ATTITUDE TOWARD USAGE OF PATANI MALAY LANGUAGE IN THREE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES

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วรงค์ศักดิ์ ตั้งปกรณ์:   ทัศนคติต่อการใช้ภาษาปัตตานีมาเลย์ในเขต 3 จังหวัดชายแดน ภาคใต้

Attitude toward usage of Patani Malay Language in Three Southern Border Province

อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก: รศ.ดร.วิทยา สุจริตธนารักษ์, 114 หน้า

วิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อศึกษานโยบายของรัฐบาลไทยที่เกี่ยวกับการใช้ ภาษาปัตตานี-มลายู สำหรับข้อมูลที่ใช้ในการวิเคราะห์ได้รวบรวมจากแหล่งข้อมูลของภาครัฐนอกจากนี้การศึกษาฉบับนี้จะใช้เอกสารมาประกอบการวิเคราะห์และข้อมูลสนับสนุนจากแบบสอบถามที่ เข้าไปสัมภาษณ์เจ้าหน้าที่ภาครัฐที่เป็นผู้ดูแลรับผิดชอบความสงบและความปลอดภัยภายในพื้นที่อาศัยบริเวณนั้น

ในปี ค.ศ. 2006 คณะกรรมการสมานฉันท์แห่งชาติได้เสนอแนะให้รัฐบาลใช้ภาษา ปัตตานี-มลายู หรือยาวี เป็นภาษาราชการสำหรับ3จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของไทย โดยเห็นว่า ข้อเสนอดังกล่าวจะสามารถช่วยลดความรุนแรงและช่วยสร้างความสงบให้แก่ประเทศไทยได้ อย่างไรก็ดีข้อเสนอดังกล่าวได้รับการวิจารณ์และต่อต้านเป็นอย่างมากอีกทั้งประธานองคมนตรีก็ไม่เห็นด้วยกับข้อเสนอดังกล่าวเพราะเห็นว่า3จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของ ประเทศไทยดังนั้นภาษาราชการที่ใช้ควรเป็นภาษไทยเท่านั้นแต่ข้อโต้แย้งดังกล่าวไม่ได้เป็นเหตุผลที่ยอมรับนักเพราะหลายประเทศเช่นประเทศแคนาดาก็ใช้มากกว่า 1 ภาษา ที่เป็นภาษา ราชการ และก็ไม่มีปัญหาใดๆ สำหรับการใช้ภาษาราชการมากกว่า 1 ดังนั้น จึงเห็นว่า การที่จะ นำเรื่องการใช้ ภาษาปัตตานี-มลายูมาเป็นภาษาราชการใน3จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ ของไทยควร ได้รับการพิจารณาอีกครั้งเนื่องจากภาษาดังกล่าวเป็นภาษาสำหรับท้องถิ่นที่ประชาชนบริเวณ นั้นใช้ในชีวิตประจำวันดังนั้นงานวิจัยฉบับนี้มุ่งเน้นที่จะกลั่นกรองความเห็นของกลุ่มคนที่จะ ใช้ภาษา ปัตตานี-มลายูเป็นภาษาราชการที่2รองจากภาษาไทยโดยความเห็นจากงานวิจัยดังกล่าว อาจสามารถนำไปสู่ความสงบและมั่นคงแก่ประเทศไทยได้ซึ่งงานวิจัยฉบับนี้จะหาคำตอบว่า การนำภาษาและวัฒนธรรมท้องถิ่นมาใช้เป็นภาษาราชการจะสามารถช่วยเข้าถึงประชาชนท้องถิ่นในการสร้างความเชื่อมั่น และไว้ใจในการปกครองของรัฐบาลได้หรือไม่

สาขาวิชา เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ศึกษา   ลายมือชื่อนิสิต…………………………………..

ปีการศึกษา 2553   ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก………….

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KEYWORDS: PATANI MALAY LANGUAGE/ JAWI LANGUAGE/ YAWI LANGUAGE/ SECURITY/ PATANI KINGDOM/ THREE SOUTHERN BOARDER PROVINCES/ PULIC TRUST

VARONGSAKDI TANGPAKORN: ATTITUDE TOWARD USAGE OF PATANI MALAY LANGUAGE IN THREE SOUTHERN BOARDER PROVINCES

ADVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. WITHAYA SUCHARITHANARUGSE, Ph.D., 112 pp.

This study aims to study Thai government policy concerning Patani Malay language.

Data used in the analysis are taken from government sources. Also, this research is conducted by using the documentary analysis and supported by the interview and by questionnaires of the officials who are responsible for the security issues in this area local resident in the area.

In 2006, the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) recommended the government to use Patani-Malay Language, or Yawi as the working language in three border provinces as means to relieve violence and help build the security of Thailand, there are many arguments against this proposal. The Privy Council president strongly disagrees with this suggestion on the ground that those three provinces are the part of Thailand, and as such only Thai language will be used in this country. This counter argument is not persuasive because in several countries such as Canada more than one language is used as official language without much of problems. When applied to the three border provinces, where the Patani Malay has been long rooted in their daily lives, the central government from Bangkok might have to reconsider whether to accept the language and local culture of the region. This research scrutinizes opinion of a member of group of people on Patani-Malay language as the bilingual language with Thai under appropriate measures. This idea might lead to help generate national security of Thailand as a whole. This research posits that acceptance of the local culture and language will gain trust of the local citizens on part of the government.

Field of Study: _Southeast Asian Studies_   Student's Signature _____

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Conflict is common around the world. According to the Conflict Barometer 2008 report, the region of Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly a third of the world's conflict.[1] This phenomenon might be explained by the fact that almost all countries in Asia have diversities, which include the dominant and dominated ethnic groups. In case of Thailand for instance, except in the three southern border provinces, standard Thai language is widely used. More than 80% of people in the three border provinces, Patani,[2] Yala, and Narathiwat, are physically, linguistically and culturally different from the rest of Thailand. Particularly, they speak Malay, known as Patani Malay or Jawi language, and firmly follow the Islamic faith. Those distinguishable features supported by its historical background gradually estrange them from the Thais in other geographical regions. Historically, the three provinces, called Changwat Chaidaen Paaktai or "จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้" in Thai, were the component of the long and glorious history of

Patani heritage; then, after this territory was amalgamated as Siamese colony, some groups of people created several organizations, such as the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), to separate themselves from Thailand.

The deadly conflict in Thailand's predominantly Malay Muslim South is at a stalemate. Although military operations might have contributed to the reduction in violence, the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has made little effort to tackle the political grievances that drive the insurgency. A limited unilateral suspension of hostilities offered by rebels has met no significant response. Draconian laws that grant security forces sweeping powers remain imposed while justice for serious cases of past

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[1] Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2008, p.52

[2] The term of Pattani means the name of province in the southern part of Thailand. The scholars will specifically state that the term of Patani will indicate the Kingdom of Patani which was independent before being absorbed into Siam Kingdom. Patani also indicates the identity of people in this three border provinces of Thailand, which includes the Islamic religion, the language known as Jawi language, for instance. Details will be delineated in ch.2, in far.

abuse remains unaddressed and torture of suspects continues. As bloody anti-government protests in Bangkok distracted the nation in early 2010, the death toll in the six years long insurgency steadily climbed. The conflict in the deep south remains on the margins of Thai politics and unresolved. A paradigm shift is needed to acknowledge that assimilation of Malay Muslims has failed and that recognition of their distinct ethno-religious identity is essential. Dialogue with insurgents and reform of governance structures remain two missing components of a comprehensive political solution.

Many scholars identify the factors, which threaten the national security of Thailand and propose the resolutions to security issues in this area. The Thai government in the past relentlessly attempted to assimilate this minority group to be Thais by imposing several policies, which the Malay ethnics consider detrimental to their culture. For instance, the government imposed the Thai curriculum and prohibited using the Jawi language in the local school in this region, but the parent considered standard Thai useless, thus resisted the government policy. Only some of them can use standard Thai as required by the government from Bangkok. Most of the people in this region are Thai Muslims and most of the population use Patani Malay or Jawi language. They have a hard time to communicate with the government officials. When this factor has been continuously combined by the government policy since 1786 AD till the present, such as the change of political power structure from Malay Kerajaan to appointed Raja by Bangkok, the promulgation of the Regional Administration Act to eliminate the local autonomy of the Raja,[3] and particularly the policy of "One Race, One Nation", which has been relentlessly executed to assimilate and change their identity to become Thai, they lost the trust in government officials and policy of Bangkok.[4] The Patani people are also subject to other worsen factors, such as corruption and abuse of powers by the government officials. It makes the security problems in the three border provinces of

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[3] Winai Sama-un, "Identity of the Thais and the cultural diversities" and Chuleepron Wirun-ha, "Conflicts in the Southern Thailand from the historical perspectives," In Surichai Wankeaw, 2007 "Source of Fire in Southern Thailand," (Ed.) (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press) p.30. (Malay Kerajaan means that a condition of having Raja as the existence of state or community.) The Detail of assimilations will be discussed in ch. 3 in far.

[4] Details will be discussed in ch. 2 in far.

Thailand worse. The primary argument of this study is that better measure, such as the acceptance of different ethnics, culture, religion, including the fairness and equality in justice system, in order to gain the public trust from those citizens should be implemented instantly. Additionally, one of the proposals is that the acceptance of the Patani Malay language as working language will help alleviate violence or the plight in those three southern provinces of Thailand. Then, this research intends to examine the opinions or attitudes of the leading people in this area and the officials working on security problems toward the usage of the Jawi language in this area and the suggestions for preserving local culture, identity of the Patani indigenous people, will alleviate the violence in this area.

This chapter will deliberately explain what this research will focus on, the scope of study, hypothesis and the benefit of this research.

1.1 Problems and Its Importance

The security issues of the three border provinces become more serious in the last several years from 2001 to present. More than four thousands of the people including children, women, and other innocent people were dead because of the violence in the area. Bomb planting, shooting and burning human alive are common way of violence they are using. After implementing several military measures and police power by the government under Thaksin administration, the problem even becomes worse. Most Buddhist citizen as well as the Thai Muslims who have supported the government in this area were threatened and killed. They lost trust in the government. They now believe that the government cannot protect their lives from the militants' actions that attempt to create the insecurity in their homes. Some of them migrate and leave their mother land to other provinces. Common area they move to is Songkla province. This serious situation needs the better resolution, which must be composed of several measures. The government must use the nonviolent method supported by the fairness of justice to solve the problems.

After deeply conducting historical background study of the Patani Kingdom, the researcher finds that some of the violent problems might derive from the political power of Siamese assimilation methods to absorb this kingdom into Siamese Kingdom by using force without enough acceptances from the Patani people. The most important factor exacerbating the violence is that the Patani people in this focused region have hard time communicating with and understanding the Thais because they speak Malay or Jawi language. The study indicates that the bedrock of the problem might be based on the desired cultural preservation of the local people and to strive for protecting their values, especially, the Jawi language and religious faith. The local populations have long denied studying standard Thai language imposed by the government. Assimilating policy to absorb the Malays to become Thais leads to the resistance; and because government officials lack understanding and knowledge of their identity. The people are left with no choice but creating the violence in this area. They might hope that the creation of violence might allow the international community to intervene, because the indigenous populations' right are guaranteed by several international conventions that Thailand has ratified and complied with those international laws.[5] Interestingly, after the violent incidents have been continuously occurred since 2001, the government considered those violent phenomena as the normal crime and employed police power to solve them. When the situation became more intense, the government exercised the full military power to

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[5] The examples of those international conventions are: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965; The Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries 1957; The Convention on the Status of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR) 1966; and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. Those international conventions aim to protect the rights of the ethnic group including the right to self-determination of the indigenous populations. For instance, article 27 of the ICCPR states that: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." Thailand has ratified the ICCPR since October 29, 1996 and entered into force since January 30, 1997. Then, Thailand has the duties and responsibilities not to ignores those provisions to protect the minority group in Thailand. *See* details in Kittisak Porkkati 2008. "Community Rights," (Bangkok: Winyuchon) pp.59-71

deal with the same problem but always failed to assuage those problems. Finally, the government set up the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to study the actual causes of problems. By 2006, the NRC suggested among other, using the Patani Malay language as a working language even among government officials. NRC believed that doing so would decrease the tension between officials and the people in local area. This measure might simultaneously create the better understanding among them. This research concurs with the recommendation of the NRC which suggests the government use Jawi language as the working language in three southern border provinces to relieve violence and help build security of Thailand. There are many arguments against this proposal. For example, this proposal have been challenged by the Privy Council President who strongly disagreed with this suggestion by asserting three southern provinces have been part of Thailand. Because this is Thai country, only Thai language should be used. This research submits that the mentioned counter argument is not persuasive because in several countries such as Canada more than one language are used as official languages without the problems of insurgency. Applicable to the three southern border province, where indeed the Patani Malay language has long been rooted in their daily lives and cultures, the government from Bangkok might have to reconsider and to accept their language and local culture in this region. This research primarily submits that the acceptance of the usage of Patani Malay language in this area as the bilingual language with Thai under the appropriate measures will facilitate the creation of national security of Thailand as a whole. This acceptance will gain the public trust of the local citizens in three southern border provinces. To procure the national security of Thailand, this policy must be substantiated with and supported by other measures such as the economic development, the good government and the fairness of the justice under the rule of law.

Consequently, this research intends to examine the opinion of the people in the three southern border provinces and of the officials working with the security problem in this area of the extent they agree with the usage of the Jawi language.

1.2 Objectives of Study

According to the idea that the usage of Patani Malay or Jawi language will relieve the violence in those three border provinces, this research strongly believe that the acceptance of the usage of Jawi language as working language for the government offices in this area is very crucial. Consequently, this research strives to figure out the policy of Thai government toward the usage of Patani Malay or Jawi language in this area. This research aims to find out the attitude or the opinion of the officials including the leading people in the community toward the idea of the Jawi usage in this area whether this measure might gain the public trust in this focused area. Finally, this research also hopes the result of the study will at least in some small way to alleviate the security problem for Thailand as a whole.

1.3 Scope of Study

The study will briefly discuss historical background and successive policies of the Thai over the three border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat that form basic causes of discontent and disagreement of the local population against government. Focus will be given on the usage of the Patani Malay language as working language in the region even in government offices. Attitude of people concerned will be studied to testify as to the acceptability of the Patani Malay language. Some discussions on security issues will be made as they are related to disharmony in the region

1.4 Methodology of Research

Documentary research is adopted to gain information and understanding of historical background of relationships between the three southern boarder provinces and the Siamese/Thai government. Scholarly works, news reports and government records will also be utilized as well as online information on internet sources.

This research will be supported by the empirical study using structured interview and questionnaire on the leaders of the local communities, and the high level officials working in this area as well as officers working with security problem. The focus will be

on opinions or attitudes of the participants on the extent of using the Patani Malay language.

1.5 Hypothesis

    (1) The historical background of the Patani kingdom and the effort to maintain that identity are the main factor that create the violence in the three southern boarder provinces. It is furthermore compounded by the corruption practice and abuse of power by the public officials, educational background, economic problems, political factors, the different culture, and particularly, the incapability to communicate with one another among local people and the government officials, all contribute to difficulty and trouble.

    (2) The measure to maintain and preserve the local culture, and identity of local people will help gain the public trust for the government from the local citizens. The government support of bilingual language – both Thai and Jawi, in the educational system and the acceptance of the usage of Jawi language as the alternative working language will substantiate the measures to gain trust and to maintain the security in the area.

1.6 Definition

Patani: The ancient Kingdom of Patani

Pattani :   The current territory, namely Pattani located in the southern province of Thailand.

Patani Malay language: The local language of Malay dialect has been commonly spoken in only the southern three border provinces of Thailand by the ethnic Malay Muslims; it is known differently as Jawi language, which derives from Arabic language

Militant: The member of the separatist group who intentionally create the insecurity situation in the three border provinces.

Thai Muslims: The people in the three border provinces who firmly are the fellowers of Islam, the interchangeable term are the Thai Muslim. However, this term might be arguable because some scholar thinks that the term of Thai is indeed an ethnic while the term Muslim conveys religious faith. Then, using and combining those two terms are false.

Thai Buddhist: The people in the three border provinces who firmly are the fellowers of Buddhism.

Separatist: The groups that have been established to create the violence and sometimes will be interchangeably called the insurgent group. Its objectives have been asserted in several aspects; some of them seek to separate Pattani, Narathivat, and Yala provinces to be independent from Thailand. There are several groups of them such as PULO, which stands for Patani United Liberation Organization, BNP, which stands for Mujahideen Pattani Movement, GMIP which derives from Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, BRN which stems from National Liberation Front, BNPP which comes from Patani Liberation National Front.

Siamese colony: The extension of the Thai government to the other entity out of Bangkok, including the absorption of Patani territory into the Siamese colony.

Leaders of communities: the local officials, such as the district officer, or the elected officers, working in areas, and the religious leaders in focused area.

The officers working relating to the security problems: The police officers, and the soldiers who work in the three border provinces, such as the high level of

the units, and the officers in the central government who are responsible for policy making toward the security problem in the focus area.

1.7 Benefits or Usefulness of Study

1. Better understanding of problems in the three southern border provinces of Thailand.

2. The opinions and attitudes of the people toward the idea of using jawi language in the three southern boarder provinces of Thailand could help reduce or solve tension and violence if it is adopted as public policy.

CHAPTER II
SOME BACKGROUND OF SOUTHERN PROVINCES
AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The primary idea of this study is that the study of historical background is the most important factor to better understand the bedrock of the violence in the three border provinces of Thailand. Without it, the government will not be aware of the sensitive issues which might seem small ones but psychologically crucial for the Malay ethnic group in the focus area. Putting in that way, the central government might impose the undesirable policy and thus bring about the violence in this particular region unintentionally. This chapter will deal with brief history of Patani Kingdom which used to be an independent and very vital commercial state for the oversea merchants in the past. This chapter will also illustrate the burgeoning stage and devastation of Pattani territory, which is finally subjected to the Siamese colonization.

According to the documentary researches, identity destruction[1] including the language suppression becomes the crucial factor bringing about the conflict of the nation.[2] Specially, in the Pattani region, the Malay Muslims are very proud of their own identity; they continuously speak Malay or Melayu in their own development, known as

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[1] David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia", Pacific Affairs, Vol.16, No.1 (Spring, 1988), 51-77. It suggests that intervention into community by state will destroy the communal authority structures of minority group; this situation will create the identity crisis and insecurity of the group. The community elite loses his legitimacy and finally tries to protect his status and respect, which eventually createsviolence to keep the elite's legitimacy. According to this conclusion, the identity assimilation can bring about the violence and territorial separation.

[2] Imtiyaz Yusuf, "The southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim ummah", in Chaiwat Satha-Anand (ed.) 2009. Imagined Land?: The State and Southern Violence in Thailand. Bangkok: Sanrei Printing Co.Ltd. pp.207,214 Yusuf indicates that the southern Thai violence episode demonstrates that etho-religiosity identity is a large factor in shaping conflict, not purely religious issues.

Jawi language.[3]   After the incorporation of Patani Kingdom into Thailand, the violence continuously occurs, especially after the application of identity assimilation policy by the Thai government.[4] This might be depicted as an endeavor of the Malay ethnics to preserve their own culture, language, and identity rather than fighting for an independence from Thailand.   The understanding of historical study is very crucial to help alleviate the violent problems, the Thai government might have to apply more and numerous sophisticated measures to solve this conflict.   Eventually, one of several methods to relieve the widespread violent situations might be to build trust by conducting fact-finding deeply into history, and established truth must be shown to public sincerely. Particularly, the researcher strongly believes that the acceptance of the traditionally local values, culture, language, and their identity must be the first priority to obtain trust from the members of the focused area.

2.1 Brief history of Patani Kingdom

Patani[5] was the largest city in an independent Malay kingdom, known as Langkasuka territory.[6] Established in the first century AD, the kingdom soon gained its

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[2] Duncan McCargo. 2008 Tearing Apart The Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pp.4

[3] The scholars also indicate other important factors bringing about the violence, such as the lack of good governance, the lack of local participation in policy establishment, the misunderstanding and mistrust between the local citizens and government officials and other problems including the lack of due process of law in criminal justice system. Please see generally in Chaiwat Satha-Anand.2009 (ed.), Imagined Land?: The State and Southern Violence in Thailand. Bangkok: Sanrei Printing Co.Ltd. pp.9-11

[4] The scholars use the term "Patani", instead of "Pattani" (double t spelling) to refer to the wider imagined and historical region, while "Pattani" is used in a much narrower sense, and is reserved for one of the four Southern provinces under conflict. *Eg. See* Duncan McCargo, 2008. *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP

importance as a commercial and trading center for those sailing between the Gulf of Thailand. In addition, Langkasuka also extended its commercial routes on the east coast and on the west coast, where Sai-buri played the important role in the western area.[7] In the early period of "Langkasuka" kingdom, most people's faith was Hindu and Mahayana Buddhism until the 13rd AD.[8] Langkasuka, became less important kingdom due to the competing force of other kingdoms, such as Srivijaya and the Angor of Cambodia. The capital city and its center were removed to the new territory and finally replaced by the kingdom of Patani around 13rd century.[9]

Around 12th century, most people in Patani kingdom conducted the constant contact with Persia Arab, who followed the Islamism, and Indian, some of whom were Hindu. The local people intermarried with those merchants.[10] Certainly, these incomers brought with them their cultural heritage, and Islamic ideals were main ways of life for most people in this kingdom since the 13rd century.[11] By 15th century, the Kingdom of Patani was converted to Islam and declared itself an Islamic state in 1457.[12] Since then, the Islamic kingdom of Patani, led by the Sultans from two major dynasties, increasingly grew in terms of economic prosperity and cultural cradle. Patani became the commercial center for the merchants from Japan, China, Java, India, and Arab since 1516 AD.[13]

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[5] Srisak Wallipodom, et al, 2007. Loa-Khan-Tam-Nam-Tai (Myth of Southern Thailand), pp.20-21 (The Myth of Patani Kingdom is not crystal clear. Most documents derive from the folk tale, ancient historical documents, and historian analysis idea toward some materials left in the Patani regional area.)

[6] *Ibid*

[7] *Ibid*.p.24

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Andries Teeuw, et al. 1970. *The Story of Patani*. The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, p.75

[12] Ibrahim Syukri, (pseudonym) 1985. History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani, United States, Ohio University Press. pp. 19,26, 29

Because it was the prosperous area, the merchants from Portugal, England, and the Netherlands became the first group to have commercial contacts with Patani since 1602.[14]

Patani became one of the most important commercial centers of the region. The kingdom of Siam, which had stronger power than any other in the continent, extended its power to the Patani kingdom since 1603 AD.[15] Siam attempted to invade Patani by military action for several times from 1603 to 1633 AD but never succeed.[16] While kingdom of Siam failed to occupy Patani, the intermarriage between Patani rulers and other Islamic states became the most important tools to strengthen their relationships to bargain with Siam. Siam was one of the largest and strongest powers in the area, Patani also had relationship with Siam by sending some gift an act of acknowledging authority of Siam.[17] In this aspect, Patani would compromise with Siam to keep their local autonomy to rule and still had capacity to keep relationship with other states. In other

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[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid*. Also cited in History of Southern Thailand, available at http://suttiporn.blogspot.com/2008/02/history-of-southern-thailand.html (last visited April 25, 2009) and Srisak Wallipodom indicates that the most important evidence to illustrate the Siam Kingdom power is that the Portugal ambassador came to negotiate with Siam over Melaka Channel territory in Ayutthaya Reign. Srisak Wallipodom, *Ibid*. p.26

However, some historian, for example, Thawat Ratanaphichart, indicates that Patani Kingdom came under the power of Sukhothai Era, but it conflicts with Sujit Wongthase in that Sujit indicates that the Patani was independent state in Sri-vi-chai Kingdom rather than being controlled by the others. Please see Thawat Ratanaphichart, History of the four southern provinces of Thailand, Narathivat-Patani-Yala, Setul, (Bangkok: Silpakorn Department, no specific printed year), p. introduction; Sujit Wongthase, Editor's Introduction. In History "Confidentiality" of the three southern provinces of Thailand, Patani Kingdom in "Sri-vi-chai" is older than Sukhothai era, (Silapa-watanatham Journal) (Bangkok: Matichon Press, 2005) Cited in Peerayut Orphan, Intercultural Communication of Malay-Thai in Southern Thailand and Thai-Malaysian in Kelantan, Malaysia, (Ph.D. Thesis, Journalism and Communication Faculty, Thammasat University, 2008) p.83

[15] Ibrahim Syukri, *Ibid.* pp.19,26, 29

[16] Srisompop Jitpiromsri, *Id.* pp. 98-99

words, Siam and Patani had the relationship that was called un-tightly power relationship without occupation but based on the commercial profit.[18] Even when, Patani sent gift called "Bungamas" to the Siam. Patani ruler still had absolute power over its land, or self-governing during Ayutthaya epoch. Patani was generally held within Ayutthaya power, but might be independent sultanate when Ayutthaya became weak.[19]

In 1786, in the reign of Rama I, Siamese kingdom was finally successful in invading and occupying Patani.[20] The relationship changed from loosely power relationship to occupation, After occupation, Siam still allowed Patani to employ the administration system, called Malay Kerajaa system – meaning that raja (raya, king or queen) was the existence condition of state – but Siam was in charge of appointing the raya as the delegated ruler from Bangkok. For instance, Siam appointed Tengku Lamidin as the raya of Pattani; Tengku Lamidin must show the loyalty to Siam by sending Bangamas to Siam. Pattani was too far for Bangkok to efficiently control, the rebellion occurred sometimes. Siam designated Pattani to be under the control of Songhla, the southern border city of Siam in that era. Of course, this was decision without proper measures to deal with the ethnic diversity of Patani people.

To deal with the resistance of Pattani people, Siam introduced and implemented several political measures to fully control Pattani by changing its political power structure from Malay Kerajaa system to "divide and rule system." Between 1808 and 1817 Pattani was divided into seven entities, and Siam had absolute power to appoint the governor or

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[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Duncan McCargo. 2008 Tearing Apart The Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P.4 (Some Conservative Thai historians have argued differently that Patani was still part of Siam even at the time of weak power.)

[19] Srisompop Jitpiromsri, supra note 1 pp. 98-99.

raya in those entities.[21]   However, this policy turned out to be futile: the revolts still recurred, and the policy in use even created more resentment amongst the appointed governors. Changing the administrative structure in such way made the Islamic rulers lose their divine powers under the religious way of life of Muslim world, not merely in term of politics.[22] It was the measure to abolish the Raja system and eradicate the Muslim identity as well.   Under those oppressive rules and inconsiderate control, there were several uprising events to resist Siam during 1831-1832 AD and other rebellions consecutively.[23] Finally, those measures still created much more complicated problems until the current period.[24]

By the time of King Chulalongkorn, a new policy was brought into effect, that is the abolition of "Bangamas system" and introduced the new law imposing duties for the Pattani to pay monetary tax in 1899 AD.[25] Two years later, Siam launched new strategies to unify the Kingdom of Siam as the modern state by promulgating the Regional Administration Act of 1901which created the Thesaphiban system. Those seven entities were combined together to ensure more direct control from the government in the form of the grouped area called "Monthon Pattani," which was assigned the highest power to the regional commissioner appointed by Bangkok.   In addition, the name of the ruler of those seven entities was also changed into Thai name approved by the king of Siam.

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[20] Those seven entities or cities were: ปัตตานี (Pattani/ Patani), ยะลา หรือ ฌาลอ/Jalor, ยะหริ่ง หรือ ฌิริง (Jering หรือฌามบู/Jambu), ระแงะ (Rengeh หรือลืแฆ็ฮ/Legeh), ราห์มัน (Rahman หรือรามัน/Raman), สายบุรี (Saiburi หรือตะบูลัน/Taluban), and หนองจิก (Nongchik หรือ เตาะฌง/Tok Jong). Please *see* Mohd, Zamberi A Malek, Umat Islam Patani : Sejarah dan Politik, HIZBE: Shan Alam, 1993, cited in Srisak Wanllipodom, supra note 2, at 28. Also *see* Sujit Wongthet, 2005. "Kingdom of Patani in Srivijaya was older than Sukhothai History," Bangkok: Matichon.

[21] Srisompop Jitpiromsri, supra note 1, p 100

[22] History of Southern Thailand, available at http://suttiporn.blogspot.com/2008/02/history-of-southern-thailand.html

[23] Srisompop Jitpiromsri, supra note 1, p.100

[24] *Ibid.*p. 102

After the administration reformation occurred, the circle of violence has relentlessly happened to widely resist Siam since 1903 till present.[26] However, some local Malay rulers ("Raja" or "Raya"), and even the British government (through the Anglo-Thai treaty), officially recognized Thai rule and sovereignty over the area in 1909.

As with other colonized states such as India, Africa, and even America, after the modern state unification measures were launched in King Rama V, Pattani was subject to the "assimilation and standardization" policy, imposed by the central government. For example, the officials were dispatched from Bangkok, and educational system, which must be identical to the rest of Siam, were imposed upon. Sultanate system or Raja was actually abolished in 1902 by replacing the new regional bureau under the regional administration act of 1901. Bangkok also declared the new legal system to replace the Sharia and Adat Laws, the Islamic Laws, widely used and accepted not only as religious practices but also ways of political life for Muslim in Pattani prior to the occupation of Siam kingdom.[27] Standard Thai language from Bangkok was also compulsory as the official language in Patani. Importantly, in 1921, the Compulsory Primary Educational System Act was declared to force all people in Siam to study in Thai language.[28] More badly, after the revolution in 1932, the democratic government, specifically Prime Minister Marshall P. Piboonsongkram, declared the Thai doctrine of "One Race One Nation," [29] which included the same religion – or Buddhism. Bangkok also changed the name of country from Siam to Thailand, which implied that all people living in this country must be only Thai. This policy aimed at eliminating other cultures and identity by creating and imposing new identity on the people living in Thailand. [30] Doing so made all Muslim not only in Pattani but also in the eye of other Muslim countries

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[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*pp. 108-109.

[27] *Ibid.*p.113

[28] Srisak Wallipodom, supra note …. P.35

[29] Details will be discussed in ch.3 in far.

considered this policy as the threats to destroy Muslim identity as a whole. With the distinctive history and characteristics of the region being neglected, it turned out that Pattani as a Siamese colony was alienated. McCargo claims that Pattani "has never been properly incorporated culturally or psychologically into predominantly Buddhist Thailand."[31] As a result, throughout the later history (after 1909 onwards), there have been constant outbreaks of resistance, including the 1948 Dusun-nyor incident, 1954 arrest and disapperance of Haji Sulong (a leading Islamic teacher) by the Thai police, 1975 demonstrations at the Pattani Central Mosque, and countless other attacks.

The groups that were held responsible for these outbreaks mentioned above included the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). Whatever their actual motivations may be, these groups have similarly emphasized the need to separate themselves from the rest of Thailand. Their Malay identity and socio-cultural differences as their primary rationale. Some suggestions of more complicated reasons for creation of violence or separation is that the Thai government ignores or misunderstands the ways of life in terms of economic development in this territory. It claims that the ideal of current investment to develop the industry contrasts to the Muslim ways of life. Then, it is worth delineating the information about economic system of Muslim followers in this part.

The Pattani region is abundant in natural resources, which include mineral deposits such as tin, gold, wolfram, manganese, and natural gas, rubber, tropical plants such as coconuts and durian, and fish. Despite the fertile land, the Muslim Malays are not economically prosperous. It is the Chinese and Thai businessmen who own plantation crops, who own large-scale fishing boats, and who have access to technological advancements, while the Muslim Malays are either self-employed and depend upon traditional ways of fishing, or employed as workers on Chinese and Thai

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[30] McCargo, Duncan. 2008. *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. p.2

plantations. In comparison to the mainstream Thai and Chinese people in the same area, the Malay Muslims are economically inferior.

Based on such markedly different economic conditions, many have assumed poverty and underdevelopment to be the cause of the Southern conflict and violence. Srisompob and Panyasak[32] point out that the Thaksin government subscribed to this idea of economic explanation. This fact can clearly be seen in Thaksin's nationwide television address after the Tak Bai tragedy. Operating under such an assumption, the government then ordered that additional funds be given into the Southern Muslim majority areas after the upsurge of violence in January 2004. It was believed that such funds would help solve the problem.

The economic issues are very unlikely to blame for the continuous uprisings and violence in the South. Srisompob and Panyasak offer two reasons for ruling out the economic issues as the sole factor contributing to current violence. First, considering the location of attacks, there is no evidence that poverty and incidents of violence are related, citing the statistical data to show that the 2004 violent attacks occurred in only a small proportion of the eighty-five communities that experiences poverty, while the majority of attacks occurred in communities that are above the poverty line. Second, the rubber prices have increased and many Malay Muslims are better off than before, and identity issues are nothing new, the violence still continues.[33]   Due to these reasons, solving economic issues would not help eradicate Southern violence.

2.2 The Specific Characteristics of Pattani Identity

In this section, the socio-cultural aspects of the conflict will be defined in some detail, dividing the section into three subsections, each addressing a particular aspect of

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[31] Srisompob Jitpiromsri, and Panyasak Sobhonvasu. 2007. "Unpacking Thailand's Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations." In *Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence.* Ed. Duncan McCargo. Singapore: NUS Pres, 89-111 .
[32] *Ibid.*

the Southern identity, that is, religion, language, ethmic and identity of Muslim followers in Patani kingdom.

2.2.1 Religion

As pointed out above, the region in conflict has been deeply rooted in Islamic traditions, and it is indeed this particular aspect of identity that has made this region distinct from the rest of Buddhist Thailand.

As the historical site of Islam in South-East Asia, Pattani was also the center of religious education and scholarships. Not surprisingly, Pattani featured many famous "pondoks" (religious schools), established by religious scholars who received training from leading Islamic institutions of Mecca, Medina, and Cairo. The religious centers served both moral and worldly functions. They were not only places for worshipping, but also educational sites for the locals, where Islamic doctrines and ways of life, history, and Arabic have been passed down from generation to generation. It is not farfetched to claim that both the pondok and the mosques play an important role in creating and reinforcing the sense of Islam in this region.

With the "assimilation and standardization" policy implemented since the Anglo-Thai treaty in 1909, Pattani experienced the enforcement of Thai education and culture. For example, during the government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the pondoks were officially transformed into registered private Islamic schools (Rongrian Aekachon Sorn Sasana Islam), subject to government rules and regulations. The pondoks were asked to teach government-designed secular curriculum, or otherwise they would run the risk of not being financially supported by the government. This was done with the intention to

"create and improve Thai consciousness, cultivate loyalty to the principal institutions such as the nation, the religion, and the monarchy."[34]

As a registered private Islamic school, a pondok was required to operate under a centrally designed curriculum as approved by the Ministry of Education, in which case all the textbooks and the medium of instruction were in Thai. Undoubtedly, this produced immensely fatal effects upon the traditional system of religious education in this region, and gradually the pondoks as registered Islamic schools disappeared, due to their inability to operate as before, and were ultimately replaced by Thai public schools. However, since the traditional Islamic educational system was still in high demand, the locals sent their children to receive education abroad (in Malaysia, India, Arab countries for example), and by the time they returned home, it was very likely that these new waves had developed the separatist idea and become potential leaders of long-wanted freedom.

The Thai government has continued to enforce their Buddhist-based policies upon this Islamic-based region at all levels. For example, the 1997 Islamic Organizations Administration Act politicized provincial Islamic councils, turning them into proxies for wider national and local power plays. At the same time, most of the representatives from this Islamic region (including those in the parliament and those in provincial and district organizations) who were supposed to do everything in the best interests of the locals, became allies with the government and followed their orders, thus being ultimately alienated from the locals. For other political representatives from the South, their voices were marginalized, within the Buddhist-dominated system of government. As regard the impotence of the Malay-Muslim political representatives, [35] it argues

"[T]he Malay Muslim elites on whom the Thai had been relying to manage the region's population were no where to be seen. Islamic leaders had precious little to say about the violence, and Wan Nor and his fellow

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[33] As cited in Surin Pitsuwan, 1982. *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand*. Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University.
[34] McCargo (2008), *supra* note 3 p.184

Wadah group politicians were so compromised that they failed effectively either to represent the fury of the South to Bangkok, or to communicate Bangkok's position to the South. The Thaksin government even tried to blame the Wadah group for what had happened, putting MP Majmuddin Umar on trial for treason, in a tragicomic attempt to teach Wadah a lesson."

If McCargo's view above is correct, then the religion is only a small part of the whole conflict. More likely, what is at issue is the political and power struggle, seen through both the institutional exclusion and suppression and repression. That is, the Muslim-Malays believe that they have a just cause to rebel against the rest of Thailand. Their beliefs have been partly reinforced by the Islamic principles that "God alone has sovereignty" and that "Disobedience and revolution against those who are deemed unjust are justified."[36] This view is further supported by Chaiwat[37] and Nithi.[38] Although different in details, both Chaiwat and Nithi believe that the Southern conflict is aimed at securing independence, operated by ordinary, underprivileged people (and not the international terrorist network), who rely on popular religion and beliefs. Thus, to understand the nature of the conflict better, I turn my attention to language in the next section, which is part and parcel of the local identity.

2.2.2 Language

Language has long been noted to play an important role in the formation and expression of identity and sense of belonging. More than just a means of communication, language is the unifying bond between individuals coming from different backgrounds. Some scholars even went so far as to argue that language determines the world views of

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[35] *Ibid.* at 14….

[36] As cited in Bunnag 2003. Nayobai kan pokkrong khong rattaban tor chaothai muslim nai changwa chaidaen thai 2475-2516. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. pp.34-37

[37] Nithi Auesrivongse, 2004 Mong Satanakarn parktai phan wan kabot chaona. Silpa Wattanatham. 25(8), June.

its speakers: "We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds…"[39] In this way, the Muslim-Malay in Southern Thailand have been bound by a common Patani dialect of Malay, known as Jawi. According to Saynee Mudmarn ,[40] who studied the relationship between language and loyalty amongst the Muslim-Malays in the South of Thailand and who obtained information from the 1960 census for the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, approximately 75% of the total population in the area, who were older than 5 years, were unable to speak Thai. The situation may have changed now, since as mentioned in the previous section, the government has increasingly operated under the assimilationist model of national integration by enforcing a standardized education curriculum and by transforming the pondoks, which used to be the linguistic and cultural enrichment center, into private schools. As a result younger generations are now in the system where Thai is the medium of instruction.

Despite the educational policy from the central government and despite the linguistic encroachment by Standard Thai, Jawi still plays an important role in the Southern community and has been maintained through various means. Saynee Mudmarn [41] argues that Jawi has been the home language of the locals in the former Patani Kingdom, and it is used amongst peers, family members, and people in the same community. Other sources where the use of Jawi has been maintained include the tadika school, which is a school set up by a Malay community aimed at teaching the basic knowledge of Islam as well as the Malay language. While receiving formal education at Thai school, Muslim-Malay children also attend this kind of community school at weekends, in hopes of preserving their Malay language and culture. Finally, some of the pondoks still serve to maintain and perpetuate the use of Jawi by refusing to adopt the

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[38] Edward Sapir and David Goodman Mandelbaum. 1958. *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality.* Berkeley: University of California Press, p 69.
[39] Saynee Mudmarn, 1988. *Language Use and Loyalty among the Muslim-Malays of Southern Thailand.* Doctoral dissertation: SUNY Buffalo.
[40] *Ibid* at 104-106

secular educational system as asked by the Thai government and have continued to focus on religious studies only. The Jawi is held as a sacred language in the religious domain. Strongly affiliated with Islam, Jawi is used in many Islamic rites and rituals, except for those prayers that are recited in Arabic, the language of Qur'an.

Because of the roles and functions of the Jawi dialect mentioned in this section, it can be seen that the dialect is so important as to foster and perpetuate Malay-Islam identity and culture, and is capable of holding the locals of the Southern Thailand loyal to its use. It is to be concluded, as Mudmarn convincingly points out:

> [t]he Malay language functions as a boundary marker between those who are Malay and those who are not. It links their present existence with their glorious past, reminding them of their history as a separate sovereign polity. Furthermore, Malay is considered a source of cultural heritage, of positive values and of pride for the Muslim Malays. [42]

If our hypothesis of the importance of Jawi is correct, then it is perhaps not surprising that the speakers of Jawi, who maintain loyalty to and take pride in their home language but who are also denied—in one way or another—their linguistic rights, feel resentment and could not help feeling suppressed. Such pressure comes from no where but the central government's desire to increase the use of Thai as a crucial element of spreading Thai identity and hegemony by discouraging the use of Jawi.

Fraser sums up the feeling of a member of the Malay-Islam in Southern Thailand who was caught up in this predicament nicely. He indicates that the most readily available means of signifying his distinctiveness in the face of increasing contact with the Thais is the Malay villager's membership in the Islamic world community. He is unable to rally around linguistic differences, for these are under direct attack by the government. Although he insists he is first a Malay and then a Muslim, he is unable to use his Malay culture as a mark of distinctiveness, for either he is branded as an irredentist, or he is

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[41] *Ibid.* at 283

unable to define clearly what the distinctive elements of Malay culture are---other than religion"[43]

Such a fact may also be seen in the way in which the Muslim Malays are ethnically represented. Beginning with the first administration of Marshall P. Piboonsongkram government (1938-1946), there have been attempts to replace the foreign (or non-Thai) ethnic label with a religious one. The Muslim Malays, who used to call themselves and were known as Melayu Patani (which of course indicates a strong sense of ethnic and national tie to Malaysia), has been changed and given a new identity—Thai Muslims. It was hoped that this linguistic change would help achieve national assimilation and integration. However, it has turned out that the more effort the government exerts in the transformation of the Southern locals to have the same identity as the rest of the Thai people, the more alienated and estranged these people have become. Even today, the Muslims are often(and sometimes derogatorily) referred to the rest of the Thai people as "khaek ". This term contains humiliation meaning and thus looks down on those Muslim Malay people. In other word, this particular way of reference reveals the fact that the Malay Muslims are ostracized, excluded, and alienated even in their own land, by the mainstream Thai people.

Certainly, a harmonious relationship with a group of people with an entirely different linguistic background is not possible with the use of force, coercion, or imposition of the uncalled-for policies. Instead, the government should be willing to take into consideration the linguistic differences, and show respect for such differences, recognizing that it is for the whole country's benefits to promote Jawi to a higher status, particularly at the regional level so that the locals feel welcome as part of the Thai community. Having discussed the linguistic situations that contribute to the conflict, I now move onto the next section, where I address economic situations in the South.

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[42] Fraser, Thomas, M. Jr. 1966 *Fishermen of South Thailand: The Malay Villagers.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

2.2.3 Identity of the Pattani people

The ethnicity of the Pattani people will imply all factors which are different from other combinations such as national culture, language, skin color, class, etc.[44] However, the ethnicity is not a property of any group, but it is the characteristics of the relationship between something that consider themselves as culturally distinguishable aspects from the members of the other group.[45] The term ethnicity also complicatedly involves with other terms such as race, class, nationality, and identity. Some scholars, then, explain that ethnicity can be defined as a social identity.[46] The term of identity has been defined differently and it is composed of several aspects combined together and will be shown as the specific characteristics which might be a symbol to indicate the particular group that some persons belong to.[47] For the Pattani people, when discussed what will be composed of identity of them, there might be at least two distinguished factors to indicate that they are Pattani members. For example, the identity will identify what race and ethnicity of the members since ancient time till the present. This will include the language which the indigenous populations used to communicate among the members. The second factor might be found in the pious faith that the members belong to and comply with as the ways of the member's rights.[48] The identity is, then, deeply implanted to the personal

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[42] Ethnicity and Identity, available at http://www.changingminds.org/disciplines/sociology/articles/ ethnicity.htm

[43] Jon Jeppsson, 2008. Annexation and assimilation: An ethnic approach to the roots of conflicts in Thailand's deep south., (Research project, Department of Political Science, Lund University) P.8

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] Anthropological Thought and Theory, available at http://cyberlab.lh1.ku.ac.th/elearn/faculty/social/ soc65/13.html

[46] Winai Sama-un, "Identity of the Thais and Cultural Diversities" In Surichai Wankeaw. 2007 "Source of Fire in Southern Thailand." (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press) PP. 15-21

characteristics by internal – imagination and emotion – and external factors – the surroundings, as well as other combinations.

As discussed before, the Patani kingdom adopted Islamic religion at least in the 13th century. It means that Islam has been adopted in the current three border provinces of Thailand more than 1200 years ago.[49] The Pattani people, has been profoundly embodied the ways of life, which formed their identity, through the means of Islamic religion and Jawi language, the Malay Arabic dialect as the tools in socialization process of the community, known as the Malay Kerajaan. Because the Pattani populations have been implanted under the Islamic religious faith and have long history before the subjugation by Siam, their identity are extremely permanent and easily permeated to the new generations. The Pattani identity can be characterized as the darulsalam, which means that the people in this territory have to comply with the Islamic faith. The rule of "God" cannot be changed by anyone, time and space.[50] And those rules are deemed not only cultures, norms but also the law which govern all steps of Muslim ways of life.

In conclusion, Islam provides the provisions both secular and spiritual world; those rules include the science of economics, law, science, philosophy, politics, social science, career, commercial science, medicine, consumer protection, family and heritage, and other science such as the rule of war as well as the rule of engagement for the daily life of all religious followers.[51] Muslim habits cannot be changed by anyone except the sacred rule of the one true God, namely Allah.[52] They are not similar to the Thais as required by Bangkok policy to assimilate them to be Thais. Then, calling as "Thai-Muslims" is incorrect, because they are Melayu-Muslims. The extremist believes that the idea to integrate and assimilate them as well as change their identity will bring about the violence because the Pattani will strive for preserving their identity and in case necessary

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[47] Muslimthai.com, Islam in Thailand: the origin of Muslims in Thailand, available at http://www.muslimthai.com/main/1428/content.php?page=sub&category=50&id=190

[48] Thai Heritage Treasury, The Problems of Three Provinces of Thailand, available at http://www1.tv5.co.th/service/mod/heritage/nation/situation/border_r1.htm

[49] Muslimthai.com.

[50] *Ibid.*

they are willing to commit jihad, or religious war, to liberate from the non-Islamic ruler.[53] Currently, the population in Thailand is around 66.7 millions, but most of the Pattani people, living in three border provinces of Thailand, are Muslims of around two millions.

2.3 Theory of ethnicity and identity

2.3.1 Relationship between ethnicity and identity

The terms of ethnicity and identification are complexly involved each other and also closely related to other terms such as race and nationality as discussed in the former section so far. Ethnicity describes the relationship that exists between an individual and the particular group that individual belongs to.[54] The individual might share the common belief to one another from their ancestry, and thus make one shared common characteristics, shared socio cultural experiences, or both.[55] An individual may identify with an important person, such as, a parent or a friend, with a group from which he or she draws values, such as, family or co-workers, or with a broad category of persons, such as, ethnic or occupational groups. Ethnic identification can exist at the individual, family or group level.[56]

Identity, call *attaluk* in Thai, is composed of two terms that is "self" and "characteristics." The point of view of the Thai scholar identifies this term as the combination of the specific traits or characteristics of anything or any person or group of person which make general people or the others know or recognize instantly if heard or

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[51] Chuleeporn Wirun-ha, 2007 "Conflicts in the Southern Thailand from the historical perspectives" In Surichai Wankeaw, ed. "Source of Fire in Southern Thailand," (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press) P.23

[52] The Canadian Encyclopedia, "Ethnic Identity," available at http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0002662

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*

seen. The identity of each society in term of culture will be different from place to place.[57]

Identity is also defined differently by beginning with the question of "who am I?" [58] The finding toward such question will let the human interaction among members of society occurs by considering himself and others and letting others consider ourselves through the lens of society. At the same time, the perspectives toward the identity will be considered with the political power and thus its definition will depict or represent the truth from its original meaning in common sense of the society. The identity can be differentiated from the personality in many aspects. A person might share the common personal traits and also share the common identity which concerns with some awareness and activeness in our personality. For instance, the man might choose to identify himself with some group or some specific identity, especially, when he has more alternatives in such situation. Personality, then, might explain the specific individuality or behavior such as socialized person or introvert one. The identity will relate to the group which shares the common uniqueness of specific characteristics. People always intentionally mark themselves to those similar groups and shun from some different groups. One might start to indicate other identity by finding the sign of recognition such as the accent of language, sense of belonging of such person, etc.

The crucial characters of identity will be shown by the different symbols which enunciate the relationship of the combination of characteristics. Such symbols might be seen in several forms. Identity relates to numerous dimensions such as the internal factor – emotion and personal perspectives. It also combines with the external factors which the people have to interact with. Identity can be divided into two levels, the personality one and social identity, which such person will show the specific characteristics combination

[55] Source: radio media "Know, Love of Thai language", by Thailand radio communication on date 16 of June, 2007 (07.00 – 07.30 am.) Also posted in The Royal Institute, available at http://www.royin.go.th/th/knowledge/detail.php?ID=1583 (last visited April 26, 2009)

[56] Anthropological Thought and Theory, available at http://cyberlab.lh1.ku.ac.th/elearn/faculty/social/soc65/13.html

to indicate or represent what group that person belongs to. For example, the person might use the specific sign, indigenous language, or particular symbols.

Identity is the product of society, which plays vital role to connect or unite the relationship among the members and their surroundings or habitats. Identity is created by personal interaction among human beings. Eventually, identity of person will create the social structures of particular society. The pattern of identity – which includes value, culture, norms, and ethnicity – might be subjected to complicatedly change in different time and space by the evolution of technology by the power of globalization. The change of identity can happen from micro level of daily ways of life to the social movement process. The new society might develop the culture and identity, which mix all elements of those complex culture elements.

Stuart Hall indicates that some people, such as the immigrants, might still keep the old identity by living with the new habitats without being assimilated by the dominant identity. However, some might strive to preserve their identity. Identity development is dynamic characteristics, which the people have been fighting either to preserve their original uniqueness or to change to survive in new surroundings. The main characteristics of identity are the abstract entity which derives from the pure imagination of the people.

2.3.2 Characteristics of ethnic groups

Ethnic often refers to a particularly distinctive category of the population in a larger society within the diversity of culture. The different ethnic groups may be the

result of migrations of whole societies, military conquest or altered political boundaries.[59] According to the Canadian Encyclopedia, the category of ethnic group is:[60]

"First, they usually control a territory, tightly knit community or network, within which their offspring may perpetuate their heritage. Different ethnic groups may occupy the same area but use different resources. …,

Second, ethnic institutions often generate forces of attraction. A minority can develop its own social system with control over its own institutions so that interaction of the group will take place largely within the system. The French and Jews frequently maintain a comprehensive set of religious, educational and welfare institutions. Residential segregation and ethnic institutional independence therefore tend to reinforce each other.

Third, individuals need to identify clearly with the heritage and culture of the group, perhaps through language, endogamy, choice of friends, religion, parochial schools, voluntary organizations, etc. Territorial, institutional and cultural identity factors reinforce each other, so that ethnic individuals can remain distinct and less prone to assimilation. Historical symbols are also important. Without ethnic pride and knowledge, the desire to perpetuate tradition rapidly diminishes. The Jews have ritualized their history and their youth are exposed to its symbols, eg, special days, fasting, food habits, etc.

Fourth, a political or religious ideology that promotes values considered more important than cultural and institutional ones may give ethnic youth purpose and impetus. There is often a very strong correlation between religion and ethnicity, eg, most French and Polish Canadians are Roman Catholic.

Fifth, individuals with a sense of mission often use socio psychological means to adapt an ideology to a current situation, linking it symbolically with the past. Minorities

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[59] The Canadian Encyclopedia, Ethnic Identity, available at
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0002662
[60] *Ibid.*

may identify with other dimensions of ethnicity, but identity, territory, institutions, culture, heritage, ideology and leaders are crucial."

2.3.3 State and identification.

The arguable issues about the ethnicity and identity might occur in numerous ways. One of them might be the question if one nation should have only one single identity, and ethnicity. The positive answer might be preferable for the ruler, but indeed one modern state might be composed of several ethnics and diversities of identity. The clear cut reason to explain the phenomena of diversities in each society might be based on the rational and history development in different states; there might be many racial ethnic groups living together, and stick with their own multicultural norms in each group. Whenever the movement of globalization invades into the ethnic group, they have at least two choices. First, they might accept the new norms and change their identity or second, they might seek avoidance of participation or in worse case, they might make campaign for preservation of localism to protect their identity.[61] Basically, in one country, it is composed of a number of ethnic groups, which of course means that there are cultural diversities. They usually assert their rights to preserve local cultures and common heritage in their particular society as well as the right to self-determination such as local autonomy.[62] One race one nation policy[63], as a result, is false in the real world. The rights of minority groups or dominated people have been guaranteed by international safeguard. Identity assimilation strategies imposed by the central government similar to the cultural integration policy from 1932 to 1968 prove the situation of severe resistance

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[61] Choosak Pathrakulvanich, (January – March, 2007). "Cultural Diversities from Integration Unity to Hybridity", Same Sky Books, 5 Vol.1: 158

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] The policy of One Race One Nation – Thai-ism – was used in King Rama V reign by the unification and assimilation strategies to centralize the power and establish modern state. The Royal Decree 1899 imposed the regulation about population census method by stating that the government official…, when surveyed the population census, or when anyone had contacted to the office, must indicate those people as "Thai." No other nationality or ethnicity would be registered in the official government of Siam. As cited in Suchit Wongthet, (June – July, 2006) "Power of Esan and Ancestor "Where the Thais come from." Amata Foundation Newsletter, Vol. 4: 38; *see Ibid.* p.160

and thus violence all of which means the need to survive and preserve their identity.[64] In addition, if any state fails to comply with the international safeguard, the criminal and civil penalty attached by the international responsibility might be imposed on the government directly.

2.4 Literature Review

As mentioned in an Introduction chapter, the conflict is normal phenomenon around the world and likely to be part of society. In recent years, internal civil strife for any purposes, such as, independence, autonomy, etc, become more prevalent phenomena.[65] The tendency of current global conflicts is clear that they are of the intrastate ones, rather than interstate ones.[66] The main issues of conflict in the most frequent ones are the attitude toward the system or ideology of administrative government.[67]

In addition, one of the most crucial cause can be deducted from those intrastate conflicts is the striving to protect their ethnicity and language, such as the event of conflict in Sri Lanka. After Sri Lanka became independent from United Kingdom in 1948, they declared by using Act of 1956 Singhalese as the only official language. This brought about the conflict between Tamil ethnic, the minority group, and Sinhalese, the dominant group and becomes the longest intrastate conflict in the world until now.[68]

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[64] Chuleeporn Wirun-ha, "Conflicts in the Southern Thailand from the historical perspectives" In Surichai Wankeaw, 2007 "Source of Fire in Southern Thailand," (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press) PP.41-53

[65] Kathrin Lorenz, 2005, Conflict and Conflict Analysis in Sri Lanka, in Conflict, Conflict Resolution & Peace Building, edited by Jayadeva Uyangoda, (Sri Lanka, GTZ and University of Colombo Press) page 190

[66] For example, in 2008, the numbers of the conflict were: 254 intrastate and 91 interstate conflicts. Please *see* Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2008, page 2

[67] *Ibid.* at 4

[68] The Tamil asserted: "All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law." - Article 7, Universal Declaration of Human Rights" to fight back the Majority group. Some more excerpts: " We are completing by this (Sinhala Only) Bill an important phase in our national struggle. The restoration of the Sinhala language to the position it occupied before the occupation

Numerous researches about the loyalty and strife for maintaining their identities, which includes language will be deliberately explained in this part so that the result of research will be used as the guidance to get the better resolution for preventing the conflict resolution as above discussed situation in Sri Lanka. In Thailand, the government seems to better understand about the current situation of violence by rethinking the actual cause of violent phenomena. The Thai government set up the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to study the actual causes of problems. It suggested the government accepting the Yawi language as the working language in the three border provinces of southern Thailand to alleviate the violence. However, this recommendation was denied by almost all authority in Thailand. According to the research, it reveals that the separatist movement might have no power to complete their missions to separate the Pattani territory from Thailand. However, the Pattani ethnics hope that the government will accept their identity as Malay Muslims, not Thai-Muslims as required by the nationalism policy. They also need the government from Bangkok to

of this country by foreign powers, marks an important stage in the history of the development of this island" - Phillip Gunawardene, Sri Lankan Cabinet Minister, Hansard, 14 June 1956

"I pointed out that the result of forcing Sinhalese as the sole state language for official purposes on an unwilling minority brought with it great dangers.... If a minority feels deeply that an injustice and a great injustice has been done it is likely to embark upon forms of resistance and protests. The possibility of communal riots is not the only danger I am referring to. There is the graver danger of the division of the country. we must remember that the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Ceylon are inhabited principally by Tamil speaking people and if those people feel that a grave and irreparable injustice is done to them, there is a possibility of their deciding even to break away from the rest of the country." - Leslie Gunawardene, Sinhala Opposition Member of Parliament, Hansard, 8 June 1956 *(but 16 years later, Leslie Gunawardene as a Minister in the Sri Lanka Cabinet voted for the entrenchment of the Sinhala only law in Sri Lanka's new 1972 Constitution which at the same time repealed the safeguards in the Soulbury Constitution against discrimination)*

"Do we want a single state or do we want two? Do we want one Ceylon or do we want two?.. These are the issues that in fact we have been discussing under the form and appearance of the language issue... if you mistreat them (Tamils), if you ill treat them.... if you oppress and harass them, in the process you may cause to emerge in Ceylon, from that particular racial stock with its own language and tradition, a new nationality to which we will have to concede more claims than it puts forward now... If we come to the stage where instead of parity, we through needless insularity, get into the position of suppressing the Tamil ... federal demand... there may emerge separatism." - Dr Colvin R. De Silva, Sinhala Opposition Member of Parliament, Hansard, June 1956 (but 16 years later, Colvin R. De Silva, as a Minister for Constitutional Affairs in the Sri Lanka Cabinet secured the entrenchment of the Sinhala only law in *Sri Lanka's new 1972 Constitution* which at the same time repealed the safeguards in the *Soulbury Constitution* against discrimination)

Source: http://www.tamilnation.org/indictment/indict004.htm

understand their rights to preserve their local cultures, particularly, and their own language, or Jawi language. From many researches indicate that the policy of compulsory integration and assimilation is dangerous strategies, especially, for the Muslims who are highly loyal to Islamic faith. The integration or assimilation either by the political measures or educational system always fails when applied to the Muslims because they consider those policies as a threat to destroy Muslims identity. Eventually, those policies will bring about the resistance and if the government has no better strategies to deal with this situation, they have no choice to voice their needs but violent creation. Here are the researches that indicate about the ways, which the minority group, or in this case the Pattani people, try to preserve identity when subject to the assimilation policy.

Saynee Mudmarn, in 1988, suggested in this sense and showed many examples of the struggle for preserving the identity which of course includes the mother tongue language in several countries, and might become violent in defense of their own languages such as the case of a purist's resistance to use of foreign words; or in the case of India during the sixties which attempted to adopt Hindi as the sole official language among multilingual languages; the South African in 1976 which imposed Afrikaann as the official language and brought about a violent flare-up.[69] Other situations of the ethnic groups, which vehemently preserve their own language, still can be seen in other cases, such as, the Francophones in Canada, the Breton in France, the Basques in Spain, the German in the United States, including the situation of the Muslim-Malay population of the southern Thailand.[70]

In addition, he also draws some interesting statistics about the scenario of the Muslim-Malay people living in the three border provinces. Even though they are minority group among the Thais, they are majority ethnics who obviously and predominantly speak Jawi in daily lives. In 1960, over 75% of the population could not

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[69] Saynee Mudmarn, *supra* note 10, p 2
[70] *Ibid.* at 2

understand standard Thai language and felt useless to learn it.[71] Saynee indicates from his study that in a speech community where only one language serves to fully provide communicative needs for all its members, usually there is little conscious awareness of language allegiance or loyalty since there is no alternative choice for the members. In contrast, in a community where at least two languages come into immediate contact, they will compete with each other and often develops within individuals or groups of people a sense of allegiance towards a particular language than the other. In this sense, the language loyalty will become much more significant for their lives.[72] Whether the people can maintain their own language or not will be based on some factors such as: (1) the habitual language at one point in time or space which media, time and place will play the significant role for losing its language loyalty; (2) psychological, social and cultural language use which relate to the social movement and socialization process impacted by external factors; and (3) behavior toward language all of which are under condition of intergroup contact, which will be the internal attitudes and emotions toward their own languages. The last factor is usually implanted to the members by using the religious faith to keep them far away from the external factors, which is always deemed the successful mechanism to preserve the national identity.[73]

Saynee furthermore recommends that the larger size of territory is also important factor to maintain their mother tongue language by resisting the assimilation from the others likewise the way to use the religious faith to protect the local language[74]. Other mechanism to protect their language is also the pre-experienced persons in the community who are capable of instructing and maintaining it.[75] This mechanism also plays important role to change the community attitude as well. In case the nobleman and high level educated leading persons enjoy the dominant culture, they will easily change the attitude of minority group members. However, the study finds that the high educated

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[71] *Ibid.* at 3
[72] *Ibid.* at 11
[73] *Ibid.* at 16
[74] *Ibid.* at 18
[75] *Ibid.* at 19

individuals tend to able to maintain their own language, and bring about the favorable language maintenance atmosphere.[76] The result of study shows that only 4% more or less of the participants in Pattani province speaks Thai,[77] while only 3% more or less has small problem to understand Jawi language.[78] The trend of young generation of Pattani populations become more bilingual than the older ones by expansion of compulsory education system, the massive Thai media as well as the advantage and opportunity to work as government officials if they are capable of understanding standard Thai language.[79] However, even though it seems successful for this scenario, it does not impact on Muslims in general because the graduate of high level in Thai education system fails to secure job and thus diminishes the confidence for Muslims to study in Thai education system.[80] The traditional religious schools, pondok, are still very important for all youth and the far better organized, managed as well as more qualified teachers are recruited to convey and maintain their cultures and language.[81] This situation might create more loyalty to Jawi language, and most importantly, attitude to language loyalty which might be deemed as the cultural or perception factors is also able to trigger the violence in society as well.[82]

Besides Saynee research, there are also many linguistic research studies that examine the ways in which speakers of various ethnic backgrounds identify with the mainstream community in a particular region. These studies illuminate how speakers might choose, by way of language use, to highlight their membership in a minority ethnic community as well as in the mainstream community either in alternatively or simultaneously.

Theoretically speaking, if a particular ethnic group has a language other than the socially dominant language at its disposal, the speakers can use it in the construction and

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[76] *Ibid.*at 20
[77] *Ibid.*at 167
[78] *Ibid.*at 182
[79] *Ibid.*at 289
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] *Ibid.*at 290
[82] Kathrin Lorenz, *supra* note 16 at 192

signaling of ethnic identity. This includes the selection of different languages for different symbolic purposes as well as what is referred to as "code-switching", the moving back and forth linguistically between two languages.

Lesley Milroy and Li Wei, studying the role of code switching in the construction of Chinese identities in Tyneside, Britain, find that the "ethnic index" that they constructed help identify and explain the patterns of language choice and the strength of ties that a particular individual had to others of the same ethnic group.[83]

Similarly Lo addresses the linguistic construction of Asian-American identities. He claimed that code switching is used as a method for crossing by one of the participants, while the other participant can reject it and refuses to acknowledge the speaker's appropriation of Korean-American ethnicity. Thus, other members of a community, it can be argued, do have a role in validating one's ethnicity as well.[84]

Applied to the people in the Southern provinces in conflict, these studies are useful in that the "ethnic index" can be brought into use, so that it is possible to determine the strength of ties that Malay Muslims speaking Jawi have to their language. Moreover, these studies are conclusive of the fact that language is a way for individuals to signal membership in the minority ethnic community as well as the surrounding regional community. The dominant language (in this case, Thai) has what can be called the "overt prestige"—the kind of prestige that the standard language carries with it, while Jawi, the home language of Malay Muslims carries "covert prestige"—the kind of prestige which

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[83] Li Wei, Lesley Milroy and Pong Sin Ching. 1992. "A Two-Step Sociolinguistic Analysis of Code-Switching and Language Choice: The Example of a Bilingual Chinese Community in Britain." *International Journal of Applied Linguistics*. 2(1), 63-86. Also see, Lesley Milroy and Li Wei. 1995. "A Social Network Approach to Code-Switching: The Example of Bilingual Community in Britain." In Lesley Milroy and Pieter Muysken (eds.) *One Speaker, Two Languages: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Code-Switching*. 136-157.

[84] Adrienne Lo, 1999. Codeswitching, Speech Community Membership, and the Construction of Ethnic Identity. Journal of Sociolinguistics. 3(4): 461-479. Also see Lawrence Wieder, D. and S. Pratt. 1990. "On Being a Recognizable Indian Among Indians." In D. Carbaugh (ed.) *Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact*. 45-64, and K. Azoujay, 1997. *Black, Jewish and Interracial: It's Not the Colour of Your Skin but the Race of Your Kin, and Other Myths of Identity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

is recognized only by in-group members. Malay Muslims who grow up in a minority ethnic community often find themselves in a position where the linguistic signals of local identity (e.g. Malay Muslims) are tied to the rest of Buddhist Thai. The option of rejecting the standard language with overt prestige is technically open to them, although there is usually pressure from outside to "assimilate" so as to become the "same" as the rest of Thailand. One of the ways to retain close affiliation with their home language is to use it in most of the domains, such as religion, home and family, or in literature, while to use the standard language only when required to do so. This way, Malay Muslims can avoid assuming Buddhist Thai identities and simultaneously signal affiliation with their ethnic background.

Kathrin Lorenz suggests in the study of conflict and conflict analysis that "conflict is a form of social interaction which contributes to both the stability and the transformation of power structures" of the any society. It links to dynamic social and political tensions that represent divergent interests of segments of society. In a community, which lacks the adequate tools to obtain peaceful resolution, it can turn into open confrontation and physical violence. In contrast, the society equipped with many measures including the socio-economic opportunities will be able to cope with the social tension.[85]

Kathrin also indicates that the structural characteristics and triggering events leading to violence are distinguishable into four categories: structural factors, political factors, economic/social factor and cultural or perceptual factors.[86] The examples of those might derive from the lack of participatory mechanisms in making policy, weak or failed states structure and civil society, including the sudden economic decline.[87]

William A. Smally has studied the diversity and unity of language in Thailand.[88] According to this study, over 91 % of population speaks standard Thai, while minority is

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[85] Kathrin Lorenz, *supra* note 33
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] William A. Smalley, 1994, Linguistic diversity and national unity language ecology in Thailand, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, pp.1-2

Malays, Hill tribes, Pak Tay, etc, which the standard Thai language can gain acceptance from the society and usually do not perceive it to be politically important.[89] During the Prime Minister Piboonsongkhram administration in 1960s, the extremely low rate literate in standard Thai language (around 0.4%) in Pattani province pushed the government to lay down policy of one language in this area. [90] For instance, in this period, the government began to transform the Patani-Malay traditional school into private school under the Private School Act of 1949.[91] In 1968, the royal decree prohibited establishing of new traditional school and the Thai standard program became compulsory.[92] This policy often creates the political pressure and result in intensifying the ethnic antagonism, and always failed. For instance, after implementing this policy, more students left for Malaysia and the Middle East, which means they got into the center of Muslim nationalism. During this era, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was formed and became the most effective of the secessionist movements in the South under the impetus of this policy.[93] Additionally, in Thailand, the differences of language and culture in this region, similar to elsewhere, were used as the tools to exploit benefit, which exacerbated the injustice in society. [94]

May Tan-Mullins explores the attitude and opinion of the Muslim in Pattani province, and finds that the people either Buddhists or Muslims in the south concerns about the safety and security especially after the two tragedy event, Kru-Ze mosque with the 32 militant death on 28 of April 2004 and Tak Bai with the 78 Muslims suffocated without imposing penalty on the person in charge on 25 of October 2004. Muslims are very sensitive in several issues; for example, they sensitively consider that reconstruction of Kru-ze mosque by the non-Muslims, the Thai soldiers, is the insulting of the Muslims. In addition, injustice in case of those massacre events, ending up without penalty

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[89] *Ibid.*at 3

[90] *Ibid.*at 4 (This every low rate occurs even though the Thai government school with 4 grades had been opened for 20 years or more.)

[91] *Ibid.*at 170

[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] *Ibid.*

imposed on the persons in charge of those events bring about more tension to the people in this focused area.[95] According to the interview, the participants indicate that they believe that they are discriminated and could not obtain fair practice especially the right to religion and the right to preserve their culture and language. However, they do not agree with the separatists and they believe that there is no movement for independence; rather it is a movement of rights and freedom.

Chaiwat Satha-Anand , in 2006, emphasizes that to establish the national security, the truth must be firmly established, rather than forget.[96] He states that the historical pressure in the tragedy incidents, Dusan-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004, which were massive massacre of Muslims and militants, including the policy in Field Marshal Piboonsongkram aiming at returning Malays into Thai was too aggressive and left the deeply bad memory not only to Muslims in Thailand but ones oversea as well. In the first incident, some hundred Muslims died under the unclear established facts, and resulted in more than thousand Muslims refuge into Malaysia. The second event created the equal bad memory to Muslims because the Muslims militants were killed in the sacred place of God. The Kru-Ze event memorized Muslims of the Holy struggle for Patani Kingdom. The Thai government might have to consider the measures to deal with this ethic group because Muslims actually seek to maintain their identity and language. Truth, then, is the most important to remedy the tragedy conducted by the Thai government in the past.

Saroja D. Dorairajoo indicates that all violent events in the southern Thailand do not contribute to only separatist group as the Thai officials usually rely on. He observes that prior to passage of the budget by the Parliament, the empty bomb, which always was planted at the police station or the security officers, is always planted in the region. In addition, there still are many factors that lead to violence such as the drug trafficking, smuggling, abduction, etc., as well. He states that the separatist in the region is in fade until the year of 2004. He finally concludes that the violence in the southern Thailand

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[95] May Tan-Mullins, May 2006. "Voice from Pattani, Fears, Suspicion, and Confusion," Critical Asian Studies, 38:1, 145-150

[96] Chaiwat Satha-Anan, 2006 "The silence of the bullet monument: violence and "truth" management, Dusan-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004", Critical Asian Studies, 38:1, 11-37

might be roughly categorized into three groups: (1) responses to loss of elite Malay power and threat to Malay identity; (2) use and abuse of separatist history to promote violence in the south; and (3) reaction to local conditions of prejudice against Malay-Muslims by the Thai state.[97] The separatist might serve as assertive rational to procure the public budget into this area and officials will exploit it afterword.

Alan Collins indicates the similar problem about the educational policy in Malaysia, which becomes the hot issue in its country.[98] In 2002, once Malaysian government announced it would reintroduce English as a medium of instruction in all Malaysian primary schools, the Tamil, Malay, and Chinese ethnics strongly disagreed. Choice of language in the education system is one of the most highly sensitive issues in this country, stated specifically, between Malays and the Chinese. The other ethnics considered the Malay government was attacking their cultures and identities. The reaction of Chinese aimed to find safeguard for Mandarin as a medium of instruction through Malaysia's political process. Their identity is the cornerstone of human society. Then, they perceive a threat and insecurity exist to their identities. Changing policy might create the certain extent of threat which might be able to emerge depending on the degree of vulnerability in different society. For example, where a group of minority ethnic exists in the majority group, it might fear that the majority ethnics will assimilate them into the dominant nationality of the majority group. Education policy has been widely used as the tool to assimilate the minority ethnics into majority's value and culture.

Bongkord Suthas Na Ayudhaya summarizes in her research concerning education system and security that the national security relates to two dimensions, that is, the national power to exercise its capacity to protect the territory and the security in term of

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[97] Saroja D. Dorairajoo, 2006 "Violence in the south of Thailand," Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 5:3, 465-471

[98] Alan Collins, December, 2005 "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education," The Pacific Review, Vol. 18 No. 4: 567-588

protecting the national value and identity from the external threats of others.[99] Those can be called comprehensive security. The research finds that the condition to obtain national security does not only depends on the attribution and allocation of political power, public interest and economic interest, but also on delegation of the decision power from central government to lower level in accordance with the democratic system. In addition, all societal institutes have obligation to educate the social value to all citizens so that they can protect themselves. In other words, reengineering the society under the social transformation ideas will facilitate the state to obtain cooperation from its grassroots without radical resistance.

Bongkord indicates that the violent problems in the southern Thailand derive from the lack of capacity of the state officials to get along with the local people leading to the deep misunderstanding among them. Another cause that leads to the violent events also stems from the strong and rigid policy from central government to decrease the traditional religious school or pondok in those three border provinces because the government considers that those schools have been employed as the sources and tools to conduct the terrorism in the focused region. The ignorance of the importance of pondok schools, currently more than 550 ones all over the three border provinces, makes the situation become even much worse. Pondok schools are the means to convey the way of life and cultures as well as the transmission of values of society by using Jawi language in this region. These schools have been continuously important for the people in former Patani Kingdom since Ayudhaya reign. Because pondok schools use Jawi language to instruct the students those values and cultures, most of those students have not understood standard Thai well to get university admission and thus there are more than over 100,000 of them becoming unemployed because of lack of the standard Thai skills. The discussed factors have been utilized to persuade them to act against the government and become the member of separatist. The researcher suggests that the government

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[99] Bongkord Suthas Na Ayudhaya, 2007 Education system and national security: Case study between Hill tribe school in northern Thailand and Pondok school in southern Thailand.

should review all measures to deal with those violent phenomena by using more than psychological method, and reviewing the education policy as well as equipping with the well understanding toward history, local value and identity of the people in those three border provinces. The state also has to reconsider the national policy to assimilate them if it is effective or seems to be more problematic because all Muslims might consider that those assimilations the threat to their values and identities. Indeed, the actual and more effective policy that should be implemented might be: *"different but not divisive or* *"แตกต่างแต่ไม่แตกแยก"* in Thai.

2.5 Conclusion

When considering the violent problems in the southern Thailand through the lens of historical study, the review of literature toward the striving of language loyalty and the impact of assimilation policy, the findings toward the cause of conflict and violent problems are arguable in various aspects. One of those causes of violence might derive from what can be called the striving for ethnic identity preservation and loyalty toward the Jawi language of the Muslim Malays residing in Southern Thailand, attached to the lack of capacity to understand one another among the officials and the local people who share different religion, language, and economic situations. In general, it might be safe to indicate something about violent situation in the southern provinces of Thailand as following:

1. There is no single factor—religious, linguistic, or economic—that satisfactorily explains the current insurgency. However, those causes are involved and much more complicated in the current era. The different of language and the policy to assimilate has been considered as threat to destroy the value and culture of the people who are enshrined with the Muslim faith and their own identities.

2. It is more likely that the above factors have functioned together since the early waves of conflict, thus underpinning and paving the way for the current violence in the

South. Additionally, the other external factors such as the malpractice of officials, corruption, the drug trafficking, the goods smuggling, are also involved.

3. The question that should be asked and focus on now, who are behind and support the violent movement, what lies behind their motivations, what their ultimate goals are, and what are the possible ways to handle the situation. However, this research does nor intends to focus on those extremely critical points. It instead centers on the attitude toward policy of education system and Jawi language acceptance by the government in the focused area if it will facilitate to gain public trust in this region. It eventually will be used as the vital to build trust of the local grass root people that Thai government will champion freedom of those people and thus we can live together based on the concept of mutual respect of the identity without prejudice and conflict among the people in this country as a whole.

The researcher believes that the better way to peacefully live together in heterogeneous society like Thailand, specifically the three border provinces of Thailand, is to champion the usage of appropriate measures to create better understanding in both ways: vertical one between the government officials and the Malays; and the horizontal way between the Muslim Malays and Buddhist Thai in the focusing area. One of the numerous methods is to accept the Pattani identity. The government, firstly, has to accept the truth about the rich wealth of the Patani kingdom and appreciate their local culture including their beautiful language. In addition, the policies from central government which try to assimilate (or destroy) their identity must be abolished. Finally, usage their local language, Jawi language, as working language in the focused area is also the best choice to make people and government officials understand each other and thus can obtain their cooperation in the future. Next chapter, this research will illustrate the education policy to assimilate the Muslim ethnics to be Thai, which finally, created the undesirable impacts deriving from such policy. The next chapter also explains the proposal of many panels and find out the better resolution to solve the violent problems in the southern Thailand.

CHAPTER III
SIAMESE ASSIMILATION POLICY AND ITS IMPACTS

According to the brief history background of the Kingdom of Patani, Siam, with its power far greater than Pattani, occupied Pattani and after that Siam imposed various regulations on the Pattani citizens to change their identity to Siam-ism or Thai-ism in the nation state. Those assimilation policies was so radically rigid that the new generation leaders of the former great Kingdom of Patani considered Siam policies as the threat to their identities and the Muslim ways of life, which were not merely the religious belief but also all aspects of their lives, especially the most important characteristics of Malaya-Muslim politics, known as the Raja system.[1]

Pattani, as a result, resisted those assimilation policies to free themselves from Siamese Kingdom in several ways, including the incident, which is so-called "rebellion." Siam, of course, responded to those events by exercising the full powers to obliterate or root out all "stubborn Pattani citizens" and thus forced the Pattani elites to migrate to the neighboring Muslim states such as Perak.[2] Even though Siam eventually succeeded to absorb the territory of Pattani as a part of Siamese Kingdom, the conflict has been still pending and waiting to becomes rife, and thus violence will be widespread.

In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the events and policies that Siam, which currently is Thailand, imposed on Pattani territory and responded to the resistant situations of Patani in the past hundred years ago. In addition, the details of the policy to centralize the power to Bangkok in the King Rama V reign, and the educational policy and nationalism of "Thai-ism" after 1932 will be narrated in the second part of this chapter. Lastly, the undesirable impacts stemming from absorption policy as such will be depicted. This chapter will reach the primary conclusion that the improper policies will lead to violence. However, if the appropriate ideals, such as the acceptance of the diversity of citizens, including Jawi language, have been implemented, those policies

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[1] *See* details in *supra* Ch.II
[2] *See* generally Arifine, PATANI DARUSSALAM, (Muslim News Press, 2005)

might persuade the Malaya-Muslim people to live peacefully together with Thais in a specific territory of the so-called "Thailand."

3.1 The Siamese assimilation method in Pattani

As described in chapter II, the Patani kingdom had to show respect and support to Siam since the Sukhothai period.[3] Prior to the period of nation state formation, Siam had never occupied Patani in sense of the owner of private property. The relationship was based on loyalty and benefits mutually likewise the small state had to compromise with the stronger state. Sometimes, Patani declared itself as independent state or sometimes became a part of Malaka state from 1460 to 1511,[4] especially during the period that Siam was beaten by Burma in 1767. However, after Siam became more powerful, Patani was forced by the military action to be a part of Siamese Kingdom. Rise and fall of resistance of Patani made Siam leader to seek all necessary means to assure that Siam must be able to control and take advantage from Patani peninsular as a whole. The stronger measure Siam imposed on Patani, the more resistance the Patani elite attempts to free themselves from Siam. Such phenomena of the colonial expansion of England and France in Southeast Asia forced Siam leader to take more steps to control Patani seriously and aggressively by using of both military sanctions and national integration measures. The more assimilation of process of national integration has been imposed on this focused area; the resistance and violence have ensued relentlessly. Those assimilation policies have never succeeded in this area.

Mostly, Siam exercised military force or a threat of military troops as the tools to "assimilate or absorb" those Malayu territories. Those military actions sometimes were attached with cultural measures and economic development policy. This research is divided into two periods of time: prior to the revolution of 1932 and the nationalism evolution after 1932 until the present period.

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[3] C.P. FitzGerald, The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972) pp.80-81

[4] Bhuwadol Songprasert, Thaksin's Fire: Unity among the alienation in Southern Thailand, (Higher Press, 2005) pp.92-94

3.1.1 Military action prior to 1932.

After 1511, Patani was forced to be a Bungamas state under the control of Siam. The resistance to Siam became far stronger after Siam had imposed the tax measures on those Patani people. Several rebellions ensued and thus the King Rama I deployed the troop to Patani and after Siam completely eliminated the leader and divided Patani into seven cities under the doctrine of "Divide and Rule,"[5] in 1817. In this period, Siam took advantage from Patani citizens by forcing them to work around three months for the government representatives or its delegation in Songkla without any payment. Insurgence of the Patani kingdom still existed even after the dividing of Patani Kingdom. The representatives and the delegations from Bangkok under the concession contract with Bangkok were entitled to take benefit from Patani. By several pressures of colonized activities of England and France as well as other western countries, Siam began strategy of centralization by setting up the local administration throughout the Kingdom, and set up the so-called "Sa-mu-ha-the-sa-pi-barn-mon-ton-pattani" in 1896 to completely control this focused area. This strategy aimed to strengthen the power of the government from Bangkok, not to solve the problem of despotism policy imposed by the delegation. Military action was employed to suppress the resistance of Patani several times before Siamese Kingdom entered into the Anglo-Siamese Treaty with England in 1909. This treaty rendered Siam to surrender the Malayu territory to England, except for the former Patani Kingdom, which later became three provinces of the southern Thailand. It additionally divided the Melaya-Muslim people into two countries between Siam and England's colony. This treaty brought the dissatisfaction to the leaders of those semi-autonomy Malayu states because the people in this area had engaged in marriage for a long time. Moreover, the elites of those entities were also afraid of losing their status and power.

Patani was known as "Patani Darrusslam" or the state of peace, which followed Muslim faith as their ways of life. Their ways of life ended up with the war and the name

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[5] Those cities were: Pattani, Tok Jong (   ), Rahman or Reman (รามัน), Jalor or Jala (ยะลา), Sa or Saiburi (สายบุรี), Jering or Jambu (ยะหริ่ง) and Regeh (ระแงะ)

of their country disappeared after the invasion of Siam. Whenever Patani people attempted to free themselves, their uprisings were subjected to severe military suppression. Some of those events might be explained in some as following.

During 1787-1971, Tengku Lamidden (   ) was appointed as the Raja of Patani from Siam but he was subjected to the control of Nakhonsridhammarat.[6] During his period, mosque, and the sense of belonging were developed and implanted into the Patani people. Being occupied and taken advantage of by the delegation in Nakhonsirdhammarat roused all Patani citizens to commit insurgence. In 1789, Tengku Lamidden sent his letter to the Annam, currently Vietnam, to encourage Annam cooperate with Pattani in order be free from Siam. He defeated and appropriated several cities in Songkla, which later Songkla requested assistance from Nakhonsridhammarat, as well as the troop from Bangkok led by Pyakalahom. This war was prolonged for three years and ended with the lost of Patani. Tengku Lamidden was executed in the battle field. Subsequently, Pyakalahom destroyed Tengku Lamidden's palace and transferred the Patani citizens to Siam. Some of Patani people migrated to Keda, Perak, Kelonton, Trangkranu. After this event, Siam took more action to control Patani by appointing the official from Songkla to closely supervise the Datok Pangkalan (ดาโต๊ะปังกาลัน) Raja of Patani.

Even if Datok Pangkalan, the Patani citizens, was appointed as the Raja of Patani, during 1791 and 1810, Bangkok actually gave full power to Pra-Ja-Na, an official from Songkla, as the governor of Patani, supported by appointing numerous officials to work in Patani, to control Raja power. This was the first time that the officials from Bangkok were sent to serve in Patani without knowing and accepting the different customs of Patani. This rigorous method forced Datok Pangkalan to drive out all officials of Siam. The war occurred instantly and it was prolonged for several months. Siam called for the supports from sultan of Kedah but the request was ignored.[7] Finally, Datok Pangkalan was executed in the battlefield as a hero of Patani, and the war

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[6] Arifine, supra note…. P.52-53
[7] Ibid 56

accumulated the hatred, suffer, and desire to revenge Patani of Siam because of the cruelty of the Siam military actions.[8]

Later, the King of Siam appointed Mr. Kwansai as the full power governor of Patani without appointing the Raja from Patani people.[9] This governor had persuaded more than 500 Buddhist families from other southern provinces to resettle in Patani with the hope that this measure would balance the ratio between Muslim and Buddhists. In addition, the governor attempted to change the ways of life in Patani from 1810 with the new policy to assimilate and suppress the Patani people since then. The resistance still appeared and the government divided Patani into seven cities aiming at weakening and ruling them around 1816. Those cities were composed of Patani, Tok Jong, Rahman or Reman, Jalor or Jala, Sa or Saiburi, Jering or Jambu and Legeh. Siam reasoned for dividing Patani as to develop the financial autonomy in those cities, but in fact Siam desired to control Patani more closely. This reformation changed Patani Kingdom both in horizontal and vertical aspects. The governors were directly and only appointed from Bangkok. The structure of administration in Patani also changed similarly to the system of Bangkok.

At the early period of "Divide and Rule", Bangkok, however, was concerned only with the benefit, which might be obtained from all cities in former Patani Kingdom.[10] All cities must send Bungamas to show their respect every three years, and had to support Siam when needed such as soldier, weapon, and food during the war. They had freedom to adopt their own rules to keep their benefit as they saw it fit to their territory. Those freedoms did include the freedom to use their own language, Jawi language.

Finally, the Raja or sultan system was abolished. On December 23, 1894, Siam reformed its bureaucracy along the western style, and the first interior minister, Prince Dumrongrachanupab was appointed to deal with the taxation system and the formation of nation state.[11] Two years later, Siam declared the plan to develop the local administration

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[8] Ibid 58
[9] Ibid 59
[10] Ibid 66
[11] Ibid 123

called "Monton" or "Tesapiban" in which each one would be composed of several cities in certain region. Siam announced the eighteen Monton throughout the kingdom and the person in charge of controlling over such Monton would be appointed by the King and directly responsible for all activities in its area to Minister of Interior. Around May 1897, the Local Administrative Act was announced to enforce and this law making the Minister of Interior to adopt the enabling act as he saw it fit. In 1899, the "Cities Administration Rule of 1899" was declared to administrate all cities throughout Siam. This method completely abolished the Raja system by the royal appointed governor of all cities including the monton where the officials of Siam Kingdom who must be responsible for the King, not for the people in the local area. It eradicated the relationship between the people in former Patani Kingdom and Raja. It formulated the hierarchical control to strengthen the power of the Siam government. Patani, then, changed its status from the semi-autonomy sultanate to be only the city of Siam Kingdom without the consent of people of Patani.

This method created more tension and resistance in former Patani Kingdom and thus the rebellion had never stopped. Siam vigorously used all strategies to control Patani; for example, most the officials from Bangkok were Buddhists, they were sent to work in this area without the knowledge and attitude to local customs and norms including the language. At the same time, Siam had never tried to get consent or even allow the Patani people know and accept the new local administration. They could either understand or accept one another.

For example, in 1898, Pya Sukhum Winijchai was appointed as the Royal Official at Monton Pattani. The officials appointed as governor, judge, and revenue officer from Bangkok were sent to work in Patani. The former sultan virtually had no power about taxation. They were prohibited from obtaining any revenue. All kinds of taxes would be sent to the treasury in Bangkok without allocating to sultan and Patani people. The officials who were working in Patani abused this policy. According to the rumor, only £1.2 million was sent to treasury and around £5-6 million was corrupted by the delegation. The sultan submitted the motion to the King in Bangkok, but all attempts

failed without any acknowledgment of the King.[12] The numerous regulations about taxation issued by the officials brought about the miserable depression and economic suffer to the people of Patani. The official rules were prevalent to all aspects of life. The secular court of Siam was set up which conflicted with the Shariah or Islamic law practice. They were forced to go to court on Friday, which customarily they must go to mosque, as well as they were also forced to swear in court. The rules also required all Muslim to stand up for paying respect to the image of the Buddha on Buddhist religious days. Those practices were incongruent to their ways of Muslim lives and thus brought about more hatred and dreadful feeling to Siamese Kingdom as a whole.[13] The way, which the officials from Bangkok acted, created the sense that they came to Patani as the controller or penjajah, which occupied their higher status than any other in Patani.[14] The officials did not share the common feeling of brotherhood that engendered the feeling to stay together peacefully. They lacked the responsibility and check and balance system from the government. Some of them committed felony crime, such as murder, rape, etc, exploited the illegal benefit from the people of Patani for a while and then left Patani without any fair legal action.

The resistance became rife when Tengu Abdulkordaer Gamuruddine was acting as the leader of Patani.[15] He was able to communicate in English to the England delegation working in Malayu. He informed them about the cruelty of Siamese official practices and thus all seven cities of former Patani Kingdom planed to commit insurgence to free them since October 1901. Tengu Abdulkordaer requested assistance from England but due to being afraid of expansion of conflict in Malayu which was occupied by England, and the treaty between Siam and England, no internal intervention happened. On December 22, 1901, Pyasaksanee was appointed as the new royal delegation for Monton Pattani to solve this problem and force Tengu Abdulkordaer to resign from the

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[12] Ibid 127

[13] Ibid 131

[14] Ibid

[15] The term of Pattani (double T) is aiming at only the small cities after being divided by Siam, but the term of Patani means the former Patani Kingdom, which includes all seven cities before being divided by Siam.

office.   Simultaneously Prince Damrongrachanipab, the interior minister, ordered Pyasrisahathep, the deputy of interior minister, to investigate about the rumor and sought the acceptance of the "New Administration Rule of Ror Sor 116." On October 23, 1901, after arrival at Pattani, Pyasrisahathep met Tengu Abdolkordaer and found that origin of conflicts derived from several reasons such as the appointment of officials from the government, the devastation of their customary ways of life due to Siam rules, disparage and overthrowing from power. He proposed that the sultan should have had powers according to the customs of Muslim faith and he should be entitled the power according to Shariah or Muslim law to adopt and enforce the regulation in its own region. Most importantly, Jawi language should be an official language in this particular area.[16] Pyasrisahathep met him again and insisted him to sign his name in "document" which Pyasrisahathep indicated that it was not treaty but only Tegu Abdulkordaer's motion filed to Damrongrachanupab.   Tegu Abdulkordaer refused to sign such document by reasoning that it was written in Thai and demanded it being translated to Jawi.   He finally signed but the text he read was different from original text written in Thai, which indicated that he accepted the new local administration rule of Siam without any resistance.   After deceiving him, Pyasrisahathep instantly went to Singapore to declare that all sultans in former Patani Kingdom had accepted Siam administration and the conflicts were dissolved.[17]   Abdulkordaer sent two delegations to Singapore to declare that his signation derived from deception.   Pyasirsahathep came back to Patani and invited Abdulkordear to converse refused it.

According to the new administration regulation, it forced sultan to accept the new allocation and arrangement of former seven cities by using the new "Divide and Rule" policy. All seven cities were combined and divided into two major cities which were composed of: (1) Pattani – Pattani, Tok Jong, Rahman or Reman, Jalor or Jala; and (2) Saiburi – Sa or Saiburi, Kalapor and Legeh.   Two governors would be appointed including other officials to support the governors.   The sultan still had power to issue

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[16] Ibid 139
[17] Ibid

some rules but subjected to review by governor and if it was illegal (under Siam law), it would be abolished.   Some powers were preserved to the government such as taxation, concession of taxation, mineral or forest concession, foreign affairs, and other important issues concerning the death penalty, imprisonment for life, appropriation of people's asset, and contract relation to unmovable property of the alien, and defense and collateral troops.[18]   Abdulkordaer persisted to refuse such administration and filed motion to the King but got no response.   On December 16, 1901, Prince Damrongrachanupab announced the "Local Administration for Seven Cities of Monton Pattani Ror Sor 120" which was totally different from what Pyasrisahathep had entered agreement with those sultans.   Abdulkordaer submitted his letter to resist such regulations and proposed that Siam should accept the sovereignty of former Patani Kingdom, and other requests as followings:

> (1)   Sultan must have power to appoint and remove the Siamese officials who violated the law.

> (2)   Sultan consented to allow sixty police officers to work in former Patani Kingdom.

> (3)   Jawi language must be official language in this region, rather than Siamese language.

> (4)   Sultan consented to send Bungamas to Siam similar to the customary practice in the past.

Abdulkordaer submitted the letter to England hoping that the international pressure be imposed on Siam. Again, Prince Damrongrachanupab order Pyasaksanee to demand all sultans to accept the new administration model by signing the consent form but Abdulkordaer refused.   On February 21, 1902, Pyasrisahathep and soldiers around one hundred were heading to Abdulkordaer's office and forced him to accept the new law. After refusing to do so, Abdulkordaer was arrested on treachery and subjected to ten years imprisonment in Pisanulok province. Bangkok announced the end of sultan system in Siam since March 6, 1902.   In same month, March 18, 1902, all other sultans in other

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[18] Ibid 142

seven cities were arrested with murder accusation, and some of them were kidnapped and involuntary disappeared. Consequently, this radical and violent change brought about more hatred of the Patani people to Siamese Kingdom.[19] Several ten thousand of Patani people escaped from the cruelty and crimes committed by officials in Patani to neighborhood Malayu states, such as Kadah, Perak, Kranton, etc, After Abdulkordaer was forced to sign the name to accept the regulation of ror.sor.120, he was released and in 1903 he and family moved to Kranton as the hero of Patani people. Siam reformed this area by combining those seven cities again, resulting in three provinces, that is, Pattani province (Tok Jong, and Jering) , Yala (Rahman or Reman) Sa or Saiburi province. Finally, Saiburi became a district of Pattani and Legeh was a part of Narathiwat.

The sultan system, and Patani Kingdom which was longer than 600 years in existence, was finally ended in 1902, but the hatred of the people has never disappeared so long as Siam still sent the corrupted officials to oppress the people of Pattani.

In sum, Siam employed the military action to support the administrative measures as following:[20]

> (1) Changing of relations from power-relation to control-relation during early Siamese Kingdom (1786-1816).The development of situations derived from the Raja of Patani did not show respect to Siamese Kingdom and Siam must send the troop to suppress Patani insurgences several times such as: in 1786, 1791, and 1808, subsequently. The incidents of insurgences led Siam to use the policy of "Divide and Rule" by dividing Patani into seven small cities. The reasons behind were the expansion of colonialism of western countries which extended their power to control Penang and Singapore by England. To strengthen power of Siam over the Malayu entities, Siam decided to divide Patani Kingdom and control those cities closely through the

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[19] Ibid 152

[20] Chuleeporn Wirun-ha, "Conflicts in the Southern Thailand from the historical perspectives" In Surichai Wankeaw, ed. 2007 "Source of Fire in Southern Thailand," (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press) pp. 32-37

governor of Nakhonsrithamarat or Songkla. However, the status of those cities were confusing; Siam considered former Patani as a part of territory while the sultan of those seven cities considered themselves as the colony of Siam. They still sent Bungamas to Siam as practiced in ancient time.

(2) Changing of relations from control-relation to occupation- relation in the reign of King Rama V and prior to 1932. When England and France extended their power to Southeast Asia, Siam decided to vigorously strengthen its authority throughout the Kingdom to centralize administration to Bangkok. The King Rama V adopted the idea of nation state by establishing the bureaucracy with its hierarchical command from Bangkok to local entity. The power of local administration must be controlled by Bangkok. The Montonthesapiban, local administration organization, was established as a tool to implement those ideas. The subsequent events to strengthen power might be seen as followings:

In 1896, initiating the plan to decrease the authority of sultan.

o In 1898, abolishing the taxation power of the sultan.

o In 1899, adopting the local administration act of Ror.Sor.116 and appointed royal delegation to control the Patani area.

o In 1901, adopting the local administration regulation for the seven cities of Ror.Sor.120 which decreased the sultan power which was directly under control of special royal delegation for seven cities.

o In 1902, Tengu Abdulkordear, Patani sultan, who resisted the power of delegation, was arrested and sentenced for 10 years in Pisanulok prison but released after imprisonment for 2 years. The sultan system was completely abolished in this year.

o During 1906 and 1915, establishing Monton Pattani and its process to fully control Pattani.

o In 1909, Siam and England entered Anglo-Siam Treaty. As a result, Patani, which used to be a Malayu colony of Siam, completely became a part of territory of Siamese Kingdom.

In sum, the military action was exercised to occupy the Malayu territory during this period. Siam initiated all military measures to support the administrative rule to centralize the power from local leader to Bangkok.

3.1.2 Military Action after 1932

In 1932, after revolution occurred; Siam became the constitutional monarchy. The problems of southern Thailand seemed stable. However, whenever the leader of Pattani people attempted to request the government to accept their identity and permit them local autonomy, the government would exercise full power of military to suppress them depending on how severity of the event. For example, Dusan-nyor rebellion (กบฏดุซงญอ) in 1948 (B.E.2491), the official information of Thai government declared it as a Muslim rebellion during April 26-28, 1948; then the government sent the military to support police authority. After this event, more than 400 Muslims died and more than a thousand escaped to Malaya. The record from other sources identified that in 1948, the Muslims had gathered to self-protect from robbery by the Chinese communist who escaped from the border between Malaya and Thailand. The government intelligence reported that those people planed to commit insurgence, and this misunderstanding caused the tragedy to this village.[21] This catastrophic event informed us about the truth illustrated differently based on different motives.[22] The truth, which is the most important to solve the problem, is always covered and abused by the recorder. If this

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[21] Srisak Wallipodom, et al, 2007. Loa-Khan-Tam-Nan-Tai (Myth of Southern Thailand), pp.130-131

[22] Also see more details and arguments to the basic fact about Dusan-nyor rebellion in Chaiwat Satha-Anan, 2006 "The silence of the bullet monument: violence and "truth" management, Dusan-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004", Critical Asian Studies, 38:1, 11-37

problem cannot be made clear, it seems that the actual cause of conflict cannot be found and thus it is impossible to solve any problem.

3.2 Thai policy on Patani Malay culture and language

The identity of Thai has been created without the bedrock of what the "Thai-ism" is. In a few past centuries, the ideal of "Siam-ism, or Thai-ism" might be considered as the main factors of "sovereignty" of Siamese Kingdom.[23] In the reign of King Rama V, to completely assimilate Patani kingdom and other territories far away from Bangkok, the government of Siamese Kingdom abolished the customs to show respects of the other semi autonomy entities of sending "Bangamas or golden tree and silver tree" to Siam but required them to send monetary tax to Bangkok instead. In this period, King Rama V also declared the law changing the name of those semi autonomous states which implanted Siam-ism to their identity such as changing the word "Loa" in the name of the Monton . However, this measure was not applicable to Patani people. To do census in other parts of Siam, the law still required the local officials to register the nationality or ethnicity of those citizens as Thai nationality.[24] Nevertheless, in the early part of nation state formation, Siam still allowed the sultan system to exist and allowed them to exercise their authorities in their own territory. Even if the King Rama V finally abolished the Raja or sultan system, the local customs and religious practice were left to be folkways of Patani people. Shariah or Islamic law was enforceable in Patani and Yawi language was applicable as a function language in this particular region.

The conflicts still occurred deriving from Siam's policy on educational system. In 1921, Siam enacted the Compulsory Educational System Act of 1922, which encouraged, indeed forced all Muslim offspring to study Thai language. To implement the act of 1922, the officials closed Muslims' school or Pondok School in this era, and this situation brought about the conflict and violence. In 1923, the King Rama VI had to

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[23] Thanet Arpornsuwan, Origin of Separatist theory in the Southern Thailand, 2nd ed., (Toyota Thailand Foundation, 2008) P.22

[24] *Ibid.*

change the policy about the educational system, and issued the public administration policy to administrate Monton Patani as following: [25]

    1)   All regulations and rules to treat the Patani citizens which they considered as cruelty and oppression to Islamic religion must be abolished or revised;

    2)   Taxation measure must not be more than the citizens of neighboring cities;

    3)   The oppression of the officials, malpractice, or insult or rudeness to the citizens of Pattani as the Khak (แขก) or alien must be resolved and sought the measure to prevent such event;

    4)   The officials working in Pattani must be extremely well selected; the incrimination of appointment must not be implemented. In addition, the bad behavior officials must not be sent to this area.

The compromise policy implemented during 1923 and 1938 alleviated the tension between Siam and former Patani Kingdom.[26] In 1932, the revolution occurred which made Patani citizens hopeful to demand their community rights by democracy channel.[27] In sum, the core conflict since Rama V till 1932 derived from the formation of modern nation state; stated specifically, Patani resisted Siam to occupy the Melayu territory. The language and religion might not be as important as the mentioned factor.[28] However, language and identity became much more important issues after 1932. The strategies to destroy the identity of the ethnic citizens were much more extreme after 1938. Particularly, during the administration of Prime Minister Piboonsongkram , 1938-1944, and 1948-1957, the policy of the "Thai" nationalism created profound resistance and the highest hatred toward the Thai government by Pattani people until current period.[29]

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[25] Chuleeporn Wirun-ha 38
[26] Ibid
[27] Ibid 39
[28] Ibid 40
[29] Thanet Arpornsuwan p.27

During Piboonsongkram's Administration, the government imposed radically various measures such as educational system, cultural practice, and etiquette, including languages on those people. However, the research will mention only some of those policy problems, such as administrative, educational systems, which finally prohibits using the Jawi language in school, as well as when they need to contact with the Thai bureaucracy. Some details can be illustrated as following:

The Nationalism Policy during 1938-1944 (or B.E.2481-2487) can be seen as the time line below: [30]

1940 (B.E.2483) changing the name of country from Siam to Thailand

1942 (B.E.2485) establishing of National Cultural Council and declaring of 12 items of nationalist policy to establish "Thai-ism" in the eye of Prime Minister Piboonsongkram including the prohibition of dressing in Muslim style, speaking in Jawi language. Sometimes, it was interpreted that this policy prohibits the Islamic religion as the Muslim faith in Thailand.

1944(B.E.2487) abolition of Shariah or Islamic law relating to family law in the four provinces (Pattani, Satul, Narathiwat, and Yala) including eradicating the Islamic Judge. This event forced many Pattani people to migrate to Malaya and other Muslim countries. In this year, Haji Surong founded the Patani People's Movement (PPM) to develop the ways of life of the people in the former Patani Kingdom.

In this administration, the government pushed vigorous and vehement change, which in the eye of Muslim it was the threat to their identity. One of the most important issues is the policy to deal with the *Shariah or Islamic law, language, and other characteristics of their ways of life*, which concerned all aspects of the ways of Pattani people. The scholar considered that the problems of southern Thailand in this period

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[30] Bhuwadol Songprasert, supra note 4, pp.104-110

derived from the government without the outside intervention.[31]   Prime Minister Piboonsongkram adopted the policy of nationalism, generally known as **"One Race One Nation"**[32]**,** from the leader of Germany and issued 12 items of nationalist policy. Three of them, Item 3, Item 9 and Item 10, directly impacted to the Muslim in this region instantly.

Item 3 imposes of Thai ethnic name. This rule requires every single person living in the Kingdom to identify himself as Thai ethnic. For example, the Chinese progeny is required to change the Chinese last name to be Thai name. Likewise, Muslim offspring is required to change their first and last name to be Thai name and thus identify himself as "Thai-Muslim."

Item 9 imposes the regulation on official language and knowledge. This item requires that all "Thais" must understand standard Thai language, both in writing and speaking fluently.   This requirement also encourages all illegible persons to study Thai language.

Item 10 imposes the regulation on clothing and dressing. This rule demands that all Thai must wear polite clothing such as pants, shirt, including other details, e.g., shoes and socks.

Those items affect all Thai. It seems fair and makes Thailand more fashionable. Most people in other parts of Thailand have no problem to follow this policy except for the Muslim in southern part of Thailand. Particularly, the prohibition of wearing cloth in Muslim style, and prohibition of instruction in Jawi language in those provinces are too rigorous for them to follow. In addition, Piboonsongkram's government also abolished the Shariah or Islamic law which has been continuously enforced since the King Rama V. All those policies destroy their faith and ways of life and thus Muslim in those three

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[31] Rung Keawdaeng, War and Peace @ Border of Southern Thailand, (Bangkok, Matichon Press, 2005) pp.107-110 (He further explained that during the year of B.E. 2484-2488, England was involving in the WWII, and Japan occupied both Malaya and Singapore. Malaya considered that Thailand might assist it to be free from England and then the problem of southern Thailand was ignored by Malaysia in this period.)

[32] Srisak Wallipodom, et al, 2007. Loa-Khan-Tam-Nam-Tai (Myth of Southern Thailand), pp.35

provinces refuse to follow them. [33] This policy brought about the severe conflicts between the Thai government and Tengumamud Mayayiddine, who was Tengku Abdolkordare's son, the last Patani sultan, and Adul Na Saiburi, a son of Saiburi's sultan, during WWII period. Tengumamud and Adul's attempt were supported by England. Fortunately, the skillful diplomacy of Seri-Thai, or Free Thai, changed situation and Thailand became the country that won the war. England could not intervene with the internal affair of Thailand.[34] However, the striving for fairness in culture, politics, and economy as well as the desire to preserve their identity had never stopped.

In 1945 (B.E. 2488) the new government declared the policy to decrease tension between "Thai Muslim" and the government. The royal decree to subsidize the Islamic religion had come to force. This rule set up the provincial Islamic committee and Hiji Surong became the president of this panel. He submitted the seven requests to the government of Prime Minister Thamrongnawasawat as following:[35]

(1)   The Thai government should appoint the Thai-Muslim, the citizens of the four provinces of the southern border of Thailand, as officials for life;

(2)   Jawi language should be used as the means to instruct their offspring in public schools until grade four (the highest compulsory elementary education) ;

(3)   Both Jawi and Thai should be used as official language in those specific area;

(4)   Distinguish Muslim followers from other religious followers so that it is easy to apply and trial the case for only Muslim;

(5)   Tax and tariff obtained from the Muslim should be used to support the people only in the southern Thailand;

(6)   The officials should be Muslim of more than 80%;

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[33] Rung Keawdaeng, supra note…. P. 108
[34] Ibid
[35] Ibid 112

(7)   The Thai government should entitle the provincial Islamic committee to enact the law to be enforced in this specific area.

Moreover, the Muslims requested the government to accept their identity. That they are not Thai. As a result, the nationalism policy requiring identifying themselves as "Thai-Muslim" or Thai-Islam" was incorrect.   The Narathiwat Provincial Islamic Committee also submitted the similar motion and requested the government to establish the radio channel broadcasting in Jawi language. Most importantly, they requested government to declare that Friday and crucial Islamic days were the national holidays.[36] Even though those proposals were very difficult for the government to respond, there was no arrestment and violence to those Muslims.   However, when the government was changed to Piboonsongkram'a administration during 1948 and 1957 (B.E.2491-2500), Haji Surong was arrested and the court put him in imprisonment for almost 5 years. After he was released, he was secretly murdered and became another Pattani hero.

The violence created by government always brought about the feeling of suspicion to the government itself.   Because the Thai government always concerns about the security problem which renders the government to employ whatever means to suppress the separatist ideal, whatever the government tries to do in furtherance to protect and develop this area becomes more suspicious to the Muslims in this focused area. For example, in the Administration of Field Marshall Sarith Thanarath, the long term of economic planning and development in this area was initiated to develop the quality of the people's life. However, Sarith Thanarath also moved veteran soldier and people from other parts of Thailand to resettle in the so-called "self-development community" or "นิคมสร้างตนเอง" located in the southern provinces of Thailand.[37] The hidden agenda might be the desire to locate the Buddhist in Muslim world and thus increase the ratio of Buddhist followers in these provinces.

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[36] Srisak Wallipodom, et al, 2007. *Loa-Khan-Tam-Nam-Tai (Myth of Southern Thailand),* pp.166

[37] Srisak Wallipodom, et al, supra note … p. 36

Simultaneously, after the One Race One Nation policy was announced, the minister of education played the significant role to assimilate Muslims by establishing the standard Thai educational program. It focused on the secular approach, which aimed to implant the common subject for the Muslim progeny to work in capitalist world. This approach extremely conflicts with the Muslim study approach which focuses on the religious study. The regulations imposed by the Ministry of Education also cover to student uniform, similar to Bangkok, which prohibits the clothing according to Muslim style. It also prohibited using Jawi language both for teaching in school and in contacting the government official. The government forced the indigenous people to act aggressively to respond to such policy; some of aggressive actions, thus, have been classified as the separatist, even though they might not be the case.

3.3 The Undesirable impacts stemming from absorption policy

As described above, the absorption policy with violence brought about the more hatred of the Pattani people until current period. Whenever Thailand is subjected to any problem, such as that during the WWII, the leader of Pattani would be ready to fight for its own dependence. This trend was prevalent and true for all entity looking for independence from powerful countries anywhere.[38] For the former Patani Kingdom, they separated the goals of fighting into three levels: the independence; autonomous administration; and preservation of their own identity. In case the independence is too far or impossible, the fighting to preserve their own identity, including Jawi language, will be the lowest level for them to achieve. [39]

The ideal of separatism theory actually exists until today. However, it needs to be clarified why the phenomena occur. The first two parts has already discussed about the assimilation and absorption method, which Siam has done, to Patani kingdom since the arrival of the nation state and the western expansion to Southeast Asian countries.

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[38] Wan Kardaer Jaemann, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Malay Muslim Liberation Movement in Thailand, (Parrinya Nounpien, et al, trans.) In Source of Fire in the Southern Thailand, Surichai Wankeaw, editor, (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn Press, 2007) p. 240

[39] Ibid p.252

However, the history of Siam has never recorded in such way.[40] The Thai history record indicated that Siam was oppressed and encroached by other countries and thus had to give up some territory to those western countries. The incorrect history created more disgust among the people in Thailand. Most Thais in other part of the country always blame the reactions of Patani people to the Siamese or Thai policy because they do not understand anything about the historical background of Patani Kingdom, which was invaded and occupied by Siam without any consideration and mercy. The officials ruined and exploited the natural resources and financial taxation from the people of Patani as mentioned in the second part. If Siam in the past was more considerate, and less selfless, the Patani Kingdom, which paid respect and loyalty to Siamese Kingdom might be willing to be a part of Thailand in the present era.

The inappropriate policy and measures imposed by Siam and Thailand always cause violence to happen. Particularly, the suppression by Siam to Patani movement by means of military action always brings about the violence in response. The loyalty of Patani to Siam cannot be generated by use of force. It must be built and accumulated by courtesy and fair practice between Siam and Patani. The ideal of separation movement, or self-administration (autonomy) and the desire to preserve the identity relentlessly exists in Patani until the current period. The movement to obtain self-determination was strengthened among the members of minority group after the end of WWII.[41] The

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[40] Thanet Arpornsuwan, supra note… 5.

   [41] The movement can be seen by the stimulations of the United Nations which has adopted international conventions to enshrine the right of minority group. Examples of them are: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965; The Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries 1957; The Convention on the Status of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR) 1966; and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. Those international conventions aim to protect the rights of the ethnic group including the right to self-determination of the indigenous populations. For instance, article 27 of the ICCPR states that: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." Thailand has ratified the ICCPR since October 29, 1996 and came into enforce since January 30, 1997. Then, Thailand has the duties and state responsibilities if ignores those provisions to protect the minority group in Thailand. *See* details in Kittisak Porkkati 2008. "Community Rights," (Bangkok: Winyuchon) pp.59-71

minority group in Thailand has been encouraged by this trend as well. For example, after the end of WWII, Haji Surong, who was the leader of Patani People Movement (PPM), encouraged and awakened Pattani people to preserve their own identity and culture including Jawi language. If Thailand permitted former Patani Kingdom as independent state, Tengumumad would return and be the leader of the independent state. The examples of resistance deriving from lack of understanding of each other might be seen from the violent phenomena since 2004. Especially, the movement of separatist ideal becomes stronger during this period. As Chaiwat Satha-Anand emphasizes that to establish the national security, the truth must be firmly established, rather than forget.[42] Thailand needed to accept the truth about the tragedy incidents, Dusan-nyor in 1948, and Kru-Ze in 2004, which were massive massacre of Muslims and militants, including the policy in Field Marshal Piboonsongkram aiming at converting Malay to become Thai was too aggressive and left the deeply bad memory not only to Muslims in Thailand but those overseas as well. The first incident resulted in more than thousand Muslims took refuge Malaysia. The massacre of Muslims militants in the sacred place of God, Kru-Ze mosque, also shows desire of Muslims of the holy struggle for Patani Kingdom. These phenomena happened after the misunderstanding between the central government and local people. The proper measures to deal with ethic group in diversity society of Thailand needs to be managed. For the Muslims who actually seek to maintain their identity and language, the non-violence measure should be implemented. The government then should not distort the truth similar to the misrepresentation in the past.[43]

One of those misrepresentations is that Thailand is homogenous society, which is incongruent with the historical background.[44] The researcher still believes that an

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[42] Chaiwat Satha-Anan, 2006 "The silence of the bullet monument: violence and "truth" management, Dusan-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004", Critical Asian Studies, 38:1, 11-37
[43] Chaiwat Satha-Anan, 2006 "The silence of the bullet monument: violence and "truth" management, Dusan-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004", Critical Asian Studies, 38:1, 11-37
[44] Anan Panyarachun, "Thais and Cultural Diversities", In Surichai Wankeaw, ed., Source of Fire in Southern Thailand, (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press, 1007) p. 69 (His Excellency further explained that in this kingdom there are number racial and ethnical groups: Vietnamese, Khmer, Ramon(Morn), Chinese, and Malayu including Thais. Before Thais could establish power, there wear numerous kingdoms or community. This country is not unique and not only one race living in this area.)

acceptance of diversities in society is the most important tool to deal with the problems in the southern of Thailand. As the research usually indicates that there is no single resolution for the complex problem. The resolutions should be attached with numerous measures. For example, the fair process of criminal justice must be instantly implemented. All people are created equal and everyone seeks the justice as he or she is the victims of violent or the creator of violence. The fairness makes people comply with the law and follow the societal norms.[45] In sum, fairness can bring about the peace into society. If the government can exercise its authority to keep public order based on the rule of law and fair procedural rule in trial, peace will prevail.

3.4 Conclusion

Many scholars and media predict that the violence will not end.   One of factors arousing the violence is the benefit and the private interest of the influential persons in the focus area.[46] All policies to ease the violence in this area are based on the interests of every part of relating organization including local entities and influential person in local region. However, nobody speaks the truth; most violent phenomena are contributed to separatist action, which is not true. Currently, the problem is more complicated but it will be far more difficult if the government disregards these fundamental facts, including the custom and way of life of Muslim faith in this focused area.[47]

Some policy might be too naïve to deal with this phenomena. For example, the policy of Thaksin's Administration, which abolished the soldier, police and civilian administrative body, namely Sor-Or-Bor-Tor 43, and caused the outbreak of violence, including the educational policy to deal with Pondok school, considered as a threat to the security of Thailand,[48] This was implemented without firm knowledge of historical background of Pattani and unique characteristics of the people in this area.   Due to

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[45] Tom Tyler …..

[46] Reaungyot Chankiri, Situation in the three provinces of Southern Thailand, (Bangkok, Wongpan limited, 1980), pp 11, 14.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Bhuwadol Songprasert, supra note 4, pp.136-142

lacking understanding as mentioned above, the government also considered that the Jawi language was another important topic that created disorder in the focused area. All vigorous policies seriously implemented by government were then, based on the assertion of the security and public order reason without deep historical background study. Doing so causes the doubtfulness not only to Pattani people but also the people who follow the Muslim faith throughout the world. They question the policy of Thailand whether it puts the threat on Muslim faith, which is minority group in Thailand. Even in the economic development aspects, Thai government establishes economic development by considering it might suit them without the study of people's identity. Some government's policy, then, might conflict with their ways of life; for example, the development under the capitalist idea conflicts with the Muslim faith. Composing of several factors based on the doubtful government's policy, most Muslims reconsider that it is time for Muslims to resist the global trend and fight with the threat pending to Muslim world. Currently, it might be impossible for Pattani people to seek independent, they turn back to preserve their own identity and study its depressing historical background of Pattani as well as the inappropriate assimilation launched before 1932. The violent measures to suppress their movement after revolution in 1932 are used as the remembering tools in their educational program at least to preserve their uniqueness. On other side, it might be a good time for the government to turn back and reconsider what policy should be done properly.

One of many proposals that might be worth reconsidering to alleviate the violence in this area is Jaturon's proposal for the current violence in the southern Thailand. He suggests that the government should act instantly in following steps:

(1)   Protection of life, safety and property of the people in the focused area;

(2)   Decrease the number of law enforcement officers and soldiers due to lacking of knowledge and understanding of actual problem of violence;

(3)   Abolish the royal decree authorizing the special power to the police officers and soldier to prevent them from unfair practice and malpractice to the people;

(4)   Review the educational policy about Pondok school because this policy including involuntary disappearance cause dissatisfaction of the local people to the Thai government;

(5)   Establish the strategy to develop these three provinces by using the people center's strategy which all policy should be accepted or heard by the local people;

(6)   Move the misconduct officer from this area.

Unfortunately, these proposals were ignored by the government likewise the policy suggested by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which studied the actual causes of problems. One of several recommendations by the 2006 NRC is that the acceptance of Patani Malay language as the working language among the people in focused area including the government officials. Doing so would decrease the tension situation between the officials and the people in local area. This measure might simultaneously create the better understanding among them. This suggestion is also congruent with the royal statement of the current King of Thailand, in that, the government should support the people to preserve the local dialect so that it can guarantee the understanding among the members and thus they can live together peacefully.[49]

The government should review the different customs and norms of Muslim faith in this area. Imposing the policy from central government has proved itself wrong or might cause undesirable impacts or new problems again and again. Lacking of understanding of each other between officials and local people, and suspicion of the members will cause the violence in focused area forever.[50] Any policy needs more

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[49] Suthiwong Pongpaiboon, Structure and Dynamic in Culture of Southern Thailand and Is Development, (Amy Trading Limited., 2001) p.153

[50] Kitti Rattanachaya, General, Cease the Southern Fire and State of Thai, (Bangkok, Than-kan-pim, 2005)

deliberately considered about the undesirable impacts which might occur. Policy and measures about the acceptance of Jawi language comes up with the risk. If the government decides to implement this policy, the government must accept that it might fail to alleviate the violence. The pertinent point is that there is no panacea for keeping public order and champion the identity of minority. All necessary means might be the components of the medicine.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECURITY PROBLEMS AND THE SOLUTION FOR THE THREE BORDER PROVINCES

4.1 The Situation in the South in 2010

The Thai government also continuously exercised the highest authority to suppress the so-called the separatist or public disorder creator. As a result, the rumors of police malpractice and security-officials were and still are banal; for example, the exercise of power to arrest and extrajudicial killing the Malay Muslims and their family members. Then, in 1975, the mass demonstration at the Pattani Central Mosque occurred which was triggered by the malpractice of officers in arbitrarily killing without due criminal law process by the court.[1]

The Thai government always considered the conflict in the southern provinces of Thailand as the national security problem. The rivalries between military and police also another factor that escalates the conflict in the southern border, but finally the Fourth Army was in charge to solve conflict in this area, and later the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Command (SBPAC), was established to deal with the violence in 1981, during prime minister Gen.Prem Tinsulanond administration. Besides SBPAC, the government still set up the Mixed Security Official Command, which was composed of military officials, police officers, and civil servants. [2] It seems this military action, supported by declaring the martial law from time to time, succeeds in decreasing the violence in this region.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] This organization or "พตท. 43" was established under the Prime Minister Office Order No. 8/2524 the dated 20 January 1981 in General Preme Tinasulanont Administration to cope with the conflict in the southern province which the Fourth Army was mainly in charge. It closely coordinated with the SBPAC. See Isara Institute, The Evolution of Southern Conflict Solving Organization from SBPAC to What? Posted in http://south.isranews.org/scoop-and-documentary/scoop-news-documentary/23-2009-11-24-07-33-52.html

In 2002, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra abolished SBPAC and put the police in charged of security issue by the suggestion of Police Commissioner, Pol.Gen.Sant Sarutanond. [3] The Police Commissioner asserted that the separatists did not exist; as a result, the special organization was unnecessary after the SBPAC having been functioning for 21 years. The gainer and loser of benefit seemed unsatisfied with the SBPAC abolition, but the specialists in this particular area believed that the lack of special organization provoked the violence. [4] The reoccurrence of violence happened again in 2004, with the "strong conclusion" that the SBPAC abolition helped reignite the political conflict and violence. [5] The military camp was robbed and over 400 firearms were taken from Narathivas-rachanakarin military camp, with the death of army officials. The government assessed the situation and recreated the "Commission of Special Policy to Solve the Problem and Develop the Southern Border Area", according to the Prime Minister Office Order No.154/2003, which composed of 35 members. This committee was different from SBPAC in that there is none of the local Malays as a member in this committee, while it was the case in the SBPAC. The situation seemed getting worse, then, the government exercised more serious measures to cope with the situation. In 2004, Prime Ministry Thaksin established the Special Organization to Support and Build Peace in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand or กองอำนวยการเสริมสร้างสันติสุขจังหวัดชาย แดนภาคใต้(กอ.สสส.จชต.), and the other organizations ensued to eradicate the conflict. The violence was so severe that Prime Minister Gen.Surayuth Jula-nond recreated the SBPAC in 2006 and put the Army and Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC, กอ.รมน.) in charge of controlling and commanding in all aspects completely. SBPAC, had no authority to issue any policy and could not rotate any officials, because SBPAC became only the military mechanism. In short, the military operation in the sensitive area of

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[3] The SBPAC was abolished in April 30, 2002, according to the Prime Minister Office Order No.123/2002. See Isira Institute. Ibid.

[4] Ibid.; Duncan McCargo, Ibid. p.116

[5] Duncan McCargo, Ibid.

former Pattani territory becomes the major strategy to solve the conflict. As a result, the violence has never ended. More than 4,000 persons died from 2004 to the present. The government strongly believes that the military action and establishing the new department, the Special Police Department of Southern Border, etc., are necessary to solve the problem. In the researcher's view, the result of military operation will be worse off rather than better off. One factor might increase the hostile feeling is the injustice deriving from the military and police action. The resentment and malpractice of officers, and the antagonized history of Siam invasion and brutal behaviors, are used to extend the recreation of separatism. The injustice is another important factor that encourages the insurgency as well. For example, the facts that over 100 Malays death deriving from the incident of Kru-Ze, an armed attack to the most sacred religious place for the Malay Muslim on April 28, 2004; and the case of Tak Bai protestors, which the wrong military operation to transfer almost 100 Malay Muslim suspects to die in October 2004; all these happen without the legal responsibility of the officials, it helps increase the hostility against the government of Thailand. [6]

The ethno nationalist insurgency re-emerged in 2004 in the predominantly Malay Muslim South and has since claimed more than 4,400 lives and injury of 7,200 people.[7] It was mishandled and exacerbated by the heavy handled policies of the Thaksin administration (2001-2006). After the September 2006 coup, the interim government of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont attempted to address mistakes by making a historic apology for past abuses and reviving key conflict management bodies. In response, the

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[6] The Justice for Peace Foundation, Declaration of a-6-year-Tak Bai incidence, posted on http://patanisociety.net/?q=node/70 (This declaration indicated the failure of the justice system in seeking and finding the result of judgment in Tak-Bai incidence. It wises that the government and the National Human Right Commission of Thailand should play the important role to protect the human right violation in the southern provinces of Thailand.)

[7] Crisis Group Asian Report No.181,Souther Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solution?., 8 December 2009

militants escalated their attacks, prompting the military to launch a more aggressive counter insurgency campaign in mid 2007. In light of growing political turmoil at the centre, the subsequent post coup civilian governments largely left counter insurgency operations in the military hands.[8] After taking office in December 2008, Prime Minister Abhisit pledged to take back policy oversight but the persistent weakness of his government has held back a comprehensive and decisive response to this conflict.

The level of attacks has been steady for the past three years. During this time, security forces have been unable to reduce the violence significantly, but the insurgents have not been able to expand their military operations either. It appears that neither side will prevail militarily. Since the insurgency resumed in 2004, there were about 1,800 attacks each year, peaking in 2005 with 2,173 attacks.[9] The more aggressive counter insurgency operations launched by the military since mid 2007 cut the number of attacks in half to 821. After a significant drop in incidents in 2008, a stalemate seems to have been reached. Violence increased slightly in 2009 to 1,035 incidents. In the first ten months of 2010, there were 831 attacks, which should bring the annual total close to that of 2009.[10] Although attacks have mainly targeted security forces and government officials, most victims continued to be civilians.

Drive shooting and bombings are the most common tactics used by insurgents. The overall rate of bombings in 2010 is close to that recorded the previous year. As of 22 October, there have been 225 bombings, compared to 290 in 2009.[11] Car bomb attacks and the use of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices decreased in 2010. As of 22 October, there have been only two car bombs successfully detonated, compared to six the

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[8] Asian No.192, Bridging Thailand's Deep Divide, 5 July 2010;Conflict Risk Alert: Thailand, 30 April 2010.

[9] According to Deep South Watch, there were 1,838 attacks in 2004; 1,847 in 2006; and 1,850 in 2007.

[10] Statistic from Deep South Watch.

[11] Statistics from the army bomb disposal unit made available to Crisis Group and Crisis Group interview, officer in bomb disposal unit, 22 October 2010

previous year since 2004.[12] Bomb disposal experts believe this is a result of better cooperation between people spotting suspicious objects with the authorities.[13]

Car bomb incidents include an attack on 11 April 2010 when a bomb exploded in Narathiwat's Chana district, killing one member of the Or Sor (Volunteer Defense Corps, under the Interior Ministry) as well as injuring a police officer and two deputy village headmen. The bomb was inside a 15kg cooking gas tank, concealed by logs, and placed on the back of a pick-up truck. As the officials went to inspect spiked nails laid on the road near the parked truck, the bomb was remotely triggered.[14]

Ten days later, in the city of Pattani's Muang district, another explosion injured seven police officers and ten civilians. Triggered in the same manner,[15] the attack took place at 10:30am; two hours after assailants had thrown a military grenade into police station. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of police officer killing one and injuring 43 others. The two attacks were coordinated as the car bomb exploded about 50 meters away from police station.[16]

Some 30,000 troops are stationed in the region, about one third of whom are paramilitary rangers. While an increasing number of locally based troops have been deployed under the newly established 15th Infantry Division, battalion from other army regions are still being rotated into the border provinces.[17] The troops spend most of their time escorting government school teachers to and from work as well as Buddhist monks

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[12] Crisis Group interview, officer in bomb disposal unit, Pattani, 17 August 2010

[13] Ibid

[14] Information from army documents made available to Crisis Group

[15] Statistics from the army bomb disposal unit made available to Crisis Group and Crisis Group telephone interview, army bomb squad official, 29 October 2010.

[16] Information from army documents made available to Crisis Group.

[17] Crisis Group telephone interview, Maj. Gen. Chamlong Khunsong, Fouth Army Region's deputy commander, 21 October 2010. Also see Crisis Group Briefing, Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency, op.cit.,p.6

collecting alms in the morning. They also carry out development projects and to, a much lesser extent, capture suspected militants.[18]

Prime Minister Abhisit has said that success should be defined by the ability to maintain security while withdrawing troops.[19] The then Army Commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda, who retried in October 2010, disagreed with the idea of reducing the number of soldiers until other government agencies are ready to provide security.[20] To pave the way for force reductions, the government should increase the number of police officers and build their capacity. By some estimates, districts in the South have half as many polices as should be assigned to them.[21] While the situation may not warrant large-scale withdrawal of troops, the government could identify areas where the level of violence is minimal and begin to scale down their number and deploy more police. It should also provide more resources and training to other civilian defense volunteers. Labor-intensive tasks, such as providing security for government school teachers, should gradually be transferred to police or civilian defense groups to reduce demand for soldiers.

4.2 The Recommendations to the Security Problems

The Thai government set up the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) owing to pressure of the society in 2005 after the failure of military action. This commission was led by former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and other prominent scholars, totaling 48 persons. The NRC was in charge of studying bedrock of the violent problem and suggesting the policy to build the peace in the southern provinces area. The NRC ended its functions in 2006 with numerous recommendations toward the roots of

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[18] Crisis Group interview, senior military commander, Narathiwat, 10 August 2010

[19] Press conference by Prime Minister Abhhisit Vejjajiva at the ISOC's Fourth Region, Pattani, 17 January 2009.

[20] "Southern fire in the eyes of army chief; fears demands on troop withdrawal, negotiations, special administrative zone", Isara News Agency southern desk, 22 August 2010

[21] Crisis Group interview, military officer, Narathiwat, 11 August 2010

conflict and suggestions to decrease the problem.**22** The roots of conflicts derive from several factors, which are rooted in the cultural basis, such as the language – Islamic religion, and the history of Pattani.

The NRC, hence, proposes the conflict resolution in several ways. First, for the short term recommendations, the Thai government must solve the conflict with non-violent methods in the three different ways, such as: (1) establishment of non-violence army or peace army with no firearms; (2) creation of political dialogues between the Thai government officials and the freedom movement groups; (3) the officials in the southern area must be specially selected and recruited. The peace army force is the innovation of conflict resolution and the risk-taking group. This element is the major components of the proposals elaborated below:

> The peace army force must be composed of the skillful non-violent citizens and religious leaders, both Muslims and Buddhists, to figure out the conflict resolution and transform the conflict by the local intellectual wisdom.

> The idea to stop using the firearms and violent methods under the military operations is the core principle to prevent the conflict transforming to violence disguised as bravery of Thai government. This method will elevate the conflict between the state officials and the local people. It now entrusts and empowers the local citizens to solve the conflict themselves. In addition, when the situation is prone to become more violent, the military must keep to the rule of engagement of attack.

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[22] http://chaisuk.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/nrcreport-eng1.pdf

For the long-term conflict resolution, the NRC suggests the methods to solve the conflict in the structural dimensions in six ways as following:

1. Enactment of the law to empower the community to manage the natural resources based on the religious belief.

2. Solving the problem of unemployment in the southern area.

3. Advocating the effectiveness of the justice system based on the truth, the rule of law, and responsibility, as well as supporting the public to participate in the justice preservation.

4. Developing the Islamic law corresponding to the southern area context.

5. Preserving the diversity of educational system, enhancing the effectiveness of elementary educational system and emphasizing the importance of Thai students studying abroad.

6. Supporting the non-violent policy to solve the violence in the southern Thailand.

The non-violent method mentioned above might be delineated in the five particular methods as followings:

1. Champion the diversity of cultural diversities throughout the country.

2. Advocate the non-violence concept to solve the problem in the Thai community outside the southern area because if the out-side southern regional citizens still request the government to apply severe military operation to solve the problem, the peace cannot be built in the focusing area. Narrowing the cultural gap in different region is the most important factor for achieving the peace.

3. Declaring the Jawi language as working language additional to the standard Thai language in the southern area because most of the Pattani citizens cannot understand the standard Thai language; then, it will become the obstruction of communicative function among the officials and the local citizens. Inability to communicate understandably will create unfair practice and increasingly lead to misunderstanding and distrusting toward the official. However, working language is not similar to the official. The proposal of adding the Jawi language as working, is to better understanding among the citizens and officials. As a result, the document and symbol or road sign should be written in both Thai and Jawi language, which is compatible with the facts that English and Thai language are used in the other area of Thailand.

4. Establishment of political dialogue to better understanding about the different culture, religion and language. This process will enhance the patience, or tolerance of the Thai citizens living in other part of Thailand to evade the violent method in solving the conflict.

Lastly, the NRC also suggests the Thai government to enact the law to cope with this specific problem, namely as the Non-Violence in the Southern Provinces Act or พระราชบัญญัติสันติสมานฉันท์ในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้. According to this draft, the establishment of the three organizations to cope with the conflict comprise: (1) Southern Border Provinces Peace Strategy Administration Center (SBPPSAC) or ศูนย์อำนวยการยุทธศาสตร์สันติสุขจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ (ศอส.); (2) Council for the Development of the Southern Border Provinces Area or สภาพัฒนาพื้นที่จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้, and (3) The Fund to Support Healing and Reconciliation or กองทุนสนับสนุนการเยียวยาและสมานฉันท์. Those methods will enhance the good relationship and good understanding as well as wise and compassionate approach to religious and community leaders in the area. These respected persons can provide healing for sufferers through existing community institutions, such as temples, mosques, schools, and pondok schools, without choosing sides or ideologies but with concern for their

fellow human beings. This form of healing engenders positive feelings and hope, and can be a force for reconciliation.

However, the proposal of the NRC, especially the proposal of the accepting Jawi as working language, was completely ignored by the Thai government. The Thai government, and the prominent person, as mentioned in the first two chapters, viewed the suggestion too progressive and thus the severe military operation and police forces continue until the present. The more victims and innocence are killed and injured widely in this regional area. The special police administration known as the Tenth Police Regional Command, then, has been established in 2009. The numerous security officials, including military and police officers have been dispatched to the area without any sign of peace until the present.

The Thai government lead by Democrat Party proposed the draft of the establishment of new SBPAC in 2009, or ร่างพระราชบัญญัติการบริหารราชการจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ พ.ศ.2552, The Bill was passed into force in May 2010,[23] which emphasized the similar name of SBPAC because it was much more familiar to all parties. It widens the area of southern provinces border from the three or four provinces to be five by adding Songkha into the special area. These causes debate in the parliament because there is no evidence this resolution will response to the need of the people in the local area. The SBPAC will be chaired by the prime minister, and functions as the council and coordinator for the operation of civil servant, police and military. The major concern of this SBPAC is also aiming to protect citizens' rights and justice for the local people in this area, as well as developing the economic and the quality of life of the local people.

The SBPAC council is composed of 41 members, which are appointed by prime minister, such as, the representative of local autonomous bodies, chiefs of district,

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[23] http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000065453

provincial Islamic committee, Buddhist monk, etc.   This council will propose the necessary measures and also serve as the justice preserver for the local citizens.

4.3 Conclusion

After the new SBPAC law was enforced around six month, the Thai government declared on December 28, 2010 to abolishment of martial law including the Administration in Emergency Situation Act in some district of Pattani Province.[24] However, it is only the pilot project to the normal law in the conflicting area without any sign of permanent and sustainable peace resolution.   The Thai government still ignores other proposal of the NRC, especially, the usage of Jawi as working language in the Pattani territory.   In addition, the government might agree with the Army and Security Command that accepting the Jawi language is dangerous to the Thai nation because it is rumored that the Jawi working language is a part of current separatism scheme.[25] Conversely, the researcher believes that the proposal of the NRC will bring about better understanding and narrow the gap of distrust toward the government officials, which will lead to the permanent peace in the society.   Then, the next chapter will test this hypothesis, and will examine the perspectives of the officials and people in the local area whether they agree with the idea to accept the usage of Jawi language.

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[24] http://www.mcot.net/cfcustom/cache_page/148770.html (Please note that Pattani, spelling with double T, means to only the current Pattani province, with Patani, single T spelling, means to all area which used to belong to the former Patani Kingdom.)

[25] Wan Kordi Jeaman, "The Characteristics of Fighting." In Surichai Wankeaw, ed., 2007. Source of Fire in Southern Thailand, (Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University Press) p.251 (He indicates types of fighting to obtain complete sovereignty of the colonial entity in Asian area after WWII, particularly the Malay Patani movement, can be divided into three levels, that is: (1) the absolute separation from Thailand to found the Great Patani State; (2) establishing self autonomy to regulate themselves without any intervention of Bangkok; and (3) at least, the preservation of Patani's identity if the upper levels fail.

CHAPTER V
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY AND ITS RESULTS

5.1 General Idea of the Study Method and the Limitation

As mentioned in Chapter II, the identity-related, specifically, the preservation of Jawi language and religious principles is the dominant factor bringing about the conflict in the three Southern Provinces of Thailand. Putting in this way, the inappropriate state policy can easily force the warfare to occur destroying the life and property of the innocent in the conflicting area.[1]   The recognition of the local communal identity and the human basic needs are, indeed, the core policy which the researcher believe that the Thai government could not ignore and should be aware of shaping the appropriate policy to create the people's acceptance thus being able to stop conflict in the focusing area.   The first step is that the Thai must build the trust toward the Thai government among the community's elites and the Muslim Malay people. This is the most important factor to achieve the aim of long term and stable peace in this area.   Positive and broad-minded vision, not negative force might be better mechanism to reach this end.

This researcher, therefore, use the questionnaires aiming to test the opinions of the police officers, military forces, the teachers, the local elites, and the people living in the focusing area.   The researcher believes that the result of empirical study will show the attitude of those sampling groups, which will be useful to suggest the proper model in solving problem or at least alleviate the conflict in these three southern provinces of Thailand.   The questionnaires were submitted to the security officers, both police officers and the IV Military Force, to test if the perspective of those officers, sent from Bangkok, will be congruent with the proposal of the National Reconciliation Committee and the researcher's proposal.   The questionnaires have also been submitted to the teachers and the religious elites in those three provinces, but the researchers found that nobody would like to participate in responding.   Based

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[1] Thai World Affairs Center, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. Looking at the Conflict in the Deep South: A Conflict Transformation Approach. Posted in http://www.thaiworld.org/en/include/print.php?text=789& category_id=4&print=true

on the personal interview, they are not willing to answer any questions because of several reasons. The main reasons are they consider that there were too many documental researches for them to participate in the past years, but nothing useful occurs. The teachers seem to be afraid that participating in any researches might be too dangerous for them because, currently, the teachers become more targeted than any state's officers. As a result, the researcher cannot obtain the useful information from teacher and local religious elites to test if the local elite people and educational personnel agree with the proposal if the Jawi language should be adopted as official language in the participant's view.

5.2 Results Based on the Questionnaire

The questionnaire composes of 4 parts which are: Part I basic information of the participants corresponding to the questionnaire; Part II opinion on the cause of conflicts which lead to violence in the southern part of Thailand; Part III adopt the suggestions to solve problems through non-violent measures by employing the Jawi language as official language; and Part IV open question for the participants to identify different point of views to correctly solve the problems.

The researcher submitted questionnaires to the government officials and the people in the local area of the former Patani Kingdom, mainly in Pattani province, there were 120 questionnaires returned to the researcher's representative in the Special Branch of Police Administration Force or the Tenth Regional Police Force.

The basic information of the participants to the questionnaire are composed of 40 police officers, 40 soldiers, and 40 people from the local area, totally 120 participants. Only 33 of 120 are female, and the average age of the different groups is between 29 and 36 years old. The police officers are around 36 of age while the soldier's age is 32 years old in average, and the people in local area is around 29 years old. (See figure 1)

Figure 1. The Age of the Participants.

For the working experience in the area, most of police officials, 15 police officers, have been working in the focusing area less than three years, around 37.5 %, 9 of 40 has been working between three and five years, around 22.5 %, 4 of 40 has experience in the area from five to ten year, around 10 %, and 12 of 40 has been working continuously in this area more than 10 years, around 30%. For the information about the soldiers, that is, most soldiers, 21 of 40, have been working in the area three to five years, around 52.5 %, and 10 of 40, around 25%, have experience in this area less than 3 year, while only 5 of 40 continuously work in the area between 5 to 10 years, or around 12.5%, and only 4 of 40, or about 10%, have worked in the area more than 10 years. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. The working experience of the officers in the area

Regarding the direct vulnerability or experience, either the participant's themselves or relatives, to the damage deriving from conflicting events, most participants, 38 of 40, in the police group used to suffer from the incident or around 90 %, while all military officers or 100 % have such direct experience, similar to the people group. (See figure 3)

Figure 3. The experience of direct damage of the participants.

The results from the questionnaire can be concluded into 8 main points as follow:

   1. Knowledge about the Patani Kingdom's History:

All participants have knowledge about the Patani Kingdom's history because they indicated that they have studied about it. However, there are only 6 of 120, or around 5%, deeply and excellently know the Patani's kingdom. Particularly, around 32 of 80 in the police and soldier groups, or around 40% of these two groups of participants, have known about the Patani's kingdom very superficially, while around 56 of 80 in those two groups, or around 72.5%, have known about Patani's kingdom in the intermediate level, but most of people 36 of 40, or around 90%, know about the Patani's history in the intermediate level. (See Figure 4)

Figure 4. The level of historical knowledge of Patani's kingdom.

The questionnaire asked how long did the government officials study about the Patani Kingdom's historical background and Muslim principles. The result shows a 100 percent of police officers got a training program from 5 to 10 days, while 22 of 40 of the soldiers, or 55%, got the similar period program, and 18 of 40 soldiers, or 18%, got a training program from 3 to 5 days. (See Figure 5)

Figure 5. The training program period prior to working in the area.

Most of police officers, 25 of 40, or around 62.5 %, accepted that the training program, is not enough, while 38 of 40, or around 95%, consider that it is not enough to get training only not more than 10 days prior to working in the area. While 15 of 40 police officers, or around 37.5%, agree that a-5-to-10-day program is enough to work in the area effectively. Only 2 of 40 of the soldiers, or around 5%, agree that the training program provided by the army force is enough to work in the area. (See Figure 6)

Figure 6. The opinion about the period of training program if it is enough to work effectively.

The answer from the questionnaire shows that around 55% of police officers, or 22 of 40, are not willing to work in the area, while 15 of 40 of police officers, or around 37.5% agree to work in the area, and only 8 of 40 or 20% of police officers are extremely willing to work in the Patani area. For the soldier group, only 10 of 40 soldiers, or around 25%, are willing to work in the area, while 30 of 40 soldiers, or around 75%, are not willing to work in the focusing area. (See Figure 7)

Figure 7. The number of officers who cordially agree to work in the focusing area.

On the point that Patani citizens are Malays descendants who are continuously living in the former Patani Kingdom, currently composing of Pattani, Yala, Narathivas provinces, 50% of police officers agree while almost a half disagreeing, while 4 of 40 police officers highly agree. However, almost 100 percent of soldiers

agree with the mentioned definition, which is similar to the citizens in the local area. (See figure 8)

Figure 8. The numbers of the participants agreeing with the definition of Patini's citizens.

2. Causes of the Violence & Conflict

The results from the questionnaires in part II, which examined of the participants on the cause of the violence and conflict in the southern part of Thailand, indicates the attitudes of the participants corresponding to the question regarding the violence facing in the southern area. The results are followings:

When the questionnaire asked about the most important cause bringing about violence in Southern Thailand, the answers vary among different groups as followings:

Most of police officers, 22 of 40, believe that the most important factor is the conflict of interest among officials and smugglers, while most of the military officers, 19 of 40, believe that the violence derives from the separatist against the Siamese occupation over Patani Kingdom, while the local people, 20 of 40, believe that the conflict derives from the differentiation of race, religion, culture of Patani citizens which are different from the Thai citizens in other regional areas, so that the Patani Malays are fighting for preservation of their own identities.

The least important factor leading to the violence also varies in different groups, that is, only 2 of 40 in police officer group consider the cause of conflict derives from the separatist, while none of civilians in the local area thinks the cause of conflict derives from the separatism. The local people, 20 of 40, consider that the

cause of violence derives from the distrust toward educational policy introduced by the Thai government imposing only the Thai standard language in the past, and 12 of 40 of the local citizens consider the violence derive from the inequality of development compared to other area. (See Figure 9)


Figure 9. The causes of violence among the different groups, from separatism, racial issues, policy distrust, lack of economic development and conflict of interest.

When asked if the violence derives from the lack of strength and unity of the Military force is responsible for the cause of violence in the southern provinces, 37 of 40 in police group are prone to agree, and the result is similar to the opinion in the soldier group, which are 30 of 40. Surprisingly, the result shows that 21 of 40 in the group of local citizens also agree that the lack of strength of military unity causes the disorder in the focusing area, while 19 of 40 in this group disagree.

On another question, when asked if current violent problem derives from the Thai policy which creates distrust toward the Patini Malays, the police officers, 21 of 40, tend to disagree, while 22 of 40 in the military group are prone to agree. All participants in the local citizen group are prone to agree that the policy of central government causes the violence. In addition, when asked if the establishment of the Thai identity under the Thai standard from Bangkok which forces all citizens, including former Patani Malays, to be Thai is the most important cause of violence, almost all police officers, 35 of 40, strongly disagree, and over a half of military forces, 24 of 40, disagree as well, while only 1 of 40 in the local citizens answer

similarly to the governmental officials, or 39 of 40 agree that the policy of identity assimilation from the central government is the major cause of violence.

When asked if the most important factor that creates the violence in the southern provinces of Thailand is the lack of economic development, or that the Thai government ignores the citizens' need in the focus area, all participants in the citizen group, and the military group, are prone to agree, while the police officer, 19 of 40, are prone to agree while 21 of 40 answer differently. (See Figure 10)

Figure 10. The participants' opinion of violence deriving from the lack of development in the area.

There is one question in questionnaire which emphasizes the reliability of the literature review, in that, the practice of government's officials who do not understand the culture, identity and religious issues cause misunderstanding and, thus, brings about the violence in the focusing are.   The result shows that only 2 of 120 participants disagree. Therefore, 118 of 120, or 98.33%, agree that another major cause that stimulates the violence is the inappropriate conduct or malpractice of the officials. (See Figure 11)

Figure 11. The participants' opinions of the official malpractice causing the violence.

3. Cause of the Violence Associated with the Language Policy

The most important question and relevant to the research topic is when it was asked about the policy of single official language of the standard Thai, and prohibition of using the Jawi language are the factors creating the misunderstanding among the Patani citizens. All police officers are prone to agree with the question, and only 2 of 40 in the soldier group disagree as well as in the citizen group, all citizens agree that the policy of single official language causes the current violent in the former Patani Kingdom. (See Figure 12)

Figure 12. The policy of Thai single official language is causing the violence in the southern area.

Another result from the questionnaire is when a question tested if the national policy from central government, specifically the Thai standard language as required by the Ministry of Educational Program to be single standard throughout Thailand, conflicts with the local culture and needs of the community and thus force to distrust towards the Thai government among the Patani citizens. The result shows that only 6 of 120, or around 5%, disagree, while the rest of the participants, or around 95%, agree. (See Figure 13)

Figure 13. The opinions of the participants whether if central's government policy causes the distrust to the Thai government as a whole.

When the question asked if the perception of the Patani's citizens which do not accept the Thai educational standard program is the risk of the Thailand national security, there are only 2 of 80 in the government's official group disagree with the conclusion while only 8 of 40 in the citizens' group answer positively. In short, 32 of 40, or 80%, of the local citizens do not believe that the Patani's perception, which does not accept single standard of Thai educational system, will cause the violence in the southern area, but conversely, the official group considers such perception is dangerous to the security of the Thai. All participants in the government's officials agree with the conclusion that the Thai government should impose the strictly compulsory policy that requires all Patani's citizens to study the Thai standard language in all government school or private school that obtain budget from the Thai government, while the more than 50% of the participants, 21 of 40, in the citizens' group disagrees with the above conclusion.

In addition, the result from questionnaire shows that almost all government' officials, 78 of 80, agree that the religious school or pondok school is the original source that implants the opposite idea against Thailand, then, the government should limit the mentioned school including the existence of this school, while around 77.5%, or 31 of 40, of the citizens' group disagree. (See Figure 14)

Figure 14. The Security officers' opinion if Pondok school is the source of violence.

However, all participants in the official's group recommend that the Thai standard language should be compulsory program. All police officers disagree with the policy that does not support a bilingual program, both Thai and Jawi languages, based on the reason this program creates the antagonized feeling and does not implant the Thai into the Patani's citizens. More than 50 % of the military force also disagrees with the conclusion that the government should not support the bilingual program, similar to the participant's in the citizen's group, which is 31 of 40, or 77.5%, of the local citizens who disagree with such policy. (See Figure 15)

Figure 15. The participants' opinion to policy to not support the bilingual program.

When the question asks if the practice of government officials sent from the central government and the official Thai standard language program from the past till present create a resistance against the Thai government, most officials, 62 of 80, or

around 77,5%, disagree, but only 1 of 40, or 2.5%, of local citizens disagree with conclusion.

4. <u>Solving Conflict by Accepting the Local Culture</u>

This part shows the result of the measures to solve the conflict in the southern provinces. Most participants in security group, especially the police officers, is in the strong position against the proposal of acceptance Jawi language as official language while the participants from the rest are prone to agree, they even accept that the Jawi language will help the situation getting better by creating a good understanding among local people and state's officers. The details can be elaborated as following:

The question asks if the citizen, living in any regional areas, should have the right to fight to preserve their own identity, custom and culture including the local dialect which the central government should not intervene or convert to be the central government's standard. Approximately 70 percent of police officers, 28 of 40, disagree, which is almost the same ratio as the soldiers, or around 67.5% of 40 participants, while 57.5% of the participants in the local citizen group strongly agree, and around 42.5% agrees with the conclusion mentioned above. (See Figure 16)


Figure 16. The opinion of the participants on the local citizens having the right to preserve their identities and determining their faith without state's intervention.

When the question asks if the acceptance of the former Patani Malay identity in the southern three provinces will be the proper method to create the sustainable

peace in the long run; the 25 of 40 police participants disagree while the 15 of 40 police officers are prone to agree.   However, all participants in the group of soldiers and local citizens are prone to agree. As a result, stated differently, only 25 of 120, or around 20.83 % disagrees with the proposal to accept the Patani's identity, while 95 of 120, or around 79.17%, agrees with above proposal. (See Figure 17)


Figure 17. The percentage of the participant's opinion on the acceptance of Patani's identity creating the sustainable peace.

The result from the questionnaire has shown that when asked about the means to sustainably solve the conflict in the focus area is to open the political sphere and accept the different view point of the local elites according to the non-violent principles, all participants are prone to agree.

5. Solving Conflict by Accepting the Local Language

The questionnaire continues to emphasize on the policy proposal on accepting the Jawi language as official language and allowing Jawi language to be included into an educational program, in order to create sustainable peace. Only 21 participants in the soldier group from 120 participant disagrees, but other 99 participants from police and citizens agrees. In other words, 17.50 % of the participants disagree with the mentioned proposal, while 82.50% of the participants agree. (See Figure 18)

Figure 18. Percentage of participant's opinion on acceptance of Jawi language as working language and educational program helping create the sustainable peace.

The question asks of applying a policy of accepting the Jawi language as an official language in the local Thai government offices, where the Malay Patani citizens might communicate in Jawi thus better understanding among the citizens. There are only 6 participants in the police group and 2 in the military force or 8 of 120, or around 6.67%, who disagree, while the other participants or around 93.33% from all 3 groups agree. However, when asked a similar question on whether the Thai government should change policy by allowing the local citizens using either the dialect or the Thai standard language as communicative language with the government office, the result becomes strange because 31 of 40 in police group disagree, while 19 of 40 in the military force group also disagree. However, no participant in the local citizen group disagrees with this proposal. In other words, the 62.50% of the security officers, or around 50 of 80 in police and soldier group, disagree to adopt the Jawi language as official or communicative language. It might imply that the security officer might agree that adopting Jawi language as working language might create better understanding among the local people and officials, but they might consider that the risk from adopting such policy might be too high so that they disagree if the state officially declares the Jawi language as working language.

The questionnaire asks if the acceptance of the Patani's identity, and allowing the Jawi language as the dominant one in their own community and as communicative language with government officials will be the starting point to reconcile the hatred

feeling in the past, the 15 of 40 in police group disagree, while other 105 of 120 participants in military force and local citizen group agree. (See Figure 19)


Figure 19. The number of participants' opinion on the adoption of Jawi language as be starting point to reconcile the hatred feeling of the Patani citizens against the Thai government

Therefore, when the questionnaire asks whether the government officials accept the Jawi language as communicative or working language, this means seeking cooperative tools to better understanding among the citizens in the focus area, only 5 of 120, or around 4.17 %, disagree, while other 115 of 120, approximately 95.83%, agree.

6. Solving Conflict by Using Peaceful Ways

The questionnaire tests if the state policy to establish the Thai national identity conflicts with the historical background, which is in conformity with the sentiment and common sense as well as human right principle of the local citizens who can exercise the right of self-determination based on the custom, culture, identity of the local citizens' life. Over 50% of police officers, 22 of 40 participants, disagree with the conclusion mentioned above, while all soldiers tend to agree, and around 51% of the local citizens strongly agree, as well as around 49% agree. In other words, only the police officers are prone to think that the state policy of the central government conflicts with the local customs. The others are prone to agree that the conclusion mentioned above.   In other words, around 18.33 % of all participants disagrees that

that the Thai policy establishment conflict with the local customs, while other 81.67% of all participants agree. (See Figure 20)


Figure 20. The percentage of participants' opinion to the question if the policy of Thai establishment conflicts with the local customs and right to self-determination.

In addition, the question asks if the proposal creating a sustainable security, in which the government should apply the non-violent measures based on interest of both Thai government and the Patani's citizen in order to survive together peacefully. No participant disagrees, while 57 of 120, or around 47.5 %, strongly agree, and around 52.5%, agree. In other words, all participants are prone to agree that non-violence is should be applicable to solve the conflict problem. (See Figure 21)


Figure 21. The participant's opinions of applying non-violence method to solve the conflict in the southern area.

Regarding the violence in the southern provinces of Thailand, whether it reflects the disagreement toward the Thai government policy, almost all of police officers, 39 of 40, agree, and all soldiers agree with the mentioned conclusion, while the local citizens think differently by around 70%, or 28 of 40 in the local citizen group, disagree.

From the questionnaire, if the Thai government faithfully implement other non-violent methods to solve the problems, such as viewing the conflict as the means to show the disagreement of the Patani's citizens, the government should apply the due process of law as the mean to reconcile the conflict, as well as viewing the negotiation approach as the means to seek cooperation and resolution among the conflicting group, which finally would be the future policy of the Thai government, all participants agree 100% on this issue. In addition, all participants also agree that negotiation, and accepting the elite's opinion, including opening the political space for the local elites as means to obtain the cordial resolution decrease the conflict in the focus area.

7. Acceptance of Jawi Language into the Educational System

The researcher emphasizes on the possibility to accept Jawi language in the educational system, 14 of 80 participants in the police and military groups, disagree on this possibility, while 106 of 120, or around 88.33%, of the participants agree.

Similarly, on the question asked if the Pattani's citizens resistance against the government public school derives from the perception that the central government will employ public school as the means "to promote the Thai-ness", 74 of 120, mostly from the military force and the local citizen group, or around 61.67% of all participants, agree, but almost all police officers, 38 of 40, disagree. (See Figure 22)

Figure 22. The participant's opinion of the policy of Thai-ness integration causing resistance in the Southern area.

However, when asked that the events of threatening and harming the teacher or burning the public school is the reflection against the policy of assimilation, all participants (100%) agree on this. However, 12 police officers from all 120 participants indicates that they disagree with the means to solve the problem.

When asked if the Thai government should establish the sense of belonging toward public school of the local citizens by creating committee composing of the community elites and the religious leaders including the Muslim female association leaders who will become the school administration in shaping curriculum and management to prevent the conflict and to conform with the need of the community, again, only 5 police officers from 120 participants, or around 4.16% of the participants, disagree, while other 115 of 120 participants, or approximately 95.83% of all participants agree.

8. <u>Acceptance of Jawi Language as an Official Language</u>

The result from the questionnaire comes out that there are only 21 participants in the soldier group from 120 participants who disagree, while other 99 participants from police and citizens agree on acceptance of Jawi language as an official language. In other words, 17.50 % of the participants disagree with the mentioned proposal, but 82.50% of the participants agree. (See Figure 23)

Figure 23. Percentage of participant's opinion on acceptance of Jawi language as working language and educational program helping create the sustainable peace.

When asked whether putting the policy of accepting the Jawi language as official language in the Thai government local offices where by Malay Patani citizens might communicate in Jawi will create better understanding among the citizens and the Thai, there are only 6 participants in police group and 2 in the military force or 8 of 120, or around 6.67%, who disagree, while the other participants or around 93.33% from all 3 groups agree. In addition, when asked if the acceptance of the Patani's identity, and allowing the Jawi language as the dominant one in their own community and as communicative language to government officials will be the starting point to reconcile the hatred feeling in the past, the 15 of 40 in police group disagree, while other 105 of 120 participants in military force and local citizen group agree.

5.3 The Autonomy Debate

Successful conflict resolution involving secessionist movements often includes providing some form of autonomy to the disputed region. Reform of administrative structures to enhance the power of locals to manage their own affairs could be an effective conflict management mechanism in the South. The Thai government has regarded autonomy as a first step towards independence, believing it would violate a core principle of the unitary Thai state.

Discussion of autonomy was taboo for decades but since Abhisit took power, space for debate has opened. In October 2009, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak remarked that Thailand should grant a degree of autonomy to the deep south to quell

the insurgency. Following this, Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, chairman of the opposition Puea Thai party, said an autonomous region like "Pattani city" should be established to allow Malay Muslims more control over local affairs.

Rhetoric aside, there has been no movement by the government on this issue. The same old argument that the establishment of a "special administrative zone" would violate the principle of a unitary state still prevails. There has been little effort to explore any possibility for some form of autonomy within the scope of the constitution. The polarized political climate in Bangkok is not conducive to open discussion. Backlash could come from the nationalist Yellow Shirts, similar to the way that they recently whipped up an outcry against Cambodia's proposal to develop the disputed area around the Preh Vihear temple. The government would not want to hand the Yellow Shirts another issue while it is also coping with the fallout from its violent crushing of Red Shirts demonstrations in Bangkok.

The military has shown little support for a special administrative zone. Former army commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda questioned whether granting autonomy would end the conflict. He noted "it is dangerous to change the administrative structure under this volatile situation". Some in the military are also concerned that it could set a precedent for other regions to make similar demands. Bangkok is perhaps more fearful of losing control than ever while the Red Shirt movement remains forceful and defiant, particularly in the North and North East. Until there is political stability at the centre, it is difficult to expect any government, even if it has the will, to invest political capital on an issue that is still marginal in Thai politics.

While politicians are preoccupied with other domestic conflicts, a network of Thai academics and civil society groups has conducted surveys in the South, asking people what form of administration they think best suits their needs. They are exploring possible options within the framework of the unitary Thai and plan to gather the 10,000 voter signatures required to submit a bill to parliament. This bottom-up approach could push the agenda forward and force the government to respond.

5.4 Conclusive Study Result and Recommendations

The results of empirical research show that there must be some measures additionally applied to champion better understanding among the officers working in the conflicting area. The result show that the insufficiency of training programs to implant the officials about the history of Patani Kingdom, and the cause of grievance or hatred feeling against the Siam or Thai, and the comprehensive non-violence method to obtain sustainable peace in the focusing area.

In addition, the result also shows that the police officer are prone to have wrong perception of Jawi language and the Muslim practice which are the most valuable identity of the former Patani citizens that the police officers have to deal or work with. The government should urgently educate them to change their attitude toward this sensitive issue. The training program to get more understanding about those history backgrounds and the proposal of the National Reconciliation Committee, or NRC, mentioned in Chapter IV, might be indispensable for championing the better attitude of the police officers operating in the local area. The empirical suggests that even though the security officers, both police officers and soldiers, agree that the adopting Jawi language might create better understand among officials and local citizens, they cannot accept the Jawi language as working language officially.

In other words, the result of study implies that the official might have negative attitude to allow the local citizens to determine their own fate or to preserve their own identity because they consider those conditional change might be too risky for them to keep those former Patani kingdom in the territory of Thailand. Therefore, the most important factor to change the officers' conduct is to change their attitude toward the right of the local people to preserve their own faith and identity without the intervention of the central government. Stated differently, acceptance of Jawi language is not the threat to the security of the Thai nation, but it shows the sincerity of the Thai government to accept them as they are and thus all diversity of human being might stay together in the same nation with peace. Finally the Thai might need to review the instruction of the King Rama VI's recommendation in administrating the special sensitive area of the former Patani Kingdom, and the petition of Haji

Sulong as mentioned in Chapter IV concerning how to recruit and select the officials sent to this strictly religious area. The acceptance of self-determination doctrine to preserve their own fate, culture, religion and language must be the starting point to gain peace and public order in the society. The Thai government needs to declare the "state of negotiation for peace" among the local elites and the state's agent. The recommendation of the National Reconciliation Committee to implant the Thai citizens in the other parts of Thailand with diversity and creation of immunity to cultural diversity must be employed fully to create the state of peace because the state of peace cannot occur if the Thai citizens in other parts or outside sensitive area encourage and request the Thai government to exercise full military operation to suppress the "security problem" and local people by violent method.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The researcher believes that the historical background and the Malay identity are the crucial factors to shape and exacerbate the violence in the Southern part of Thailand. The Thai government ignored the bad experiences of the Pattani citizens committed by the former Siamese and the Thai in the past, especially the invasion, occupation and the policy of identity assimilation. The Thai government obviously and continuously views the difference of identity and language as the national security problem for Thailand as a whole. As a result, the Thai government relentlessly applies the highest capacity of military operation to suppress the "separatist groups", but the operation directly affects to Patani citizens' normal way of life, and thus creates more hatred feeling against the Thai government unavoidably. The severe military action and the abuse of power by the government officials, such as the forced or involuntary disappearance of the Pattani citizens, make the situation worse. The use of security force to deal with the internal conflict or suppress the local people will lessen the legitimacy of the Thai to rule the minority who belongs to different race, religion, and language.

In the viewpoint of the researcher, the Thai government in Bangkok and the Thai citizens in other regional territory should learn to accept the differentiation of identity, culture and religious practices of the Malay descendants in the Pattani territory. The appreciation of those factors which derive from the cultural diversity will lessen the conflict by improving the better understanding among "Thai", who might be the Thai as a whole and the "Malay-Islam of Pattani" or "Muslim-Thai" as the government's policy needed them to be, but the former Pattani citizens might not accept such term to call themselves as Thai-Muslims. As the National Reconciliation Committee (NRC) suggests the government should learn how to employ non-violent method to solve the conflicts. The research strongly agrees with the NRC and additionally suggests that the Thai government should and must urgently declare the state of negotiation for peace or at least the state of talk and brainstorming among the Thai government and the local elites to

achieve the sustainable peace based on the principle of "interest based negotiations", mediator and "collaborative governance." This process will be able to bring all stake holders in the conflicting area together for talking and deciding about the resolution together to improve the violent situation in the Southern provinces of Thailand.

The researcher is certain that before the government can implement any measure to create peace, the government needs to understand the cultural diversity and seek the common interest of all involving conflicting parties, as well as respect the Patani kingdom's history and the uniqueness of the former Patani-Malays descendants.[1] The Thai government cannot avoid accepting the truth and history of Patani's kingdom, and finds out the actual root of conflict so that the government could understand what the former Patani-Malays descendants' want and what force them to conduct the violence in the local area. The theory of conflict analysis might also be useful to help government to shape the correct policy in solving the conflict. This theory will let the government be able to map out the cause of conflicts, or potential conflicts in the future, and thus will make the Thai government understand the causes and dynamics of conflict and the forces pushing the violent conflict or creating of peace.[2] As Erik Melander's suggestion, according to A,B,C's theory, understanding of the conflicting actors' and attitudes toward the conflict, the behaviors and the dynamics of the actor's behaviors, and the actor's compatibilities, or contradictions among the conflicting parties, will allow the government to rethink about the policy to solve and lessen conflict or at least transform the conflict to step in the process of reconciliation and justice. According to study about the conflicting facts and the government policy of assimilation, the research, then, believe that if the Thai government still uses the military operation to keep the public order and eliminate the violence in the area, which has long proved itself a failure, the undesirable

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[1] Jan Sunoo and Denise Patterson McKenny, Three Areas of Conflict Resolution Skill Building: Cross Cultural Competency, Interest-Based Negotiations, Mediation. Instruction in Rotary Peace and Conflict Studies Program, Rotary Center for Peace Conflict Studies, January – April, 2010.

[2] Erik Melander, The Diagnosis and Analysis of Conflict. Instruction in Rotary Peace and Conflict Studies Program, Rotary Center for Peace Conflict Studies, January – April, 2010.

impact, such as the negative impact on poverty, will increasingly occur, and therefore the Thai government will gradually lose the legitimacy to occupy the unprotected land.

As the result of empirical study shows most of participants in the governmental side are not willing to function in the area and most of them do not fully understand the diversity of cultural factor. The government might have to review its strategy to recruit and select the government officials who are willing to work in this conflicting area. Looking into the community of Muslim itself might help to create more understanding among the conflicting groups. If the government still keeps the policy by sending the official agents from the central government, the province needs to develop educational training program to make those officers to have deep knowledge about the Pattani's history and their uniqueness.

The researcher proposes that government should fully accept the NRC's proposal, mentioned in Chapter IV, and apply all processes to create better understanding among the Malays and the officials as well as the Buddhist-Thai in the regional area. Particularly, the researcher strongly believes that the acceptace of Jawi language as working language will be the starting point to create the trust toward the Thai. As mentioned before, the Thai government needs to make announcement to the people throughout Thailand that the government will open space to start the strategy of "collaborative governance" that will let the citizens who might be different in culture, religion, race and language, to come together with the government to resolve the conflict in the local area. The state of negotiation and peace talk is the first announcement that the Thai government might have to do. That will create the trust to the local citizens, following the policy to let the local people to adopt and preserve their own identity. This might extend to create the opportunity in several ways such as economic development, as the study result shows that the cause of violence derives from the lack of economic development in the conflicting area, as well as establishing the acceptable autonomous local government by the local citizens.

The education system is significant problem for the insurgency. The government will have to reengineer and reform Islamic school to stop attempt at a radicalization of

the local Muslim culture, religious practices, and also create higher education opportunities for graduates of Islamic schools, so that they will not have to go to further their studies in other countries. This will decrease the ideological and personal support for radical insurgency in the long run.

Further research could be done with the information from the Non-Government Organization (NGO). This organization can be given a soft role in solving the three southern border provinces, at least on the social front. The improvement of social conditions will help address the grievances of the Thai Muslim in Pattani province and make less their pressure with other Thais and the government. The NGOs can support to improve economic and social problem such as education system for the population in the three southern provinces of Thailand by offering the government support through funding or donation for their reform programs. The involvement of civic groups to provide a balance between hard and soft approaches one that is not too security-oriented could build trust with Thai Muslim in Pattani.

In sum, the study both in literature review supported by the empirical research suggests that the government must, first change itself of the attitude toward the violence problem, by accepting that the full military operation will make situation worse. Only non-violence will create better understand among conflicting party. The attitude change in the government policy toward conflict resolution is not enough because the main mechanism to achieve the non-violence method is the bureaucracy and its officials. Therefore, to make such policy successful, the first starting point is to change the attitude of the security officers, both police officers and soldiers, including other officials sent from the Bangkok to the focusing area. People are different, and each group is unique. As a result, only non-violence method supported by the acceptance of the local people will be the best way to create sustainable peace in the long run. Without changing the attitude of officers and officials, as implied in the empirical research, peace cannot exist in the three southern provinces of Thailand.

BIOGRAPHY

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