roh's winning the election showed that civil society lacked unity and was divided into two groups – those supporting Kim Young-sam and those supporting Kim Dae-jung. After the inauguration, civil society united and actively rallied for democracy. One of the reasons for this was that Roh did not try to solve the problems about taking control of the government in 1979 and the Gwangju incident. Roh was considered a military officer that became a president and was the successor of Chun Doo-hwan (Kim 2007).

To lessen the pressure from the movements for democracy, the National Assembly issued a law to establish a special committee to investigate the Gwangju incident. On June 27, 1988, the Council approved the law that facilitated the investigation and established the National Reconciliation Committee to cement the division in the country due to the incident; however, the committee could not achieve

their goal since most of the committee members took the government side (Intasi 2013)

On January 22, 1990, the first ever union of the RDP led by Kim Young-sam, the NDRP led by Kim Jong-pil and the DLP, the government party, resulted in the new party taking 217 seats out of 299 seats in the National Assembly, controlling two-thirds of votes in the council and leaving the PPD led by Kim Dae-jung alone as the opposition party. Civil society viewed that this affected the stability of democracy so they orchestrated protests for democracy.

After Roh stepped down in 1992, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam were candidates for president. Kim Young-sam promised that he would revive politics to be accountable to the people; however, being a presidential candidate, protests against Kim Young-sam were staged in 22 cities including Seoul, Busan and Gwangju. The protests were organized by the All Nation Coalition for Democracy and National Unification led by university students. The protesters accused Kim Young-sam of fighting against the people's intentions; consequently, he joined Roh's DLP.

Meanwhile, the military took the stance that it would be 'neutral' during the upcoming election by the Minister of Defense, Head of Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff. They agreed that the role of the army was to protect the country's sovereignty. This was different from the past, in that in the past all the military staff would vote for the government party. Being neutral meant that the army approved anyone who won the election, even Kim Dae-jung, who was criticized by the army and was leftist and

opposed the army to the point that he was said to be an unacceptable person for the army (Oh. 1999).

There were three candidates in the 1992 presidential election – Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-yong – and all of them were civilian. In truth, it was a rivalry between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. After joining Roh's party, Kim Young-sam was considered a representative of conservatism; however, he held the upper hand because he represented the government party and won the election with 41.4% of votes while Kim Dae-jung earned 33.4% and Chung Ju-yong 16.1%. He became the country's first civilian president in 30 years.

Kim Dae-jung publicly accepted his defeat and announced that Kim Young-sam would revive democracy and unite the people. This indicated the maturity of the politicians in South Korea. They accepted the people's decision.

After the inauguration, he reformed politics, economic legislature, election laws and local government and military. His government seriously dealt with corruption. The people had to give their real names when dealing with financial transactions (Intasi 2013). Civil society groups also dispersed as they had achieved their goals – direct presidential election and civil government.

However, the factor that urged the civil society to resume its political role was the fact that Kim Young-sam did not seriously indict those responsible for the 1979 coup d'état and the incident in Gwangju. The people thought that those who were responsible for such incidents should have been punished as justice for the dead or

the injured. The government was pressured to reform the military so that it could not obstruct the road to democracy of the country (Intasi 2013).

Kim Young-sam took advantage of this situation to limit the power of the military by announcing in October 1994 that Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were responsible for the coup d'état, but in July 1995 he announced that they were not culpable for the coup. The people expressed their disappointment by staging protests led by the Korea Council of Professors for Democratization. The people wanted the government to prosecute those who instigated the revolution.

Distrusting the military, Kim Young-sam transferred high-ranking officers that supported Chun Doo-hwan, discharged or demoted them. Such officers included those involved in the Gwangju incident (Oh. 1999).

Another factor that reduced the influence of the military was the prosecution of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo for instigating the coup in December 1979 and using armed forces against the people in Gwangju in May 1980. Kim Young-sam had to give in to the demands of civil society groups and both were convicted of the charges; as a result, this tarnished the military image. Kim Young-sam was approached because he could prevent the political interference of the military (Intasi 2013). All the private organizations under the supervision of the military were dissolved under the operation "Cleaning Revolution of Korean Military" (Oh. 1999).

Kim's success in reforming the military to prevent its political interference was supported by the civil movement (Barany 2013) which further strengthened democracy.

Kim Dae-jung winning the presidential election was an indicator of the firm establishment of democracy in South Korea. He was the first president from the opposition party and represented activists for democracy. He was also pro-communism. He became president without the interference of the military and this was considered the decade of democratic development in South Korea (Barany 2013).

Civil society was still the key element in stabilizing democracy. Campaigns for political and economic reforms were launched. For example, civil society groups were united to investigate the election and participating more in politics. The Citizen Movement Council for Fair Elections (CMCFE) was organized in 1991 by the general public, with activists from 50 religious volunteer groups, female groups, agricultural organizations, economic associations, influential business groups and student organizations.

To ensure fair election, the CMCFE requested constitutional revision, setting up local centers and asking volunteers to join the group so that they could keep track of the election in April 2000 and exposed the politicians that were corrupt or local authorities and the police that helped the government candidates win the election illegally. The National Assembly Elections was set up to investigate all the candidates'

backgrounds and inform the public of what they had found out about such candidates. Consequently, 70% of the candidates were not elected.

The Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCJE) and the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) aimed for economic reforms (Oh 2012). During the military regime, the large South Korean conglomerates which dominated the economy, chaebols, illegally gained favor from the military, resulting in an economic crisis; therefore, civil society groups rallied for chaebols reform while Kim Dae-jung was in office.

The PSPD proposed measures to protect and enhance small stockholders in chaebols' companies so that they could examine the company operations. The public was encouraged to buy the stocks of those companies. Cha Ha-song, an important leader of the PSPD and a lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Korea University, asked the companies to pay small stockholders compensation for malpractice and misuse of power. The PSPD movement made those involved in economics be more accountable to the public and follow the laws strictly (Kim 2000).

The political and economic reforms during President Kim Dae-jung indicated the active participation of civil society. Many organizations united to push for fair elections and chaebols reform. They devoted themselves to solving the common problems and wanted to show that such problems could not be solved by only military officers, politicians and elites. Everyone in the country had to take part in solving these problems and this was one of the citizens' duties, being responsible for

the country. With this attitude, politics in South Korea was strengthened, leading to stable democracy.

Tocqueville (1840) stated, “Freedom for joining a group can alert the society long enough to strengthen the state.” Take South Korea as an example, after becoming a democratic country with the direct presidential election by the people, the civil society continuously promotes the stability of democracy, participates in politics by setting up organizations to push the government towards political, economic and social reforms for the benefit of the country. As a result, the government has to give in to the demands, leading to the legitimacy and stability of democracy. It is now difficult for the military to interfere. Although it was easy for the military to interfere in politics in the past because the people were not strong enough to resist such interference but when the people closely bonded with civil political parties, military interference in politics became out of the question (Finer 1962).

3.4 Summary

After the death of Park Chung-hee, the people hoped that the country would be a democratic country but General Chun Doo-hwan interfered with politics in December 1979 because there was a political vacuum, weak government leadership and weak government. Another factor that led to interference was the conflict between General Chun Doo-hwan and higher-ranking officers because Chun wanted to maintain the role of the military in politics since Park Chung-hee’s regime; as a result, he staged the revolution, obstructing the development of democracy in South Korea.

However, the change from authoritarianism to democracy started when people from various professions joined together to form civil society movements and it grew stronger, involving more organizations so that they could rally against the dictatorial government. They put pressure on the government to reform the politics, establishing democracy in the country. The government retaliated by suppressing the opposing groups with violence, resulting in the death of many students. This roused the people in joining the protests, leading to massive protests in June 1987. President Chun Doo-hwan could not use his armed forces to deal with the protesters because his consultants and the United States disagreed with this. Eventually, he had to give in. Roh Tae-woo declared his plan for democracy and reforms, including the revision of the constitution and the direct presidential election. Since then, democracy became established and grew more stable.

When South Korea became a democratic country, the military no longer interfered with politics due to the active participation of the civil society who feared that the country would experience authoritarianism again. Many organizations have been set up to investigate government operations. They started by asking the government to investigate the Gwangju incident and Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were prosecuted for suppressing the protesters through violent and corrupt means. This proves that civil society can push for the justice process to prosecute those who commit crimes to make sure that nobody is above the law. The civil society movement for military reform, active political participation and proposal of measures

for political, economic and social reforms in South Korea makes the state more responsible for the people and more legitimate. The people, consequently, trusted the government and accepted democracy. When the military believes that the people favor democracy, it becomes aware that it should not be involved in politics, leading to a more stable democracy.

To sum up, the factors leading to military intervention, transition to democracy and democratic consolidation in South Korea is summarized in the following table.



Table 2 : Summarize factors leading to Military intervention, Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea

Factors	Military Intervention 1980	Transition to Democracy 1987	Democratic Consolidation
Social Factors	-Power Vacuum Ineffectiveness and weakness of a civilian government	-People uprising to demand democracy	-Civil society has important roles in following and monitoring the government to further reform politic, social and economic -People's ideology geared toward accepting the principle of democracy
Military Factors	-Factionalism and to maintain military's role in politics	-Military leaders avoid suppressing the people and accept the people's demands for democracy	-Military ideology change to "Professionalism" and should be neutral politically

CHAPTER IV

THE CASE OF THAILAND

As stated in the scope of this research, this chapter describes Thailand's politics and democracy from 1992 to 2014, beginning from the transition to democracy in Thailand, the factors contributing to Thailand's democracy without military intervention and the factors contributing to the military's role in politics again.

4.1 Transition to Democracy (1992 – 1997)

Over 83 years ago, Thailand's democracy began with the constitutional change in 1932. There have been some other important political incidents which have caused huge tremors to Thailand's political system and society: the political incidents in October 1973 and Black May in 1992. On 14 October 1973 a political explosion occurred. At the time, Thai society was adjusting the political system from a closed political system to an open one. A scramble for power between the old elites consisting of military and civil officials and the new elites from the private sector. The ensuing incidents led to the aggregation of people from several sectors to become the Alliance against Military Dictatorship, which comprised urban elites, female street vendors, contract workers, and university students. The Alliance against Military Dictatorship were united in their grievance that they were being totally ignored by the

powerful political leaders of the time. The same group of political leaders also intentionally blocked every single access to political power for the people. The battle of civil society ended with the people's victory, and the leader of the military government was ousted from Thailand. However, democracy had not yet fully taken root as the group of people, who used to hold power together with the nation's ex-leaders, still dominated Thai society. At the same time, the old group of elites realized that a government through total authoritarianism was unable to continue. The old group of elites, then, decided to open a political space for politicians and elites from the private sector in order to reduce the political pressure (Prasertkul 2013).

After General Chatchai Choonhavan took the position of Thailand's Prime Minister following an election, the politicians from the private sector began to take the reins of power away from the military elites. Abruptly, the 1991 coup d'état by General Suchinda Kraprayoon brought political power back to military and civil officials. At first, the National Council for Peace and Order promoted Anand Panyarachun to be Prime Minister in order to show that the military did not intend to totally seize power. However, General Suchinda Kraprayoon planned to be the country's leader directly. Society began to be unsatisfied with sharing the power to govern with the military. Finally, the situation led to protests against the military government by most of the people from the urban middle classes –businesspersons, persons of working age, and members of the Student Federation of Thailand. The protests were prolonged and the

tension increased gradually. Confrontations between people and civil servants occurred. The government then declared a state of emergency and cracked down on the protestors. Many people were killed and injured or went missing. This event later became known as Black May.

The violence had a significantly negative impact on the military's image. After the crackdown, the military's political roles changed. The military had to accept greater democratic rule. Political interference by the military was more difficult because of globalization; this disseminated the idea that military government is not justified and would give rise to political problems in the future (Rekalarp. 2008). However, this victory was similar from the past. The protestors could oust political leaders individually, but could not change the political structure in order to create a democracy in which people could have political space and be truly self-managed (Prasertkul 2013).

4.2 Democratization (1997 – 2006)

Thailand's political crisis in May 1992 did not occur only at Rajadamnern Avenue but also attracted protestors from several provinces all over the country. In Chiang Mai and Nakornrajaseema, for instance, the people protested in several forms. In Nakornsritammaraj, many protestors gathered together as well (LoGerfo 2000). Such a political phenomenon caught people's attention and became a national political

trend. The military's political role gradually ended to be replaced by democratization in the country. It could be said with complete conviction at the time that Thailand had already moved forward to the "democratic consolidation" era after the military withdrew themselves from politics. The high-ranking military officers firmly stressed that the military would not meddle in politics, but they would pay attention to the development of military professional (Bunbongkarn 2004). This phenomenon was the consequence of the political struggle of civil society in 1992.

The protest, which aimed to oust the government which was not elected democratically by the people, led to political reform with the drafting of the new constitution. The new constitution had contents endorsing democracy more than every previous constitution, such as the prime minister must be elected by the members of House of Representatives (Barany 2013), the increasing of management authority for the government in order to rule the country effectively, and the foundation of several independent organizations. The most important was the provision which clearly approved the political participation of citizens both in liberty and as concerns rights (i.e. the rights and freedom to peaceful assembly without arms) and the provisions regarding the inspection of state power (i.e. the people having the right to vote of not less than fifty thousand in number shall have a right to submit a petition to the President of the senate to pass a resolution removing a person holding a political position or senior management position) (Constitution 1997). It seems that

these environmental factors helped promoted civil society to be able to participate in politics and led to the democratic stability of Thailand.

The 2001 election, held under the new constitution, was won by Pol. Lt. Col. Thaksin Shinawatra. He was promoted by almost all members of the House of Representatives to be the prime minister of Thailand. Being overwhelmingly elected and supported by the citizens, especially those in rural areas who are the largest group of people in society with the electoral vote, gave Thaksin much power (Deth. 2013).

Thaksin tried hard to reduce the military's role in politics through the appointment of his closed relatives and classmates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School to take several important positions in the Royal Thai Army. Since the military came under the influence of the government, Thaksin's political control grew. He was also confident that he could be elected as Thailand's prime minister for several terms, and that the military could not intervene in politics.

Not only was politics in the parliamentary system was strong, but politics in civil society was also active. Many Thai citizens were participating in various political activities both in the form of political participation and the groups of people participating in politics. This situation led to the "plural politics" participation and "plural society" which later developed into "civil society" and "politics in public sector". Individuals or each interest group could collectively participate in politics in

any form or more than one form. They also could collectively participate in politics at any level or many levels.

For example, a group of people had the chance to exercise their right of political participation via appealing to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) in order to inspect the accuracy of Thaksin's assets and liabilities and his transfer of stocks. These people considered Thaksin to be guilty according to the Constitution A.D. 1997 and the Organic Act on Counter Corruption B.E. 2541, and requested the Constitution Court to make a decision. They also exercised their right of peaceful political assembly while appealing to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and the Constitution Court to perform their responsibilities swiftly. However, another group of people exercised their right of peaceful political assembly while asking for justice from the NACC for Thaksin at the same time. The NACC were going to conclude on the case and make their final decision while the election was going to end as well (Chaiyasarn 2015).

Democratization in Thailand, which has its modern beginning in Black May in 1992, occurred from globalization and people's rising awareness of democracy. People's attitudes towards the military as political threat led to political movements and protests against the military, and also the new constitution which endorsed political stability and increased political participation for the people.

Political, economic, and social problems were discussed and solved in parliament, and people were able to participate in politics by petitioning for the removal of a person holding a political position whenever they observed something seemingly illegal. These factors made Thailand's politics implemented in accordance with a democratic path, without military intervention. As a result, Thailand's democracy developed steadily. No one ever expected that a coup d'état would occur again.

4.3 Military Re-intervention

Although the promulgation of Thailand's 1997 Constitution resulted in making political institutions stronger and encouraged civil society to participate in politics, swift changes through political incidents and in society also disrupted the environmental conditions of politics in the public sector. The environmental conditions such as the economic crisis, the approach of neo-liberalism, the total dominance of the political arena by elites from the business sector, the cultural separation of middle class citizens in the urban area, the separate distribution of several interest groups, made the people's political movements face more obstacles.

In particular, Thai Rak Thai Party's total dominance of political power was supported by the largest group of capitalists of Thailand. The Thai Rak Thai Party concentrated on implementing several populist policies which affected politics in the

public sector to become increasingly divisive. Groups of people, who used to gather together in order to make demands for their legitimate interests, were forced to choose between starting political movements by themselves or under the shade of political parties. Many people considered forming political movements with NGOs or groups of villagers as never bringing about any success. Therefore, they turned to place their hope and dreams with the Thai Rak Thai Party. This phenomenon was considered to be significant and unusual, because politics in the public sector did not belong to any political party or government naturally.

At the same time, the implementation of populist policies by Thai Rak Thai Party aimed to please the poor or lower classes in order to make these groups of people the party's political base. The party's implementation and expectations created distrust and dissatisfaction in the old elites, aristocracy, middle classes and members of the political movements in the public sector who felt that they were taking away their political power. Such distrust and dissatisfaction led to the creation of The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which was the largest political movement attacking Thaksin's government and his Thai Rak Thai Party. The PAD accused Thaksin's government and his Thai Rak Thai Party of a new form of corruption called policy corruption. Policy corruption was considered to be done by creating policies or amending laws or regulations in order to favor Thaksin's business interests and those around him (Prasertkul. 2013).

Events divided several groups in civil society and politics in the public sector into two larger political sides: one side felt that their legitimate rights were being taken away or infringed upon, while the other felt that the government elected by them was legitimate and their only sanctuary. This escalated into a political crisis which brought about disharmony. In principle, politics in the public sector must concentrate on negotiating with or pressuring the government to exercise their authority as much as possible. The political crisis in Thailand, however, was a crisis in which each group of people depended on the groups of elites as their leaders, and the masses of people had to support their elite leaders to usurp state power.

The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the yellow shirt movement, rallied against the Thai Rak Thai Party. The PAD, which consisted of academics, business persons, some from the middle classes, and NGOs marched together in order to oust Thaksin in the middle of 2004. The protests expanded on a broader scale afterward. As a result, the government announced the dissolution of parliament and organized a new election. However, the three former opposition parties consisting of the Democrat Party, Mahachon Party, and Chart Thai Party did not register for the elections. The Thai Rak Thai Party led by Thaksin, still received the majority vote. Anti-Thaksinism occurred in several electorates, in such a way that the candidates from the Thai Rak Thai Party were elected in lower numbers than those voting no and spoiling their ballot papers. Finally, the election was judged to be void by the Constitutional Court.

The anti-Thaksin movement continued and intensified. Further anti-Thaksinism was roused by several professional organizations such as the network of Thai doctors, pharmacists, nurses, and university lecturers. These networks of professionals issued declarations demanding Thaksin step down from his role as prime minister immediately.

After that, the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, simply called the red-shirt movement, mostly consisted of people in the lower middle classes, farmers, laborers, the poor and economically disadvantaged (thairedshirts.org.), marched together to support Thaksin's government and to rally against the yellow-shirt movement. Both political movements confronted and attacked each other on occasion.

The political crisis became full blown when the yellow-shirt movement declared the appointment of the conglomerate at the Royal Plaza on 20 September 2006 with Thai society in disarray. There were fears that the yellow-shirts' conglomerate might lead to violent conflict between the yellow-shirts and the red-shirts and result in casualties. The Thai military led by Gen. Sondhi Boonyarattaklin then seized power and took on a political role. Thailand, as a result, came under the rule of the military government led by Gen. Surayud Chulanonth as the prime minister between 2006 and 2007.

The divisions between several groups of individuals existed and also the political strength of several civil society groups, which were not the yellow-shirts and the red-shirts, seemed to be too weak to exercise any political role by being a buffer between the political rivals. At the same time, there were divisions within the Thai military as well. This began following Thaksin's interventions in the appointment of high-ranking military officers by putting his relatives, close friends and classmates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School in high-ranking positions. His intervention was considered a contrary practice against military tradition and seniority. Moreover, the government also considered cutting the military budget, which caused the military to fully realize the reduction of the military's importance in civil government (Rekalarp. 2008). The military's dissatisfaction with such interventions in its internal affairs by civil government began to increase and was one of the factors that brought the military back into Thai politics.

However, the coup d'état in 2006 was not resisted by majority of Thai citizens. Indeed, many of the Thai public, especially in the capital, came out to give flowers to the soldiers. This might imply that Thai society used its political role, both directly and indirectly, by accepting the military leaders' opportunity to take power. Scholars commented on this political phenomenon that Thai people from the middle classes just wanted a government that was transparent, effective, and visionary, while it was

not necessary for the country's regime to be democratic (Tejapira. 2002). Surachart Bamrungsuk noted that:

“If the middle class consider the military to be a political threat, their supporting strength to the military will change, and may shift to be anti-military. It is partly according to liberalism which is the “pivotal” political ideal of the middle classes. Therefore, the military's political role will face the severe resistance of the middle class if they shift back to liberalism as happened in 1992. On the other hand, the middle class will demand the military to take part in politics if they are afraid of political or military threat, the same as the Latin America model where the middle class are in the context of political fears, and they usually became conservative and ready to demand some guarantees from the military. At the same time, they are ready to abolish their ideal of liberalism by easily supporting authoritarianism.” (Bamrungsuk. 2013)

However, the military government cannot directly possess power for a long period of time. This is because of external resistance from the international community which never accepts military government, and internal resistance such as heat from Thaksin's supporters. His support made Mr. Samak Sundaravej and the People Power Party (the former Thai Rak Thai Party) win the general election in 2008. Mr. Samak Sundaravej became the 25th prime minister of Thailand. However, the political crisis

was continuing since the yellow-shirt movement marched to oust Samak and his government.

After Samak was dismissed as prime minister after being disqualified. Mr. Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin's brother-in-law then became the 26th prime minister of Thailand, and the yellow-shirt movement began to protest. The yellow-shirt movement stepped up its political activities by closing Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueng airports which had severe effects on Thailand's economy and image. Finally, the yellow-shirt movement halted their protests and all political activities after the Constitutional Court made the decision to abolish the People Power Party and two coalition government parties. The Democrat Party, therefore, was able to form the government. Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva became the 27th prime minister of Thailand.

The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (the red-shirt movement) believed that the military used their power and influences to form the government by forcing Thaksin's supporters to shift their support to the Democrat Party in order to form the government. The red-shirt movement organized protests demanding a shift in political power. The protests intensified and this led to the use of military force to disperse the protestors, resulting in fatalities and injuries to military officers, protestors, and innocent bystanders. The government finally announced a pledge to return power to the people and organize a general election in 2011.

The Democrat Party lost to the Pheu Thai Party in the general election. The Pheu Thai Party was led by Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra – Thaksin’s sister. The Pheu Thai Party formed the government which received the overwhelming support from most of the Thai people. The government still concentrated on implementing populist policies. Up until 2013, the government tried to push an amnesty law through the House of Representatives with the hidden agenda to help Thaksin be able to return to Thailand and not defend himself through the judicial system against the accusations of corruption. The amnesty law led to protests by the yellow-shirt movement. This time the yellow-shirt movement was led by Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban, a member of the Democrat Party, and was known as the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC)

The People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) mostly consisted of elites, scholars, people from the yellow-shirt movement, ex-members of the House of Representatives from the opposition party, and some middle classes. The PDRC continuously protested against the amnesty law by closing down several important sites in the downtown area as well as the Bangkok Shutdown activities, the seizing of several governmental offices, and the demands for governmental officials to cooperate with the PDRC, as well as the seizing of several mass media offices. Finally, Yingluck dissolved parliament in order to return political power to the people and organize a new general election.

The PDRC did not stop their political activities. They increased their demands for the reform of the country's politics before organizing the general election and established a people's council. There was, however, a question raised in Thai society as to whether PDRC leaders were truly confident and serious about reform of the country's politics or whether it was just a discourse occasionally used for political movement. (www.siamintelligence.com : online)

While Thai society was facing disruption, the caretaker government did not have the full authority to solve the country's problems effectively. Although the protesters were physically tired, they still held out. The military stepped up to perform a political role by claiming that they did so in order to solve the country's problem. The intervention by the military began with the declaration of martial law by Gen. Prayuth Chan-o-cha, who was the commander of the Royal Thai Army, on 20 May 2014 at 03.00 a.m. The Peace and Order Maintaining Command (POMC) was established in order to control the political situation which had been in conflict for at least 6 months. The POMC also required the protesters from both the anti-and pro-government sides to refrain from any single political activity immediately.

In the meantime, the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) was preparing to organize a large gathering all around Bangkok on 24-26 May. The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship located at Aksa Road was also waiting to respond as well.

The PDRC did not stop their demands for “the reform of the country’s politics before organizing the general election and forming the federal government which has full authority in the country’s administration”. On the other hand, the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship was demanding the "organizing of a general election before implementing the reform of the country’s politics, and disavowing a neutrally appointed prime minister". The political rallies organized by both sides gave rise to the highest level of masses of protesters later.

Gen. Prayuth Chan-o-cha considered the coup d’état in 2014 to have been unsuccessful. He adopted the strategy of coup d’état without the use of military force and through negotiation instead. He invited the seven parties of dispute – Peace and Order Maintaining Command (POMC), People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the Democrat Party, Pheu Thai Party, the Senate, and Election Commission – to join in a private meeting. However, the meeting was unsuccessful in settling all political disputes. Gen. Prayuth and all the royal army commanders announced the seizure of power on 22 May 2014 at 16.30 pm via TV pool. The leader of the PDRC, the UDD, the Democrat Party, and Pheu Thai Party were held in custody immediately and the National Peace and Order Maintaining Council was established (Thairath 2014). The development of democracy in Thailand hit an obstacle and there was a return to an authoritarian regime once again. The military still maintain an important role in Thailand’s politics.

4.4 Summary

The military has always had an important role in Thailand's politics since the coup d'état in 1932 up until now. In 1992 – 2006, however, the military reduced its roles in politics because of the political strength of the other interest groups in Thai society which succeeded in intervening in Thailand's politics.

The people's political struggle in the Black May incident had established the 1997 Constitution which strengthened political institutions. This constitution paved the way for Thailand to have the very first elected government which could survive its first 4-year term for the first time in Thailand's political history. The government also received an overwhelming number of electoral votes from the people, even strong institutions like the military had no way to intervene. Thailand's democracy seemed to have firmly taken root. At the time, no one would ever have imagined that the coup d'état would return in the pages of Thailand's political history. However, recent times have witnessed the full return of the military to politics following the coup d'état on 19 September 2006, with its power returning in order to perform its political status and roles until the present.

The coup d'état in 2006 was caused by several factors. It began when Thaksin – the representative of the new elites – tried to take political power from the old elites. Thaksin employed populist policies to attract those in rural areas, where the majority of people in Thailand reside, to form his political power base. The public

sector and civil society groups were also divided because of their dependence on the groups of elites they supported for political power. The political divisions clearly separated Thai citizens into two sides. Those individuals who remained neutral also did not exercise their political roles in easing the political divide and tension. The civil government was also unable to exercise its administrative authority effectively in order to solve the problems and curb the political violence and conflict which continued to increase gradually. The military used the political crisis to intervene in politics in order to maintain the peace and stop the confrontation between the PDRC and the UDD. At the same time, the military used this occasion to set up a power structure to facilitate the old elites to return to power again. Some of the middle classes found this agreeable and accepted the coup d'état in 2006.

The coup d'état in 2014 was also a consequence of several political conflicts which continued gradually over time since the parliamentary political system was unable to solve other social problems. The public sector or civil society was also not strong enough to act as a buffer for the parties at dispute. Supporters of both political sides would not yield to each other's demands, and continued to escalate their political activities. It was reported that the supporters of both political sides were prepared to use weapons against each other. There existed the fear that the political crisis would almost result in Thailand becoming a failed state. All the politicians, protestors, and people were responsible for this political phenomenon. The political

chaos and vulnerability to extreme violence caused by this conflict in opinion paved the way for Gen. Prayuth's seizure of power on 22 May 2014. Although the country's political regime is no longer democratic, some people felt relief at the country being returned to peace and order.

The government led by Gen. Prayuth reasserted that they had no intention to seize power but did so in order to return peace to the country, stop Thais killing one another, and to reform the country in every dimension. At present, nobody can foresee whether the military government led by Gen. Prayuth will be successful in national reform and able to pave the way for the creation of a more stable democracy in Thailand.

To sum up, the factors leading to military intervention, transition to democracy and democratic consolidation in Thailand are summarized in the following table.

Table 3: Summary of factors leading to the transition to democracy, democratization and military re-intervention in Thailand

Factors	Transition to democracy 1992	Democratization 1992-2006	Military re-intervention 2006 and 214
Social Factors	-People uprising to demand democracy	-Strong government and strong political institutions -People's ideology geared toward accepting the principle of democracy	-Social Disorder -The protesters sought to provoke a violent government response as a pretext for military intervention -Middle class return to support authoritarian rule
Military Factors	-Military suppress the people -The military leaders were forced to give up power and return to barracks	-Military withdrawal from politics	-Conflict within the military -Military's interest -Military ideology claiming that the military are the servants of the state, not servants of the civilian government -The military acts patriotically, is well organize and united. Thus, they observe

			political rallies as symptomatic of social disorder affecting national security.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1 Conclusion

South Korea and Thailand were governed by authoritarian military governments. As people grew more and more restless under oppressive governments, they forged strong civilian democratic movements in Korea (1987) and Thailand (1992). These civilian movements succeeded in decreasing the role of the military governments. Moreover, they had governments which were elected. South Korea was able to move away from military rule to democratic consolidation. In contrast, Thailand still has partial democracy, which still experiences interference from the military.

Consequently, the question has been raised. How did South Korea succeed in the consolidation of democracy? In contrast, why does Thailand's democracy break down and the military retain a significant political role? This question led to this research and it was found that some scholars assert that civil society can strengthen democracy.

In the cases of South Korea and Thailand, civil society plays a significant role in acting as the force for democratization. The uprisings of people directly initiated the transition to democracy.

Nevertheless, following the revolution in regime, soldiers never interfered in politics again. This is a consequence of the people being aware of the factors that might bring the country back to authoritarian rule. Thus, they established several groups to comment on and put pressure on government regarding significant changes in politics, economy, society and the military. This movement has seen the shift to responsible government in order to devise public oriented policy. As the military has sensed the needs and trust of people during the political revolution, they recognized that their role in politics is no longer required. Then they returned to their military base to act only in their professional capacity as the military. Military withdrawal was one of the factors that led to stable democracy in the country.

For Thailand, although, they had been under authoritarian control, there were people who stood against the military. At last they obtained a democracy like Korea. However, Thailand's democracy was not as stable as Korea's. There were separations between people which brought about political crisis. Mostly, the consistence group aimed to stimulate the sanction of military. Twice they accomplished coups in 2006 and 2014. Another factor was the middle class who used to fight for democracy. In 2014, the date of the last coup, they rarely protested against the military. In fact, they showed their support.

The following table shows several factors that have played roles in democratic change. It also demonstrates how society and the military support democracy in Korea and Thailand.

Table 4 : Social and Military factors that support Democratic Consolidation and Prevent Consolidating Democracy.

Factors	South Korea	Thailand	South Korea	Thailand
	Transition to Democracy 1987	Transition to Democracy 1992	Democratic Consolidation	Factors preventing Thailand from consolidating democracy
Social Factors	-People uprising to demand democracy	-People uprising to demand democracy	-Civil society has important roles in following and monitoring the government to further reform politics, society and economics -People's ideology geared toward accepting the principle of democracy	-The political conflict between Thaksin's opponents and his supporters leads to divide civil society -The protesters sought to provoke a violent government response as a pretext for military intervention -Middle class return to support authoritarian rule

<p>Military Factors</p>	<p>-Military leaders avoid suppressing the people and accept the people's demands for democracy</p>	<p>-Military suppress the people -The military leaders were forced to give up power and return to barracks</p>	<p>-Military ideology change to "Professionalism" and should be neutral politically</p>	<p>-Conflict within the military -Military's interest -Military ideology claiming that the military are the servants of the state not servants of the civilian government. -The military act patriotically, is well organize and united. Thus, they observe political rallies as symptomatic of social disorder which affects national security.</p>
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To conclude, Korea's civil society was stronger than Thailand's. Therefore, Korea's democracy has undergone stable development as a consequence of the gathering of many groups such as students, laborers, religious groups and other

professionals. Although Korea has successfully established democracy, civil society still plays roles in following and monitoring the government to further develop politics, society and economy. Thus, the military has rarely had the chance to interfere in politics. Furthermore, the military became more professional, which has helped strengthen political stability.

In contrast, Thailand's civil society successfully fought authoritarianism and established democracy for 15 years. However, there were many factors which divide civil society. Disorganization between political groups resulted in the political crisis with conflicts between both groups. Thailand almost became a failed state. The middle class subsequently desired the return to support authoritarian rule. Thus, they could not develop the democratic consolidation as in the case of Korea, despite both countries having started upon the path of democratic change at similar times.

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