

THE NORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ON THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND
DEFENCE POLICY



Mr. Xiaofei Yan

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

An Independent Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements

for the Degree of Master of Arts in European Studies


Inter-Department of European Studies

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Chulalongkorn University

Academic Year 2019

Copyright of Chulalongkorn University



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY



สารนิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

สาขาวิชายุโรปศึกษา สหสาขาวิชายุโรปศึกษา

บัณฑิตวิทยาลัย จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

ปีการศึกษา 2562

ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

Independent Study Title THE NORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ON THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND
DEFENCE POLICY

By Mr. Xiaofei Yan

Field of Study European Studies

Thesis Advisor BHANUBHATRA JITTIANG, Ph.D.

Accepted by the GRADUATE SCHOOL, Chulalongkorn University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Master of Arts

INDEPENDENT STUDY COMMITTEE

..... Chairman
(Assistant Professor Bhawan Ruangsilp, Ph.D.)

..... Advisor
(BHANUBHATRA JITTIANG, Ph.D.)

..... Examiner
(Assistant Professor KASIRA CHEEPPENSOOK, Ph.D.)



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

ชื่อเวฟ เยชน : -อิทธิพลเชิงปทัสฐานขององค์การสนธิสัญญาแอตแลนติกเหนือต่อนโยบายร่วมด้านความ
 มั่งคั่งและการป้องกันของสหภาพยุโรป. (THE NORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE
 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ON THE EUROPEAN
 UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY) อ.ที่ปรึกษา

หลัก : ภาณุภัทร จิตเที่ยง

หลังการสิ้นสุดของสงครามเย็น องค์การสนธิสัญญาแอตแลนติกเหนือ (North Atlantic Treaty
 Organization) ยังคงมีบทบาทและขยายตัวเพิ่มมากขึ้น ขณะเดียวกัน นโยบายร่วมด้านความมั่งคั่งและการป้องกัน
 แห่งสหภาพยุโรป (Common Security and Defence Policy) ก็เริ่มก่อตัวเป็นรูปเป็นร่างมากขึ้น อย่างไรก็ตาม
 นโยบายร่วมนี้กลับไม่ได้มีความคืบหน้าชัดเจนในด้านสมรรถนะและความสามารถ สำหรับการศึกษเกี่ยวกับความ
 สัมพันธ์ระหว่างสององค์กรที่ผ่านมากตั้งอยู่บนหลักการลัทธิจะนิยม (Realism) เป็นสำคัญ อย่างไรก็ตามงานชิ้นนี้อาศัยมุมมอง
 ที่แตกต่างในการศึกษาประเด็นเดียวกัน โดยพิจารณาการปะทะสังสรรค์ผ่านแนวคิดประกอบสร้างนิยม
 (Constructivism) งานศึกษานี้วิเคราะห์อิทธิพลเชิงปทัสฐานขององค์การสนธิสัญญาแอตแลนติกเหนือต่อนโยบาย
 ร่วมด้านความมั่งคั่งและการป้องกัน ผู้วิจัยพบว่าสารัตถะของบรรทัดฐานทางการเมืองและบรรทัดฐานของความมั่นคงของ
 ทั้งสองความร่วมมือมีความคล้ายคลึง ผู้วิจัยค้นพบว่าองค์การสนธิสัญญาแอตแลนติกเหนือมีอิทธิพลเชิงปทัสฐานต่อ
 นโยบายร่วมด้านความมั่งคั่งและการป้องกันในสามระดับ ได้แก่ แนวคิดในการจัดตั้ง การดำเนินการ และโครงสร้างสถาบัน
 ท้ายที่สุดงานชิ้นนี้สรุปว่านโยบายร่วมด้านความมั่งคั่งและการป้องกันของสหภาพยุโรปไม่สามารถเป็นอิสระได้ เพราะ
 อิทธิพลที่ยังคงมีอยู่มากมายขององค์การสนธิสัญญาแอตแลนติกเหนือ

สาขาวิชา ยุโรปศึกษา

ลายมือชื่อนิสิต

ปีการศึกษา 2562

ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาหลัก

6284002220 : MAJOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

KEYWORD NATO, CSDP, Norms, Constructivism, Rationalism

D:

Xiaofei Yan : THE NORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY. Advisor: BHANUBHATRA JITTIANG, Ph.D.

After the Cold War, NATO did not only disappear, but it also enlarged. Although the CSDP is on the agenda, it has not made significant progress in terms of assets and capabilities. For the study on the relationship between the two, most current studies are based on realism. Starting from the perspective of constructivism, this paper used documentary analysis to review the normative history of NATO and the history of the normative development of the CSDP, and found that the core political norms and security norms of the two are completely consistent. Finally, it concludes that the NATO norms influence the CSDP through the three levels of norm entrepreneurs, daily security practices, and the institution, so that the CSDP cannot be independent. This paper provides a new study perspective of the relationship between the two.



Field of Study: European Studies

Student's

Signature

Academic Year: 2019

Advisor's

Year:

Signature

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

How time flies! I am touched by my experience of studying and life at Chulalongkorn University.

In the process of writing my paper there were many difficulties, but I was fortunate enough to receive support and encouragement from many people.

I was able to successfully complete my paper and would now like to take the opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to all those who have helped me on this journey.

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Bhanubhatra Jittiang. He is very knowledgeable in academics, and provided me with professional guidance. He provided constructive comments and suggestions which were beneficial to the writing of my paper. He is reliable and always replied to emails with haste. At the same time, he is also very friendly and kind. In my personal opinion, whenever I was anxious and lacked self-confidence, he always gave me encouragement and the confidence which calmed me and helped me stay focused. Honestly, I am unable to describe in words what an excellent advisor he is. I have been extremely fortunate to meet him and would like for us to remain friends for life.

Secondly, I would also like to thank all the professors of the programme who provided me with the basic understanding of this subject and without their expertise I would have been unable to find the direction to write my paper. They are truly exceptional and are the treasures of the academic world.

I would also like to thank our assistant Miss. Nuun of the programme, my classmates and the back-end technicians of Ithesis. They have truly helped me succeed in the completion and submission of my paper, so that I could graduate on time.

Finally, the members of my family without your continued love and support I wouldn't have been able to concentrate on my objectives.

I truly appreciate everyone that have helped me succeed.

Xiaofei Yan



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
.....	iii
ABSTRACT (THAI).....	iii
.....	iv
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH).....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
REFERENCES.....	30
VITA.....	35



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

European integration is undoubtedly one of the most successful examples of regional integration in the world. Shortly after the end of World War II, the European countries began to explore and practice political and defence cooperation. However, when compared with economic integration, the political and defence collaboration has been less successful. At the economic level, the EU has established a common market to achieve the free movement of goods, labor and capital. However, at the political level, the EU failed to pass the EU Constitution in 2005, meaning that the member states have not completely abandoned their sovereignty. Consequently, the EU has a limited ability to act as a single entity. At the military level, the European Union does not yet have its own army. It relies mainly on NATO for security and defence issues. Thus, it is not surprising that the Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens commented that the European Union (EU) is known as an "Economic giant, political dwarf, and military worm" (Whitney, 1991).

After the end of the Cold War, the EU was committed to changing its former image. It made progress in several regards, including the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) proposed at the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 to replace ESDP. This policy provides the framework for military cooperation among the EU's member states. Through this framework, the EU can rely on the civilian and military assets of

the member states to maintain peace and strengthen the international security of third countries (Commission, n.d.). Since CSDP was established, NATO, as the security apparatus and framework, has continued to operate in Europe despite the great changes since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. NATO's operations have included more than traditional security issues, including the focus on global terrorism, energy security, global warming, disease control, cyber-attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Not only did NATO not withdraw from the stage of history, but it has also continued to assert normative influences on the European nations. This study explores the influence of NATO norms on the emergence and development CSDP. It asks: How do NATO norms influence CSDP?

1.2. Arguments

I argue that NATO's core political norms are freedom, democracy, and human rights, and the security norms cover collective security. NATO norms have an influence on CSDP through the three levels of norm entrepreneurs, daily security practices, and the institution level.

1.3. Literature Review

Over the past several decades, scholars have explored the relationship between NATO and CSDP. The present literature on the topic mainly has focused mainly on

the following aspects: Is CSDP a threat or a challenge to NATO? What is the relationship between the European nations and the US in the context of CSDP and NATO? What is the future of CSDP and NATO? What is the impact of Brexit on CSDP and NATO? Review of the following literature provides partial answers to these questions.

The contestation between CSDP and NATO was the first theme of the investigation.

Scholars have investigated whether CSDP threatens the existence of NATO (e.g., Dunn, 2001; Kashmeri, 2010; Koops, 2017). CSDP skeptics argue that it does. Dunn (2001) recognises this conflict as that between the European Union and the United States, and explores whether the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)¹ was created to counterbalance the United States and rebalance NATO. He believes that this question also involves whether ESDP strengthens or weakens the capabilities and integrity of the NATO alliance and a larger question is whether the United States can cope with the rise of the EU as a peer competitor in international politics. Koops (2017) also believes that CSDP and NATO are in a competitive relationship concerning European defence. However, he suggests that it seems difficult for both parties to be compatible. NATO appears to have more influence.

Another line of argument emerges from the work of Ojanen (2006) and Milzow (2012) who state that due to the rapid development of ESDP, the EU is seen as a threat

¹ ESDP is the acronym for the European Security and Defence Policy, and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 replaced this with CSDP.

to NATO and the Atlantic relations as well as American power. Accordingly, Ojanen (2006) concludes that only through the division of labour and the specialisation of roles can the EU and NATO coexist in harmony. Nevertheless, as Howorth (2018) explains, while the US actively encourages the EU to develop its military capability, the United States is also concerned that such capabilities may cause Europe to compete militarily with the United States.

Despite powerful arguments by the critics, many scholars believe that the European defence cooperation threatens neither American interests nor NATO. Kashmeri (2010) believes that the continuous growth of EU military power is due to three main reasons: Firstly, the EU is a governmental entity that combines civilian, police, legal, and military resources to perform tasks. Compared with NATO, which has only military resources, it is easier to obtain the people's support. Secondly, some African countries, such as Chad and the Central African Republic, have made it clear that they cannot accept intervention by a force comprising the Americans, but they can accept deployment of EU military force. Thus, there is a clear separation of tasks. Thirdly, CSDP is led by Europeans and can make decisions based on their interests, rather than only safeguarding the interests of the United States. For these reasons, (Kashmeri, 2010) eventually concludes that the rise of CSDP does not mean that it is a challenger to NATO. On the contrary, it has emerged to protect the common European interests. Furthermore, Howorth (2012) as well as Koppa (2019) mention that more than two decades have passed since the creation of CSDP, but the EU

continues to rely on NATO's infrastructure. The study by Bhathal (2013) on EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR Althea further confirms that EU military might could hardly match that of NATO. When the EU is solely responsible for providing funds and the necessary resources, such as in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, operations by the EU are slow and plagued by planning and implementation issues. The EU member states lacked political will and material commitment for the operation. For EUFOR Althea, when NATO's assets and capabilities were used under the Berlin Plus agreement, the scale of operations was larger and more effective, creating a very successful CSDP military operation. Through these two examples, Bhathal (2013) concludes that without relying on NATO's capabilities, the EU still cannot implement long-term and complex military operations. It continues to have limited executive power in promoting and ensuring international security. Thus, CSDP does not threaten the transatlantic relationship.

The first debate provides a solid foundation for the second one surrounding the question of cooperation between CSDP and NATO. The first group of literature in this theme of research suggests that cooperation may not occur given the shift in the strategic interests of the US, and the possibility that the US presence could weaken Europe. However, Howorth (2012) believes that CSDP and NATO should find the way for better cooperation. Only through the framework of NATO can CSDP finally achieve autonomy. This means that the alliance should first attach importance to Europe and its periphery, and ensure the stability of this region through demonstrating

sound capability in crisis management, and secondly, NATO and CSDP should not treat each other as rivals, because the EU and CSDP share resources in terms of the European forces and capability. Thirdly, there must be a gradual institutional and political merger between CSDP and NATO.

However, in recent years, Howorth (2018) points to President Trump's interview with the New York Times that if the EU cannot provide adequate compensation for the military protection provided by the US, the US would withdraw from NATO. Furthermore, Calleo (2013) also argues that another reason why cooperation between CSDP and NATO is unlikely to occur is because the presence of the United States in Europe has weakened the need for Europe to defend itself. While the defensive "umbrella" of the United States protects Europe, it also prevents the latter from implementing autonomous military operations. That is to say, the supremacy of the United States has limited security and defence development in Europe, which is certainly not in the interests of the EU.

Another important challenge for cooperation between the EU and the US is that the two parties have different values regarding global governance. According to Hendrickson (2006), the consensus within the EU is that the current world order must continue to be based on multilateralism, and solutions must be negotiated within regional and global frameworks. This approach, however, is not shared by the US, since the latter prefers to manage conflicts unilaterally. The United States hopes to use its advanced military capability to intervene in conflicts (Rühle, 2013). In addition, as

far as the decision-making process is concerned, the EU is willing to use military power to prevent conflict only after all other non-military means have been exhausted. The United States, on the contrary, more likely to use military means as the sole solution (Cornish, 2004).

Despite some skepticism, Howorth (2012) shows that many global situations continue to require cooperation between NATO and CSDP; therefore, cooperation between these two parties remains viable.

Demetriou and Benney (2016) believe that supporting and coordinating with CSDP is in the best interest of the United States and NATO. Firstly, CSDP can free the United States from most of its defence responsibilities in Europe. Secondly, by encouraging the European nations to invest more in their own security, the US could make Europe be more aware of new security threats, including those that evolve from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Thirdly, CSDP can reduce European concerns about the influence of the United States within the alliance. Finally, all these developments would help strengthen NATO both politically and militarily. Some scholars, such as Kashmeri (2010), go even further by suggesting that CSDP should merge with NATO because of the existing overlap and close proximity between the military personnel's tasks within the EU and NATO.

The final theme that scholars have explored in the existing literature is projection of the future relationship between the EU and NATO. Howorth (2017) predicts that there are three potential scenarios. The first is that after the triple European crises of

currency, borders, and defence, European integration will fail, and the EU member states will return to the 1950s scenario when they relied heavily on NATO for military assistance. He argues that this scenario is not expected by either the US or the EU. While this scenario is unlikely to happen, it cannot be ruled out completely. The second scenario is that the EU will make progress with its national defence construction, thus making CSDP more effective, but the EU will not fully acquire strategic autonomy; essentially still relying on NATO and the United States. The last scenario is that if the EU wants to stabilise its own security, it should give up its dependence on the US by developing its own capabilities to the greatest extent and obtaining complete strategic autonomy. This requires cooperation between the European Union and the United States in order to achieve the Europeanization of NATO over the next ten to fifteen years. Koppa (2019) believes that in a new and challenging security environment, it is now time for NATO to establish Europe as its pillar, and the EU should speak with one voice. As the United States inevitably shifts its strategic focus to Asia, if the EU wants to provide protection and security for European citizens, it is time to gradually take over from NATO in order to achieve NATO's "Europeanization" objective.

In recent years, Brexit has aroused academic attention. It becomes another key factor for scholars to consider how this would change the shape of the relationship between CSDP and NATO. Csornai (2017) believes that, on the one hand, due to Britain's strong military deployment capabilities and significant defence budget,

Brexit's exit from the EU maybe difficult to place. On the other hand, Brexit means the barriers against an increase in the EDA's budget, military integration under PESCO, and establishment of a joint European military headquarters would be removed, which may help to build a more effective CSDP structure. However, most EU member states still regard NATO as the security provider, so the development potential of CSDP is limited. In the future, the EU may play more of its soft power but continue to rely on NATO, or more precisely, the United States, to deal with any severe security challenges arising in Europe. After Brexit, the United Kingdom may continue to participate in certain EU operations and missions, but it will not have the right to initiate and make decisions. Thus, the United States will lose its closest ally within the EU, and the British diplomatic assets will shrink. Koppa (2019) proposed three modes of cooperation that may occur after Brexit: Britain may participate in CSDP as a third party; by strengthening contacts with NATO, NATO will become the main platform for cooperation between the UK and the EU; the UK will strengthen bilateral relations between the major European allies (especially France). No matter what Brexit means to the UK, it will have an impact on the relationship between CSDP and NATO, and the quality and extent of this impact are difficult to predict. Just as the result of the analysis of the impact of Brexit on inter-organisational relations by Cladi and Locatelli (2020), Brexit will keep the institutional isomorphism unchanged, but it may have an impact on the overlap of functions, but the quality and intensity of this impact remains too difficult to evaluate. For certain tasks, it will be

more difficult for the EU to compete with NATO, but for now, both sides are highly committed to crisis management operations, so a large number of functional overlaps may still exist.

1.4. Research Framework

Based on the existing literature regarding NATO, the EU, as well as CSDP, I recognize that scholars have focused too heavily on the conflicts and cooperation between these parties. Nonetheless, one of the aspects that they have not yet investigated in detail is their normative connection between them. We can say that most scholars have in the main studied the relationship between NATO and CSDP from the perspective of utilitarian rationalism, and have ignored the role of norms in the construction of the relationship between these two parties. Perhaps the reason for this phenomenon is explained by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) regarding norms, that is, in the field of international relations, scholars always regard norms and rationality as two opposing concepts. Nonetheless, extensive empirical study on norms proves that there is a close relationship between norms and rationality. No matter whether it is norm or rationality, neither party can perfectly explain complex political issues. The two work together in the political field, so normative and rational research should not be opposed but must be considered together.

To better understand the relationship between the two security frameworks, I argue that it is inevitable that we have to explore closely their normative relationship

as much as the unitarian rationalist relationship between NATO and CSDP. Using the former approach to complement the existing approach could provide us with more insights on how NATO and CSDP influence each other and construct each other while they are connected materially based on common interests. More importantly, the discussion of norms also paves the way for us to reaffirm which of the potential future scenarios of CSDP and NATO is more likely to come true.

Therefore, this paper attempts to answer how NATO norms influence CSDP from a constructivist perspective. There is general agreement on the definition of the norms referred to in this paper as, "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). While constructivists in international relations directly use the term "norm" for their discussion of norms, sociologists may use the term "institution" to refer to the same concept (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This paper uses the term "norm" in order to avoid any confusion, except for direct quotations, I may apply the term "institution," instead of "norm".

1.5. Research Methods

This paper mainly uses documentary analysis for the investigation. While using some primary sources, I have drawn my conclusions from secondary literature. I mostly retraced the historical development of both NATO and CSDP in order to understand their normative construction. From historical tracing, I then analysed how NATO norms may have influenced those of CSDP.

1.6. Components

Following this introduction, I divide my study into four parts. The second chapter reviews the normative history of NATO. I apply constructivism to understand NATO. The third chapter provides a general review of the normative construction process of CSDP. I focus on the rationales for establishment of CSDP to discover CSDP norms. The fourth chapter analyses which aspects of NATO norms influence construction of CSDP. In particular, I highlight the influence of NATO norms on CSDP through norm entrepreneurs, daily security practices, and the institutional level. The final chapter concludes this study and discusses the future direction for further research of this topic.



2. A Normative History of NATO

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

2.1. Political Context for the Establishment of NATO

The Second World War caused unimaginable damage to most of Europe. A total of about 36.5 million Europeans were killed during this conflict, more than half of whom were civilians. There were refugee camps and people in need of relief everywhere. In some regions, the infant mortality rate was as high as 20%. Millions of orphans were living on the streets of Europe's major cities. In Hamburg, Germany,

half a million people became homeless (NATO, n.d.).

During the same period, communism, with the help of the Soviet Union became a threat to the democratically elected governments of Europe. In 1948, the Czechoslovak Communist Party overthrew the democratically elected government of Edvard Beneš. The rise of communism caused great concern with the liberal bloc. The United States initiated several projects to curb the growing influence of communism, including the Marshall Plan, which aimed at supporting European recovery and stability as much as promoting liberal democratic values. At that time, each European country was still concerned about its own security. Each nation believed that military cooperation and the security it provided must develop simultaneously with economic and political progress. Nonetheless, several democratic countries in western Europe tried to strengthen military cooperation and collective defence through some cooperative projects, but in the end they realised that only through a genuine Transatlantic Agreement could they prevent a Soviet invasion, achieve a revival of European militarism, and lay the foundation for political integration (NATO, n.d.).

After the Second World War, the US, together with the allied leaders, emerged as the most important actors shaping the global order, and they found themselves in an exceptionally advantageous position to propose new rules and principles regarding international relations. Thus, they were able to change the international order (Wheeler-Bennett & Nicholls, 1972). Hirschman (1982) and Odell (2014) point out that global historical events, such as wars or major economic depressions in the

international system, can direct people to seek new ideas and norms. Hall (1989) thinks that the ideas and norms held by the party losing the war and the party believed to be the cause of an economic depression are particularly easy to spurn. This scenario provides space for the rise of new norms. It was also at this critical juncture that NATO emerged with a set of norms governing security practices.

2.2. NATO's Creation

After the Second World War ended, the European nations, including Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy, were exhausted from the war. They recognised that they could no longer fight each other. Thus, they were determined to cooperate with one another. On March 4, 1947, Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty, which stipulated that if one of the contracting parties was involved in a military operation with Germany, the other party should use its own military and other means to provide assistance; If either country faces a threat by Germany, it should be stopped by joint action. In addition, neither country could conclude a treaty that is hostile to the other, nor join an alliance that is hostile to the other party. They should promote economic prosperity for each other (CVCE, 2013).

The signing of this treaty meant that Britain and France had taken an important step on the road to the establishment of the Western European Union.

On March 17, 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the "Brussels Treaty." This was a multilateral military treaty based on a

military alliance. It was a prelude to the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States supported this treaty but believed that the treaty was far from enough. The US recognised that more meaningful political action must be taken to eliminate the fear among the countries of western Europe and thus restore their confidence. This required strengthening the construction of common norms (Truman, 1956). However, in the Cold War situation, western Europe had limited power, and any alliance that separated it from the United States could not obtain sufficient security guarantees. Only a real Transatlantic Alliance could prevent Soviet aggression and the revival of European militarism. Finally, on April 4, 1949, the United States entered the "North Atlantic Treaty" with eleven European countries leading to the creation of the military and political group called the "North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

The North Atlantic Treaty emphasises the support and maintenance by the parties of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the desire for peace in the world, the defence of democracy, personal freedom, and the rule of law. The parties also determined to unite and work together for collective defence and to maintain peace and security (NATO, 2019). In the prestigious Article 5 of the Treaty, the new allies agreed that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.....", and after such an attack, each ally will implement "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" in response. It is worth noting that the important purpose of Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty is not immediately related to the threat of attack. Article 3 lays the

foundation for military preparations for cooperation among the allies, and Article 2 provides them with room for non-military cooperation (NATO, n.d.). These important values are the major norms that NATO provides, and they continue to serve as the basis for NATO's operations until the present day.

Upon the creation of NATO, many European and American leaders expressed their opinions about the organisational norms highlighting their common values as well as identities. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lovett pointed out that the treaty emerged because of the common Western values of the US and European countries coming together. British Foreign Minister Bevin believed that the United States and Europe built a Western style democratic system, which was the spiritual representative of western countries. The French Foreign Minister emphasised that NATO represented a trustworthy Western style civilization. The Norwegian foreign affairs officials declared that as we are all part of a Western community we must work together to maintain the health of this community (Cited in Woyke, 1993). Through the statements of these people, we can see that the establishment of NATO was not only based on realism, but on norm-based constructivism.

2.3. Discussion NATO Norms

When norms are first constructed, they are often influenced by the dominant power (Krasner, 1982). Norm establishment serves as the way for a major power to refrain from using coercive means to promote its policies and values. At the same

time, the norm strategy reduces the implementation cost of maintaining effective norm order (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990). This logic of norm emergence also applies to NATO. In the previous section, I establish that NATO emerged with the US at its core, and incorporated the common values and norms of the US and the western European nations. As a hegemony, the US tried to create and spread its own norms to ensure continuation of its power in the global politics after the Second World War had ended (Moe, 1990). However, the US could not act alone regarding norm creation because, if it did so, it might experience resistance from the other countries. Thus, the United States gave its European partners a certain right to speak and decide in exchange for the latter's support for American norms and principles.

The European and American identity of the principles of freedom and democracy was important for the normative establishment of NATO. These two norms also affected the country's views and pursuit of power and interests (叶江, 1999). One of the important factors in the establishment of NATO was the long-term accumulation of Western culture, especially manifested by the democratic nature of the Western countries. As Acheson said: The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty was not the reason for emergence of the North Atlantic Community. Instead, this community was the result of shared norms. NATO is a product of three hundred and fifty years or more of history (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). Perfect norms are the most important guarantor for stable operation of this international social system, the representative and external manifestation of Western culture. NATO is the bastion for the protection

of free and democratic norms, common assets, and civilisation (Gheciu, 2001).

The adherence to freedom and democracy also distinguishes the US from the USSR. As former British Foreign Minister Bevin said, the Soviet Union's security system does not conform to Western civilisation when referring to the idea of freedom, liberty, as well as democracy. If the United States and Europe want to establish an organisation, it must include the principles of freedom and democracy in its organisational construction (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002; Jackson, 2001).

Judging from the process of establishing norms, the democratic nature and strategic vision of the United States as the leading country is the key. Some people even believe that establishment of NATO norms is the embodiment of American democratic ideas, and the US domestic political principles have become the basic principles for construction of the international system (Reus-Smit, 1997). Establishment of NATO norms is regarded as a result of the development of Western culture that represents law, justice, and freedom. Through NATO's framework, Europe and the US can seek common ground while preserving their differences and work together to maintain the Western democratic system. NATO's implementation of this "unanimous" policy is called the "NATO method" (Kaplan & Honick, 2007). As (Robertson, 1991) pointed out, NATO is not only a military alliance and a political organisation, but it is also a defensive alliance with shared values.

2.4. NATO's Enlargement

Hellmann and Wolf (1993) mentioned that according to the rationalism theorists, the smaller the alliance, the better; the larger the alliance, the higher the management costs and the lower the benefits for the members, thus realists believe that NATO will eventually disintegrate, not enlarge. Walt (1990) pointed out in "The Origin of the Alliance" that although NATO's complete institutional structure may delay the pace of its decline, only the reappearance of the Soviet threat can maintain NATO in its current state. Mearsheimer (1990) believed that the threat of the Soviet Union was the glue that united NATO's members. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, NATO may continue to exist nominally, but it will not play the true role of an alliance.

Despite many skeptics, the fact is that NATO, which is no longer facing the communist threat, has disintegrated. Instead, it has expanded further in recent years. Through its expansion, Sloan (1995) argued that NATO is able to expand to maintain and pursue its common values and beliefs. The end of the Cold War does not mean that the United States and Europe abandoned the western community. The study by Gheciu (2005) shows that the US and European positions are highly consistent on issues involving the political system, democracy, and human rights. At the same time, both parties have made it an important mission to promote these common values globally. The creators of NATO had not only to deal with the potential geostrategic challenges, but also have to protect the liberal norms of the trans-Atlantic region. The "Perry principle" states that democratisation and social reform should be used as the most important criteria for measuring a country's membership status. Perry's

colleagues also said that NATO's eastward expansion will inevitably lead to the spread of democracy (Perry, 1995). The 1995 NATO Enlargement Research Report pointed out that only those countries that have the characteristics of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law may join NATO. Former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage claimed that NATO's enlargement lies in the inclusion of democratic countries under its protection. No country may refuse membership by another country for geopolitical and historical reasons or external pressure (Gallagher, 2004). Therefore, enlargement of NATO is not only the result of rational calculation, but also the result of the spread of norms. Thus, NATO's expansion is equivalent to the expansion of NATO norms.

3. History of the Normative Development of CSDP

3.1. The Process of CSDP Establishment

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the European Union began to introduce a common foreign and security policy. However, there was no substantial progress in terms of military assets and capacity. The real breakthroughs took place when Tony Blair assumed the premiership of the UK, and the emergence of the Kosovo crisis. After Blair came to power, he changed the British government's consistent position on European defence issues for the first time. He suggested that Britain needed a new way of thinking and should participate in European defence

affairs, rather than stand by and say "No" (Rutten, 2001). Blair's Labour Party government abandoned the long-term stance of the British government and began to move from opposition to support for the development of its independent defence in Europe. The fundamental reason was that it recognised that if Europe wanted the United States to continue to fulfil its NATO commitments, then Europe must first rely on itself regarding security issues (Howorth, 2000a). Other scholars hold different opinions on the change of the Blair government's position, but we can say that the reasons were complicated. Williams (2005) analysed the foreign policy of Blair's administration and believed that the foreign policy of the United Kingdom during this period included three major doctrines, namely, multilateralism, Atlanticism, and moralism. Although the content is not the same, I think it is in the same trend with the core norms of NATO. This means that NATO norms were beginning to permeate the EU's security and defence policies, rather than the EU establishing new norms. As Blair emphasised, we must ensure that European security norms are complementary to NATO, not a challenge (Salmon & Shepherd, 2003).

In December 1998, the British and French leaders met in Saint Malo and jointly issued the "Saint Malo Declaration." The declaration expressed their serious concern about the problems of the EU's common security policy. One, was that Europe was unable to provide its own defence or even political leadership. The second, was that Europe's defence budget is 60% of the US, but its military capabilities are not equivalent to 60% of the US. At the same time, the declaration stated that it would

fully and quickly implement the relevant provisions of the Common Diplomacy and Security Policy of the Treaty of Amsterdam and gradually develop a common defence policy, and it stipulated that NATO's collective defence commitment must be maintained. The member states' efforts to strengthen European unity must not violate NATO's obligations, but must contribute to the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance (Heisbourg, 2000). In March 1999, Blair, the former British prime minister, said that Europeans should not hope that Americans would handle every chaos of Europe in the European backyard. The EU should be able to assume some security responsibilities on its own, and a joint effort by Europe is much better than independent actions by each country (Blair, 1999). Thus, Blair's endorsement urged the European nations to come together to create a common security and defence policy.

During the Kosovo War in 1999, the United States and NATO were able to demonstrate their dominance and operational capabilities. The same conflict, however, identified the institutional and military deficiencies of the EU and the member states. At that time, Europe relied heavily on US military capabilities. The crisis in Kosovo also caused Europeans to ask the question once addressed by President Charles de Gaulle: Will Americans be willing to fight for Europeans at all times? The European nations then realised that most Americans are unwilling to risk their lives in various European conflicts if their national interests are not seriously threatened (Van Ham, 2000). Consequently, the EU leaders proposed the concept of the "European Security and Defence Policy" (ESDP) at the EU Cologne Summit in June 1999. They decided

to give the EU the necessary military means and capability to implement the tasks of autonomous conflict prevention, crisis management, and enhanced cohesion as proposed by the Petersberg Declaration. The EU Council is required to make the necessary decisions on how to implement the conflict prevention and crisis management tasks and determine the functions of the Western European Union by the end of 2000 (Howorth, 2000b).

The 2003 "The Berlin Plus Agreement" enabled the EU to use NATO's assets and capabilities to carry out EU-led crisis management tasks. Due to the serious differences between the EU member states on the Iraq issue in 2003, a common strategy is needed to enhance cohesion within the EU. The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003 provided the framework for CFSP, including the framework that later became CSDP. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, contains important provisions related to CSDP, such as the provisions in the mutual assistance and solidarity clause, the expansion of the Petersberg tasks, and so on. In addition to continuing to focus on improving the readiness and deployment capabilities, the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 pays more attention to military-civilian cooperation. Civilian crisis management is an important part of CSDP, and has always been a key area of the EU's international effort. The Military Headline Goals are designed to ensure that the EU has the military capability required to implement all the tasks covered by the Petersberg Declaration (Communications, 2016).

3.2. Rationale Behind the EU's Development of CSDP

Theories of Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and Neofunctionalism all predict that cooperation and integration in the European area will not occur in the security and defence fields, because the issues involved in the policy field are too sensitive (Howorth, 2007). The end of the Cold War means that the direct threat from Russia faced by the EU in the field of security and defence has disappeared. Moreover, most EU member states were hiding under the security umbrella of NATO. From a utilitarian perspective, the EU did not need to build its own security and defence. This makes it difficult for neo-realist scholars to explain why the EU strengthened its cooperation and integration on security and defence issues at the end of the last century. In trying to explain the reasons for the enhanced cooperation between the EU member states on security and defence issues, the arguments of the neo-realists are hardly persuasive, especially if such arguments are hard to believe, such that, the strengthening of American power and the unipolar world order led to the establishment of CSDP, which was intended as a means of balancing the influence of the United States (Howorth & Menon, 2009). In recent years, some constructivist scholars have proposed different interpretation frameworks, mainly focusing on the domestic conceptual drivers of CSDP and the impact of European integration on the socialisation and identity shaping of state actors (Checkel, 1999), such as Reichard (2013), who believes the European countries have formed a

relatively independent European identity during the past fifty years of mutual cooperation. They have developed the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy for the purpose of national construction, not only for specific defence considerations.

3.3. Discussion of CSDP Norms

I think that since CSDP's members are also members of the European Union, the EU norms could apply to CSDP. For many years, the EU has been trying to spread its values through various tools and become a normative power. As Rosecrance (1997) pointed out, the imperialist countries that once ruled the world are now setting the global standards in normative terms. Although it sounds contradictory, the European achievements are normative. Manners (2002) coined the term Normative Power Europe (NPE), and identified the five main core norms of the European Union, including the centrality of peace; freedom; democracy; the rule of law; and human rights, which are embodied in the EU's body of law.

After the failure of the EU's attempt to establish the European Defence Community in the 1950s, people began to praise the lack of military means as a virtue, not a sign of EU weakness (Palm & Crum, 2019). However, in the 1990s, the lesson learned from the separatist conflict in the former Yugoslavia is that if there is no decisive military support, diplomatic and economic sanctions, or moral condemnation are worthless (Björkdahl, 2011). Although Smith (2005) believes that normative power identity and the use of military means are essentially conflicting, because

military intervention inevitably influences foreign policy decisions and damages the standard of the norms. However, most scholars insist that since military means is a necessary tool for the EU to promote the EU's values on a global scale, it may help to strengthen the EU's normative power (Björkdahl, 2011; Sjursen, 2006). This can be proved from the practice of the EU's military missions and operations. Although the stated objectives of military missions and operations are likely to include utility-based and value-based considerations (Aggestam, 2008; Raik, 2012), Palm and Crum (2019) found that most of the EU's military missions are based on these values after studying twelve military operations under the CSDP's framework. What is certain is that the EU emphasised its humanitarian concerns during its initial mission. Usually, the EU's military operations are aimed at supporting the implementation of peace agreements or democratic elections. Just as in 2006, when the EU's second military operation in the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) provided services for the peaceful management of democratic elections. Different from traditional pacifists, I agree with Sjursen (2006) on the understanding of NPE that the military power of the European Union may be an indispensable tool for effectively spreading the core values of NPE worldwide.

The EU states in its official website that the foundation of the EU is based on vigorously promoting and protecting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law throughout the world. This commitment is the foundation of all the EU's internal and external policies (Action, n.d.). CSDP is one of the EU's policies. There is no doubt that CSDP should comply with these norms.

3.4. CSDP Enlargement

Since a prerequisite for becoming a member of CSDP is first to become a member of the European Union, enlargement of CSDP follows the same rhythm as enlargement of the European Union. As in (Commission, 2016), the criteria for joining the EU involve many aspects, including a free market economy, stable democracy, the rule of law, and acceptance of all the EU's legislation, which means that new members must meet the criteria of the EU's norms. Therefore, we can say that any enlargement of CSDP is closely related to the EU's norms.

4. Discussion

In the previous two chapters, I have presented how NATO and CSDP have emerged and developed normatively. In this section, I discuss how NATO norms may have influenced those of CSDP.

Through this study, we can see that some NATO norms and those of CSDP are very similar or even the same. In particular, the political norms of NATO and CSDP are democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. The Security norms cover collective security.

I have found that NATO norms influence CSDP through the following three levels.

Firstly, at the level of norm entrepreneurs, NATO norms have influenced CSDP, because norm entrepreneurs create norms and spread these norms into the institutional setting of NATO and CSDP. For example, the major normative entrepreneurs such as Britain, France, and Germany, as members both NATO and CSDP, they may spread the same norms to the two institutions. Therefore, we can say that NATO norms have influenced CSDP through the advocacy of the norm entrepreneurs.

Secondly, at the level of daily security practice, NATO norms have penetrated CSDP. The daily security practice of NATO's member states are usually governed by NATO norms. When the member states of NATO and CSD overlap, there is a transfer of NATO norms to CSDP through the continuous practice of NATO's member states which are now also members of CSDP.

Finally, at the institutional level, CSDP continues to interact with NATO and relies on NATO's resources. So, NATO's practice and ideas continue to influence the way CSDP operates.

5. Conclusion

Through this study, I have found that NATO influences CSDP to such an extent that CSDP cannot achieve its own agenda and wants to become independent, because even from a normative level, it is still influenced by NATO. I also understand that due to the institutional overlap and interaction mechanism between NATO and CSDP, the

NATO norms should not be a one-way communication process, so NATO norms should not only influence CSDP, but also vice versa.



REFERENCES



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

- Action, E. U. E. (n.d.). What we do. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/foreign-affairs_en
- Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: ethical power Europe? *International Affairs*, 84(1), 1-11.
- Bhathal, P. (2013). CSDP and NATO: Rethinking the Transatlantic Security Relationship. *Urceu*, 2013(1), 1-10. doi:10.5642/urceu.20132013.03
- Björkdahl, A. (2011). Normative and military power in EU peace support operations. In *Normative Power Europe* (pp. 103-126): Springer.
- Blair, T. (1999). *NATO, Europe, and our future security*. Paper presented at the speech at the NATO 50th Anniversary conference, Royal United Services Institute, London.
- Calleo, D. P. (2013). Europe and America in a new century. *Survival*, 55(5), 211-224.
- Checkel, J. T. (1999). Social construction and integration. *Journal of European public policy*, 6(4), 545-560.
- Cladi, L., & Locatelli, A. (2020). Keep calm and carry on (differently): NATO and CSDP after Brexit. *Global Policy*, 11(1), 5-14.
- Commission, E. (2016). Conditions for membership. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en
- Commission, E. (n.d.). Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/common-security-and-defence-policy_en
- Communications, S. (2016). Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy_en
- Cornish, P. (2004). NATO: the practice and politics of transformation. *International Affairs*, 80(1), 63-74.
- Csornai, Z. (2017). Evaluating the Effects of Brexit on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. *KKI Policy Brief del Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade*.
- CVCE. (2013). Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France. Retrieved from https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/1fb9f4b5-64e2-4337-bc78-db7e1978de09/publishable_en.pdf
- Demetriou, P., & Benney, T. (2016). NATO & CSDP: Can the EU afford to go solo? *Cogent Social Sciences*, 2(1). doi:10.1080/23311886.2016.1208376
- Dunn, D. H. (2001). Viewpoints - European Security and Defence Policy in the American Security Policy Debate: Counterbalancing America or Rebalancing


- NATO? *Defence Studies*, 1(1), 146-155. doi:10.1080/714000008
- Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. *International Organization*, 887-917.
- Gallagher, T. (2004). Balkan But Different: Romania and Bulgaria's Contrasting Paths to NATO Membership 1994–2002. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 20(4), 1-19.
- Gheciu, A. (2001). *NATO's History: The Politics of "Securing the West" Since 1949*. Ph. D. diss,
- Gheciu, A. (2005). *NATO in the "New Europe": The politics of international socialization after the Cold War*: Stanford University Press.
- Hall, P. A. (1989). *The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations*: Princeton University Press.
- Heisbourg, F. (2000). European defence takes a leap forward. *Nato Review*, 48(1), 8-11.
- Hellmann, G., & Wolf, R. (1993). Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the future of NATO. *Security Studies*, 3(1), 3-43.
- Hemmer, C., & Katzenstein, P. J. (2002). Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism. *International Organization*, 56(3), 575-607.
- Hendrickson, D. C. (2006). Of Power and Providence: The old US and the new EU. *Policy Review*(135), 23.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1982). Shifting involvements: private interest and public action.
- Howorth, J. (2000a). Britain, NATO and CESDP: fixed strategy, changing tactics. *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.*, 5, 377.
- Howorth, J. (2000b). *European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?* (Vol. 43): Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union.
- Howorth, J. (2007). Security and defence policy in the European Union. *New York*.
- Howorth, J. (2012). CSDP and NATO Post-Libya: Towards the Rubicon? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 35, July 2012.
- Howorth, J. (2017). EU–NATO cooperation: the key to Europe's security future. *European Security*, 26(3), 454-459. doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1352584
- Howorth, J. (2018). Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations? *Journal of European Integration*, 40(5), 523-537. doi:10.1080/07036337.2018.1512268
- Howorth, J., & Menon, A. (2009). Still not pushing back: Why the European Union is not balancing the United States. *Journal of conflict resolution*, 53(5), 727-744.
- Ikenberry, G. J., & Kupchan, C. A. (1990). Socialization and hegemonic power. *International Organization*, 283-315.
- Jackson, P. (2001). *Occidentalism: rhetoric, process, and postwar German reconstruction*. Columbia University,
- Kaplan, L. S., & Honick, M. (2007). *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Kashmeri, S. A. (2010). Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP. *Atlantic Council*.
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/ACUS_Kashmeri_SaveNATO_Nov2,10.
- Koops, J. A. (2017). Theorising inter-organisational relations: the “EU–NATO relationship” as a catalytic case study. *European Security*, 26(3), 315-339.
- Koppa, M. E. (2019). The relationship between CSDP and NATO after Brexit and the EU Global Strategy. *FEPS Studies*, April.
- Krasner, S. D. (1982). American policy and global economic stability. *America in a Changing World Political Economy*, 29-48.
- Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 235-258.
- Martill, B., & Sus, M. (2018). Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or ‘French connection’? *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 20(4), 846-863. doi:10.1177/1369148118796979
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International security*, 15(1), 5-56.
- Milzow, K. (2012). National interests and European integration. *Discourse and Politics of Blair, Chirac and Schröder*.
- Moe, T. M. (1990). Political institutions: The neglected side of the story. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 6, 213-253.
- NATO. (2019). The North Atlantic Treaty. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
- NATO. (n.d.). A short history of NATO. Retrieved from <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/organisation.htm>
- Odell, J. S. (2014). *U.S. International Monetary Policy : Markets, Power, and Ideas As Sources of Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ojanen, H. (2006). The EU and NATO: two competing models for a common defence policy. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(1), 57-76.
- Palm, T., & Crum, B. (2019). Military operations and the EU’s identity as an international security actor. *European Security*, 28(4), 513-534.
- Perry, W. J. (1995). The Enduring Dynamic Relationship That Is NATO. *Defense Viewpoint*, 10(9).
- Raik, K. (2012). EU and Mass Protests in the Neighbourhood: Models of Normative (In) action, *The Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.*, 17, 553.
- Reichard, M. (2013). *The EU-NATO relationship: a legal and political perspective*: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Reus-Smit, C. (1997). The constitutional structure of international society and the nature of fundamental institutions. *International Organization*, 51(4), 555-589.
- Robertson, D. (1991). NATO's Future Role: A European View. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 38(1), 164-175.
- Rosecrance, R. (1997). *The European Union: a new type of international actor*: European University Institute.

- Rühle, M. (2013). The future of the transatlantic security relationship. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 35(5), 283-287.
- Rutten, M. (2001). *From St-Malo to nice-European defence: core documents*: Institute for Security Studies, European Union.
- Salmon, T. C., & Shepherd, A. J. (2003). *Toward a European army: a military power in the making?* : Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sjursen, H. (2006). The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be? *Journal of European public policy*, 13(2), 235-251.
- Sloan, S. R. (1995). US Perspectives on NATO's Future. *International Affairs*, 71(2), 217-231.
- Smith, K. E. (2005). Beyond the civilian power EU debate. *Politique européenne*(3), 63-82.
- Truman, H. S. (1956). *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope*: Doubleday & Company.
- Van Ham, P. (2000). Europe's common defense policy: Implications for the trans-Atlantic relationship. *Security Dialogue*, 31(2), 215-228.
- Walt, S. M. (1990). *The origins of alliance*: Cornell University Press.
- Wheeler-Bennett, S. J. W., & Nicholls, A. J. (1972). *The semblance of peace: The political settlement after the Second World War*: Springer.
- Whitney, C. R. (1991). WAR IN THE GULF: EUROPE; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighti-ng-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html>
- Williams, P. (2005). *British foreign policy under New Labour, 1997-2005*: Springer.
- Woyke, W. (1993). The Foundation and History of NATO. *The Western Security Community*, edited by Norbert Wiggershans and Roland Foerster, Oxford: Berg.
- 叶江. (1999). 解读美欧: 欧洲一体化进程中的美欧关系: 上海三联出版社.

VITA

NAME	XIAOFEI YAN
DATE OF BIRTH	25 APRIL 1981
PLACE OF BIRTH	CHINA
INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED	MASTER OF ARTS, EUROPEAN STUDIES, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY
HOME ADDRESS	ROOM 289/1172, THE BASE, 289 SOI. ONNUT 1/1 SUKHUMVIT 77 ROAD, PRAKANONG NUA WATHANA BANGKOK 10260, THAILAND



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY